Dokument: Induction With and Without Natural Properties: a New Approach to the New Riddle of Induction

Titel:Induction With and Without Natural Properties: a New Approach to the New Riddle of Induction
URL für Lesezeichen:https://docserv.uni-duesseldorf.de/servlets/DocumentServlet?id=67861
URN (NBN):urn:nbn:de:hbz:061-20241204-100444-4
Kollektion:Publikationen
Sprache:Englisch
Dokumententyp:Wissenschaftliche Texte » Artikel, Aufsatz
Medientyp:Text
Autoren: Thorn, Paul D. [Autor]
Schurz, Gerhard [Autor]
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Dateien vom 04.12.2024 / geändert 04.12.2024
Stichwörter:Natural properties, New riddle of induction, Nelson Goodman, Problem of induction, Projectability
Beschreibung:Drawing on past work, we introduce a new approach to the New Riddle of Induction, showing that the inductive projection of gruesome properties is unreliable under particular ideal conditions that are sufficient for the reliable inductive projection of non-gruesome properties. As an auxiliary to our account, we introduce rules for resolving conflicts between background information and the conclusions of otherwise reliable inductive inferences. Our approach to the New Riddle of Induction is quite permissive in the range of properties it recognizes as suitable for inductive projection, allowing for the inductive projection of highly gerrymandered non-natural properties. However, as an addendum to our discussion of the New Riddle, we show that natural properties do form a more reliable basis for inductive projection in cases where one’s sample is small.
Rechtliche Vermerke:Originalveröffentlichung:
Thorn, P. D., & Schurz, G. (2024). Induction With and Without Natural Properties: a New Approach to the New Riddle of Induction. Philosophia, 52(4), 935–958. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00768-8
Lizenz:Creative Commons Lizenzvertrag
Dieses Werk ist lizenziert unter einer Creative Commons Namensnennung 4.0 International Lizenz
Fachbereich / Einrichtung:Philosophische Fakultät » Philosophisches Institut
Dokument erstellt am:04.12.2024
Dateien geändert am:04.12.2024
english
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