Dokument: Downstream Profit Effects of Horizontal Mergers: Horn & Wolinsky and von Ungern-Sternberg Revisited

Titel:Downstream Profit Effects of Horizontal Mergers: Horn & Wolinsky and von Ungern-Sternberg Revisited
URL für Lesezeichen:https://docserv.uni-duesseldorf.de/servlets/DocumentServlet?id=68668
URN (NBN):urn:nbn:de:hbz:061-20250217-095636-6
Kollektion:Publikationen
Sprache:Englisch
Dokumententyp:Wissenschaftliche Texte » Artikel, Aufsatz
Medientyp:Text
Autor: Schmal, Wolfgang Benedikt [Autor]
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Dateien vom 17.02.2025 / geändert 17.02.2025
Stichwörter:linear demand, bargaining power, big tech, vertical restraints, horizontal mergers, merger control
Beschreibung:Mergers between previously contending firms are a permanent challenge for policymaking as they potentially harm competition. The core incentive to merge is the prospect of higher joint profits of the previously independent firms after the merger. We discuss and compare the core assumptions of Horn and Wolinsky (1988) and von Ungern-Sternberg (1996) that lead to contrary results regarding the attractiveness of horizontal mergers of downstream firms in a 1:2 setting leading to a monopolized 1:1 setting. While the latter finds a merger beneficial for the downstream firms, it harms their joint profit, according to Horn & Wolinsky. We theoretically apply both models to the two settings. We also present extensive sample calculations that quantitatively confirm the two papers’ core insights. Discussing and contextualizing the results, we provide a comprehensive overview of horizontal mergers in the downstream part of vertical structures with bargaining over linear input prices. Due to continuing relevance of horizontal mergers for competition policy and, in particular, in light of the consolidation phase in tech start-ups, the topic is of enduring relevance in policymaking.
Rechtliche Vermerke:Originalveröffentlichung:
Schmal, W. B. (2023). Downstream Profit Effects of Horizontal Mergers: Horn & Wolinsky and von Ungern-Sternberg Revisited. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 23(4), 981–1000. https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2023-0177
Lizenz:Creative Commons Lizenzvertrag
Dieses Werk ist lizenziert unter einer Creative Commons Namensnennung 4.0 International Lizenz
Fachbereich / Einrichtung:Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
Dokument erstellt am:17.02.2025
Dateien geändert am:17.02.2025
english
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