Dokument: Why do we punish? A multinomial analysis of the mechanisms underlying moral punishment
| Titel: | Why do we punish? A multinomial analysis of the mechanisms underlying moral punishment | |||||||
| URL für Lesezeichen: | https://docserv.uni-duesseldorf.de/servlets/DocumentServlet?id=67588 | |||||||
| URN (NBN): | urn:nbn:de:hbz:061-20241209-085809-5 | |||||||
| Kollektion: | Dissertationen | |||||||
| Sprache: | Englisch | |||||||
| Dokumententyp: | Wissenschaftliche Abschlussarbeiten » Dissertation | |||||||
| Medientyp: | Text | |||||||
| Autor: | Philippsen, Ana Isabel [Autor] | |||||||
| Dateien: |
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| Beitragende: | Prof. Dr. Bell, Raoul [Gutachter] Prof. Dr. Buchner, Axel [Gutachter] | |||||||
| Dewey Dezimal-Klassifikation: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie » 150 Psychologie | |||||||
| Beschreibung: | The human species is unique in their capacity for large-scale cooperation. What is particularly remarkable is the extent to which cooperators are willing to sacrifice own resources to punish others for non-cooperation, referred to as moral punishment. While this behavior can be easily explained when interacting with partners repeatedly, it is more challenging to explain why people consistently engage in costly moral punishment even in one-shot interactions where they cannot benefit from forcing others to cooperate. In light of the ubiquity of this behavior as well as the crucial role of such moral punishment in sustaining cooperation, understanding what motivates people to morally punish in one-shot interactions is an important but yet unanswered question. In the present dissertation, this gap in research was addressed in seven experiments using a simultaneous one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game. The established multinomial cooperation-and-punishment model was used to obtain an adequate estimate of the probability of moral punishment and to thereby test different mechanisms proposed to underlie the inclination to morally punish, namely emotion communication, conformity and deliberation. The findings revealed that a) communicating one’s emotions after an interaction could partly substitute costly moral punishment, indicating that moral punishment to some extent serves to communicate an emotional evaluation to the partner; b) people do not punish to enforce conformity but, instead, primarily punish defection; and c) moral punishment occurs deliberately rather than intuitively, in line with the hypothesis that deliberating fairness helps overcome selfish, profit-oriented impulses. In sum, while the experiments shed light on different mechanisms underlying moral punishment, they jointly reveal a remarkably robust preference to morally punish defection across a variety of contexts. | |||||||
| Lizenz: |  Dieses Werk ist lizenziert unter einer Creative Commons Namensnennung 4.0 International Lizenz | |||||||
| Fachbereich / Einrichtung: | Mathematisch- Naturwissenschaftliche Fakultät » WE Psychologie » Allgemeine Psychologie und Arbeitspsychologie | |||||||
| Dokument erstellt am: | 09.12.2024 | |||||||
| Dateien geändert am: | 09.12.2024 | |||||||
| Promotionsantrag am: | 01.10.0024 | |||||||
| Datum der Promotion: | 13.11.0024 |
