Dokument: Ecological Empiricism

Titel:Ecological Empiricism
URL für Lesezeichen:https://docserv.uni-duesseldorf.de/servlets/DocumentServlet?id=67824
URN (NBN):urn:nbn:de:hbz:061-20241202-120222-2
Kollektion:Publikationen
Sprache:Englisch
Dokumententyp:Wissenschaftliche Texte » Artikel, Aufsatz
Medientyp:Text
Autor: Vosgerau, Gottfried [Autor]
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Dateien vom 02.12.2024 / geändert 02.12.2024
Stichwörter:Affordances, Grounded Cognition, Measurement, Naturalness, Concepts
Beschreibung:Both metaphysics and cognitive science raise the question of what natural concepts or properties are. A link between the two is notoriously hard to establish. I propose to take natural concepts or properties to be those that are revealed in interaction. The concept of affordances is refined and naturalized to spell out how interacting with objects grounds concepts. I will call this account “Ecological Empiricism”. I argue that the notion of naturalness within this framework turns out to be a gradable – there are more or less natural properties – and dependent on the perspective taken – metaphysically natural properties are different from cognitive natural properties. From a metaphysical point of view, perfect correlations between actions and sensory input are relevant, which are best approximated by scientific measurement. For cognition, simple or basic actions are relevant. Although metaphysical and cognitive naturalness does not coincide according to Ecological Empiricism, it presents a common framework with a uniform conception of naturalness.
Rechtliche Vermerke:Originalveröffentlichung:
Vosgerau, G. (2024). Ecological Empiricism. Philosophia, 52(4), 959–978. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00740-6
Lizenz:Creative Commons Lizenzvertrag
Dieses Werk ist lizenziert unter einer Creative Commons Namensnennung 4.0 International Lizenz
Fachbereich / Einrichtung:Philosophische Fakultät
Dokument erstellt am:02.12.2024
Dateien geändert am:02.12.2024
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