Dokument: Conceptual Spaces: A Solution to Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction?

Titel:Conceptual Spaces: A Solution to Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction?
URL für Lesezeichen:https://docserv.uni-duesseldorf.de/servlets/DocumentServlet?id=67823
URN (NBN):urn:nbn:de:hbz:061-20241202-115320-7
Kollektion:Publikationen
Sprache:Englisch
Dokumententyp:Wissenschaftliche Texte » Artikel, Aufsatz
Medientyp:Text
Autor: Scholz, Sebastian [Autor]
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Dateien vom 02.12.2024 / geändert 02.12.2024
Stichwörter:Concepts, Reasoning, Naturalness, Induction, Scientific realism
Beschreibung:Nelson Goodman observed that we use only certain ‘good’ (viz. projectible) predicates during reasoning, with no obvious demarcation criterion in sight to distinguish them from the bad and gruesome ones. This apparent arbitrariness undermines the justifiability of our reasoning practices. Inspired by Quine’s 1969 paper on Natural Kinds, Peter Gärdenfors proposes a cognitive criterion based on his theory of Conceptual Spaces (CS). He argues the good predicates are those referring to natural concepts, and that we can capture naturalness in terms of similarity. In contrast to Quine, he does not primarily rely on logic, but geometry. He frames his account as a descriptive project, however, and it is not obvious how it addresses the normative dimension of Goodman’s Riddle. This paper develops a charitable reconstruction of his argument, based on the idea that the instrumental success of our projectible concepts is grounded in their cognitive-pragmatic naturalness. It then explores three lines of reasoning against the argument: Evolutionarily motivated skepticism, the miracles argument, and the relation between instrumental and pragmatic success. I conclude that in its current form, the CS account fails to provide any justification of reasoning beyond appealing to its instrumental success, and that a metaphysically robust notion of naturalness helps to achieve the desired goal.
Rechtliche Vermerke:Originalveröffentlichung:
Scholz, S. (2024). Conceptual Spaces: A Solution to Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction? Philosophia, 52(4), 915–934. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00744-2
Lizenz:Creative Commons Lizenzvertrag
Dieses Werk ist lizenziert unter einer Creative Commons Namensnennung 4.0 International Lizenz
Fachbereich / Einrichtung:Philosophische Fakultät
Dokument erstellt am:02.12.2024
Dateien geändert am:02.12.2024
english
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