Dokument: Alcohol Prohibition and Pricing at the Pump*
| Titel: | Alcohol Prohibition and Pricing at the Pump* | |||||||
| URL für Lesezeichen: | https://docserv.uni-duesseldorf.de/servlets/DocumentServlet?id=68636 | |||||||
| URN (NBN): | urn:nbn:de:hbz:061-20250214-102654-6 | |||||||
| Kollektion: | Publikationen | |||||||
| Sprache: | Englisch | |||||||
| Dokumententyp: | Wissenschaftliche Texte » Artikel, Aufsatz | |||||||
| Medientyp: | Text | |||||||
| Autor: | Fischer, Kai [Autor] | |||||||
| Dateien: |
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| Beschreibung: | Firms often sell a transparent base product and a valuable add-on. If only some consumers are aware of the latter, the add-on’s effect on the base product’s price will be ambiguous. Cross-subsidization between products to bait uninformed consumers might lower, intrinsic utility from the add-on for informed consumers might raise the price. We study this trade-off in the gasoline market by exploiting an alcohol sales prohibition at stations as an exogenous shifter of add-on availability.
Gasoline margins drop by 5% during the prohibition. The effect is mediated by shop variety and competition. Using traffic data, we unveil sizeable consumer-side reactions. | |||||||
| Rechtliche Vermerke: | Originalveröffentlichung:
Fischer, K. (2023). Alcohol Prohibition and Pricing at the Pump*. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 72(1), 548–597. https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12366 | |||||||
| Lizenz: |  Dieses Werk ist lizenziert unter einer Creative Commons Namensnennung 4.0 International Lizenz | |||||||
| Fachbereich / Einrichtung: | Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät | |||||||
| Dokument erstellt am: | 14.02.2025 | |||||||
| Dateien geändert am: | 14.02.2025 |
