Dokument: Closing information gaps in DMA enforcement—expectations, incentives, and the role of anonymity for whistleblowers

Titel:Closing information gaps in DMA enforcement—expectations, incentives, and the role of anonymity for whistleblowers
URL für Lesezeichen:https://docserv.uni-duesseldorf.de/servlets/DocumentServlet?id=72133
URN (NBN):urn:nbn:de:hbz:061-20260203-114420-6
Kollektion:Publikationen
Sprache:Englisch
Dokumententyp:Wissenschaftliche Texte » Artikel, Aufsatz
Medientyp:Text
Autoren: Hinck, Sarah [Autor]
van den Boom, Jasper [Autor]
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Dateien vom 03.02.2026 / geändert 03.02.2026
Stichwörter:third-party rights , gatekeepers , Whistleblowers , Digital Markets Act , business users
Beschreibung:The introduction of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) Whistleblower Tool marks an important step in encouraging informants to report DMA breaches by gatekeepers, while navigating the complexities of anonymity and protection for informants. This article aims to answer the question of how the implementation of the DMA Whistleblower Tool impacts potential whistleblowers and their incentives to come forward. To this extent, we examine varying levels of anonymity (full, partial, non-anonymous) and their respective advantages and disadvantages for whistleblowers, highlighting the necessity for regulators to secure protections against retaliation without compromising administrative efficiency or due process. Despite the DMA’s intention to apply the protections of the Whistleblower Directive (WBD), practical implementation has lagged, creating several challenges. The DMA’s reliance on the WBD faces obstacles due to the decentralized nature of the WBD, the DMA’s centralized reporting system, the differing focus of internal versus external reporting channels, and the mismatch between the WBD’s focus on insiders and the DMA’s broader range of potential informants, such as business users and competitors. These issues point to the need for enhanced procedural clarity, better utilization of national competition authorities, improved alignment between the DMA and the WBD, and the formation of DMA interest groups to advocate for business users.
Rechtliche Vermerke:Originalveröffentlichung:
Hinck, S., & van den Boom, J. (2025). Closing information gaps in DMA enforcement—expectations, incentives, and the role of anonymity for whistleblowers. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 2025(00), Article jnaf017. https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnaf017
Lizenz:Creative Commons Lizenzvertrag
Dieses Werk ist lizenziert unter einer Creative Commons Namensnennung 4.0 International Lizenz
Fachbereich / Einrichtung:Juristische Fakultät
Dokument erstellt am:03.02.2026
Dateien geändert am:03.02.2026
english
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