Dokument: Essays on Competition in Digital Economics
| Titel: | Essays on Competition in Digital Economics | |||||||
| URL für Lesezeichen: | https://docserv.uni-duesseldorf.de/servlets/DocumentServlet?id=54621 | |||||||
| URN (NBN): | urn:nbn:de:hbz:061-20201030-102237-4 | |||||||
| Kollektion: | Dissertationen | |||||||
| Sprache: | Englisch | |||||||
| Dokumententyp: | Wissenschaftliche Abschlussarbeiten » Dissertation | |||||||
| Medientyp: | Text | |||||||
| Autor: | Fourberg, Niklas Michael [Autor] | |||||||
| Dateien: |
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| Beitragende: | Prof. Dr. Normann, Hans-Theo [Gutachter] Prof. Dr. Haucap, Justus [Gutachter] | |||||||
| Dewey Dezimal-Klassifikation: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie » 330 Wirtschaft | |||||||
| Beschreibung: | In the last two decades no other technology has shaped the way people interact and firms compete more than the internet. This development poses multiple challenges for governments and public authorities. These encompass providing a potent network infrastructure which is capable of satisfying present and future data demands. Further, counteracting economic inefficiencies that may arise from new products or business models. And, lastly, ensuring that all stakeholders, especially consumers, benefit from the advancement of new services and will not be subject to anticompetitive behavior that might be borne by the dynamics of new digital markets. Chapter 1 therefore examines structural drivers of fiber deployment and the effectiveness of policy interventions such as subsidies and a technologically selective regulation. To do so, a natural experiment in the German telecommunications market from 2013 to 2017 is exploited to evaluate a technologically restrictive deployment regulation. However, the data does not provide a significant effect of a technologically restrictive deployment environment but suggests that subsidies are highly effective. An additional funding of 100,000 Euro corresponds to a 3 to 4 percentage point higher likelihood of fiber deployment. Chapter 2 builds upon these findings and theoretically examines a monopolist’s two dimensional optimization problem with respect to an access price and chosen customization degree of a horizontally differentiated product. In doing so, we allow for consumers' preferences to be reflected by a general log-concave density function and that the offered product is represented by an interval within the horizontal characteristics space. This setting is better suited to fit real scenarios of population density and the deployment extent of a communication network, among others. In this setting we show that monopolistic inefficiencies arise also in the degree of customization. The increased complexity of products in digital services often gives rise to consumer switching costs whose competitive effects on prices and markets are not fully understood. Chapter 3 aims at filling this research gap and experimentally analyses price setting behavior, the degree of tacit collusion and explicit collusion incentives on switching costs markets. The analysis provides evidence that switching costs lead to a more intense competition, lesser degree of tacit collusion and a consequential increase in the incentives to collude explicitly. | |||||||
| Lizenz: |  Urheberrechtsschutz | |||||||
| Fachbereich / Einrichtung: | Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät » Volkswirtschaftslehre | |||||||
| Dokument erstellt am: | 30.10.2020 | |||||||
| Dateien geändert am: | 30.10.2020 | |||||||
| Promotionsantrag am: | 08.08.2018 | |||||||
| Datum der Promotion: | 03.09.2020 |
