Dokument: Controlling weighted voting games by deleting or adding players with or without changing the quota
| Titel: | Controlling weighted voting games by deleting or adding players with or without changing the quota | |||||||
| URL für Lesezeichen: | https://docserv.uni-duesseldorf.de/servlets/DocumentServlet?id=68710 | |||||||
| URN (NBN): | urn:nbn:de:hbz:061-20250219-141216-4 | |||||||
| Kollektion: | Publikationen | |||||||
| Sprache: | Englisch | |||||||
| Dokumententyp: | Wissenschaftliche Texte » Artikel, Aufsatz | |||||||
| Medientyp: | Text | |||||||
| Autoren: | Kaczmarek, Joanna [Autor] Rothe, Jörg [Autor] | |||||||
| Dateien: |
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| Stichwörter: | Cooperative game theory, Weigthed voting game, Computational complexity | |||||||
| Beschreibung: | Weighted voting games are a well-studied class of succinct simple games that can be used to model collective decision-making in, e.g., legislative bodies such as parliaments and shareholder voting. Power indices [1,2,3,4] are used to measure the influence of players in weighted voting games. In such games, it has been studied how a distinguished player’s power can be changed, e.g., by merging or splitting players (the latter is a.k.a. false-name manipulation) [5, 6], by changing the quota [7], or via structural control by adding or deleting players [8]. We continue the work on the structural control initiated by Rey and Rothe [8] by solving some of their open problems. In addition, we also modify their model to a more realistic setting in which the quota is indirectly changed during the addition or deletion of players (in a different sense than that of Zuckerman et al. [7] who manipulate the quota directly without changing the set of players), and we study the corresponding problems in terms of their computational complexity. | |||||||
| Rechtliche Vermerke: | Originalveröffentlichung:
Kaczmarek, J., & Rothe, J. (2023). Controlling weighted voting games by deleting or adding players with or without changing the quota. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 92(3), 631–669. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-023-09874-x | |||||||
| Lizenz: |  Dieses Werk ist lizenziert unter einer Creative Commons Namensnennung 4.0 International Lizenz | |||||||
| Fachbereich / Einrichtung: | Mathematisch- Naturwissenschaftliche Fakultät | |||||||
| Dokument erstellt am: | 19.02.2025 | |||||||
| Dateien geändert am: | 19.02.2025 |
