Dokument: Three Essays on Competition Economics
| Titel: | Three Essays on Competition Economics | |||||||
| URL für Lesezeichen: | https://docserv.uni-duesseldorf.de/servlets/DocumentServlet?id=54709 | |||||||
| URN (NBN): | urn:nbn:de:hbz:061-20201110-104116-7 | |||||||
| Kollektion: | Dissertationen | |||||||
| Sprache: | Englisch | |||||||
| Dokumententyp: | Wissenschaftliche Abschlussarbeiten » Dissertation | |||||||
| Medientyp: | Text | |||||||
| Autor: | Schad, Jannika [Autor] | |||||||
| Dateien: |
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| Beitragende: | Prof. Dr. Haucap, Justus [Gutachter] Prof. Dr. Normann, Hans-Theo [Gutachter] | |||||||
| Dewey Dezimal-Klassifikation: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie » 330 Wirtschaft | |||||||
| Beschreibung: | Chapter 1 on “The Effects of Private Damage Claims on Cartel Stability: Experimental Evidence” is joint work with Olivia Bodnar, Melinda Fremerey and Hans-Theo Normann. Private damage claims against cartels may have negative effects on leniency: whereas whistleblowers obtain full immunity regarding the public cartel fines, they have no or only restricted protection against private third-party damage claims. This may stabilize cartels. We run an experiment to study this issue. Firms choose whether to join a cartel, may apply for leniency afterwards, and then potentially face private damages. We find that the implementation of private damage claims decreases cartel formation but makes cartels indeed more stable, largely due to fewer leniency reports. The overall impact of private damage claims is positive: cartel prevalence declines.
Chapter 2 on “Single Monopoly Profits, Vertical Mergers, and Downstream Entry Deterrence” is joint work with Matthias Hunold. We review the Chicago school's single monopoly profits theory whereby an upstream monopolist, which can use contracts to extract all monopoly profits from the downstream firms, cannot generate additional profits through vertical integration. For this, we employ a model where the upstream firm uses two-part tariffs. We show that the incumbents can profitably use vertical integration to commit to a more aggressive pricing for the case that a downstream entrant refuses the supply contract. This can deter welfare-enhancing entry in cases where the monopoly supplier faces the threat of less efficient alternatives, such as in-house production or a competitive fringe. The anti-competitive effects arise from the seemingly pro-competitive elimination of double marginalization. Chapter 3 on “The Causal Effect of Product Reviews on Prices. Evidence from Amazon.com” is a single-authored essay. Product reviews and ratings are frequently used by online shoppers to obtain information and have a substantial influence on purchase decisions. Their importance is also reflected in the recent debates and first policy measures regarding fake reviews. I study the causal effect of product reviews on the prices at Amazon.com. An instrumental variables approach solves the problem of simultaneity of prices and ratings. In particular, I instrument a given product rating by a reviewer’s tendency to rate products in general. My estimations show that marketplace sellers on Amazon.com reflect reviews in their prices. I find that an increase in the aggregated star rating by one star increases the product’s price, on average, by up to 6.5 percentage points. In contrast, there is no robust effect that indicates an increase in prices of Amazon offers in response to an improvement in the aggregated star rating. | |||||||
| Lizenz: |  Urheberrechtsschutz | |||||||
| Fachbereich / Einrichtung: | Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät » Volkswirtschaftslehre | |||||||
| Dokument erstellt am: | 10.11.2020 | |||||||
| Dateien geändert am: | 10.11.2020 | |||||||
| Promotionsantrag am: | 14.08.2020 | |||||||
| Datum der Promotion: | 30.09.2020 |
