Dokument: Three Essays on Equilibrium Selection with Coupled Populations
| Titel: | Three Essays on Equilibrium Selection with Coupled Populations | |||||||
| URL für Lesezeichen: | https://docserv.uni-duesseldorf.de/servlets/DocumentServlet?id=40669 | |||||||
| URN (NBN): | urn:nbn:de:hbz:061-20161212-111957-0 | |||||||
| Kollektion: | Dissertationen | |||||||
| Sprache: | Englisch | |||||||
| Dokumententyp: | Wissenschaftliche Abschlussarbeiten » Dissertation | |||||||
| Medientyp: | Text | |||||||
| Autor: | Dr. Martínez Martínez, Ismael [Autor] | |||||||
| Dateien: |
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| Beitragende: | Prof. Dr. Hans-Theo Normann [Gutachter] Prof. Dr. Rasch, Alexander [Gutachter] | |||||||
| Dewey Dezimal-Klassifikation: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie » 330 Wirtschaft | |||||||
| Beschreibung: | Predictions of evolutionary game theory with regard to equilibrium selection generally depend on whether players interact within a single population or between two (or more) different populations. Standard one- and two-population models are the limit cases of a uniparametric family that combines intra- and intergroup interactions. This dissertation studies a setup that interpolates between both extremes with a coupling parameter κ. We analyze the bifurcation in the replicator dynamics of the coupled model applied to the hawk-dove game in Chapter 1. We identify three regions for equilibrium selection, one of which does not appear in basic one- and two-population models. We also design and conduct an innovative experiment in continuous time that widely confirms the theoretical predictions. Among some subtleties in the behavior of the system for intermediate values of κ, we observe a systematic bias in the share of hawk play in the mixed regime, and an upward shift in the critical value of κ for which polarizing behavior begins.
We account for these effects by extending the model to consider perturbed best response dynamics in Chapter 2. Finally, Chapter 3 proposes a generalization of the original model to situations where the intra- and intergroup interactions can be any pair of different games defined by 2 × 2 payoff matrices. Replicator dynamics predicts a maximum of twenty-one possible scenarios for equilibrium selection. Motivated by the findings in Chapter 2, we introduce a model of perturbed best response dynamics which reduces these cases to only four behavioral families. This exhaustive analysis of the more general model with coupled populations paves the way for a further experimental agenda based on the predictions of Chapter 3 and the experiment in continuous time designed for Chapter 1. | |||||||
| Lizenz: |  Urheberrechtsschutz | |||||||
| Fachbereich / Einrichtung: | Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät | |||||||
| Dokument erstellt am: | 12.12.2016 | |||||||
| Dateien geändert am: | 12.12.2016 | |||||||
| Promotionsantrag am: | 29.09.2016 | |||||||
| Datum der Promotion: | 30.11.2016 |
