Dokument: How to tamper with a Parliament: Strategic campaigns in apportionment elections
| Titel: | How to tamper with a Parliament: Strategic campaigns in apportionment elections | |||||||
| URL für Lesezeichen: | https://docserv.uni-duesseldorf.de/servlets/DocumentServlet?id=70788 | |||||||
| URN (NBN): | urn:nbn:de:hbz:061-20250917-122018-4 | |||||||
| Kollektion: | Publikationen | |||||||
| Sprache: | Englisch | |||||||
| Dokumententyp: | Wissenschaftliche Texte » Artikel, Aufsatz | |||||||
| Medientyp: | Text | |||||||
| Autoren: | Bredereck, Robert [Autor] Faliszewski, Piotr [Autor] Furdyna, Michal [Autor] Kaczmarczyk, Andrzej [Autor] Kaczmarek, Joanna [Autor] Lackner, Martin [Autor] Laußmann, Christian [Autor] Rothe, Jörg [Autor] Seeger, Tessa [Autor] | |||||||
| Dateien: |
| |||||||
| Stichwörter: | Bribery attack , Apportionment method , Computational complexity | |||||||
| Beschreibung: | In parliamentary elections, parties compete for a limited, typically fixed number of seats. Most parliaments are assembled using apportionment methods that distribute the seats based on the parties' vote counts. Common apportionment methods include divisor sequence methods (like D'Hondt or Sainte-Laguë), the largest-remainder method, and first-past-the-post. In many countries, an electoral threshold is implemented to prevent very small parties from entering the parliament. Further, several countries have apportionment systems that incorporate multiple districts. We study how computationally hard it is to change the election outcome (i.e., to increase or limit the influence of a distinguished party) by convincing a limited number of voters to change their vote. We refer to these bribery-style attacks as strategic campaigns and study the corresponding problems in terms of their computational (both classical and parameterized) complexity. We also run extensive experiments on real-world election data and study the effectiveness of optimal campaigns, in particular as opposed to using heuristic bribing strategies and with respect to the influence of the threshold and the influence of the number of districts. For apportionment elections with threshold, finally, we propose—as an alternative to the standard top-choice mode—the second-chance mode where voters of parties below the threshold receive a second chance to vote for another party, and we establish computational complexity results also in this setting. | |||||||
| Rechtliche Vermerke: | Originalveröffentlichung:
Bredereck, R., Faliszewski, P., Furdyna, M., Kaczmarczyk, A., Kaczmarek, J., Lackner, M., Laußmann, C., Rothe, J., & Seeger, T. L. (2025). How to tamper with a Parliament: Strategic campaigns in apportionment elections. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 155, Article 103700. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcss.2025.103700 | |||||||
| Lizenz: |  Dieses Werk ist lizenziert unter einer Creative Commons Namensnennung 4.0 International Lizenz | |||||||
| Fachbereich / Einrichtung: | Mathematisch- Naturwissenschaftliche Fakultät | |||||||
| Dokument erstellt am: | 17.09.2025 | |||||||
| Dateien geändert am: | 17.09.2025 |
