Dokument: The Nurturing Stance, Moral Responsibility, and the (Implicit) Bias Blind Spot

Titel:The Nurturing Stance, Moral Responsibility, and the (Implicit) Bias Blind Spot
URL für Lesezeichen:https://docserv.uni-duesseldorf.de/servlets/DocumentServlet?id=71466
URN (NBN):urn:nbn:de:hbz:061-20251121-115249-1
Kollektion:Publikationen
Sprache:Englisch
Dokumententyp:Wissenschaftliche Texte » Artikel, Aufsatz
Medientyp:Text
Autor: Baston, René [Autor]
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Dateien vom 21.11.2025 / geändert 21.11.2025
Stichwörter:implicit bias , accountability , forward-looking responsibility , discrimination , self-image , self-control , abilities
Beschreibung:Can we hold agents responsible for their implicitly biased behavior? The aim of this text is to show that, from the nurturing stance, holding subjects responsible for their implicitly biased behavior is justified, even though they are not blameworthy. First, I will introduce the nurturing stance as Daphne Brandenburg originally developed it. Second, I will specify what holding somebody responsible from the nurturing stance amounts to. Third, I show how and why holding responsible can help a subject develop an impaired capacity. Fourth, I analyze empirical data about holding prejudiced subjects responsible and highlight that the internal motivation to control prejudiced reactions decreases implicit attitudes’ influences. Furthermore, the data show that in order to be appropriate moral demands have to acknowledge the target's autonomy and competence. In sum, from the nurturing stance, holding implicitly biased subjects responsible is appropriate if they can adequately respond to the moral demands.
Rechtliche Vermerke:Originalveröffentlichung:
Baston, R. (2022). The Nurturing Stance, Moral Responsibility, and the (Implicit) Bias Blind Spot. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 9(1), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2021.45
Lizenz:Creative Commons Lizenzvertrag
Dieses Werk ist lizenziert unter einer Creative Commons Namensnennung 4.0 International Lizenz
Fachbereich / Einrichtung:Philosophische Fakultät
Dokument erstellt am:21.11.2025
Dateien geändert am:21.11.2025
english
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