Dokument: Cost-sharing or rebate: The impact of health insurance design on reducing inefficient care

Titel:	Cost-sharing or rebate: The impact of health insurance design on reducing inefficient care
URL für Lesezeichen:	https://docserv.uni-duesseldorf.de/servlets/DocumentServlet?id=68674
URN (NBN):	urn:nbn:de:hbz:061-20250217-115944-7
Kollektion:	Publikationen
Sprache:	Englisch
Dokumententyp:	Wissenschaftliche Texte » Artikel, Aufsatz
Medientyp:	Text
Autoren:	Kairies-Schwarz, Nadja [Autor] Rieger-Fels, Markus [Autor] Waibel, Christian [Autor]
Dateien:	[Dateien anzeigen] Adobe PDF [Details] 649,2 KB in einer Datei [ZIP-Datei erzeugen] Dateien vom 17.02.2025 / geändert 17.02.2025
Stichwörter:	rebates, relative thinking, framing, cost-sharing, loss aversion
Beschreibung:	This paper investigates how the design of health insurance plans influences individuals' treatment decisions. We derive several hypotheses how the framing of incentives in a plan affects behavior and test these hypotheses in a laboratory experiment. Our results show that rebates are more effective in containing costs, as individuals request significantly less inefficient low-value care under rebates than under cost-sharing. We elicit individuals' degree of loss aversion but find no evidence that loss aversion influences utilization rates. Instead, our results suggest that relative thinking and the difficulty of understanding the dynamic incentive structure drive the design effect.
Rechtliche Vermerke:	Originalveröffentlichung: Kairies-Schwarz, N., Rieger-Fels, M., & Waibel, C. (2023). Cost-sharing or rebate: The impact of health insurance design on reducing inefficient care [OnlineRessource]. Frontiers in Behavioral Economics, 2, Article 1043188. https://doi.org/10.3389/frbhe.2023.1043188
Lizenz:	Dieses Werk ist lizenziert unter einer Creative Commons Namensnennung 4.0 International Lizenz
Fachbereich / Einrichtung:	Medizinische Fakultät
Dokument erstellt am:	17.02.2025
Dateien geändert am:	17.02.2025