Dokument: Collusion and Competition in Oligopolistic Markets

Titel:	Collusion and Competition in Oligopolistic Markets
URL für Lesezeichen:	https://docserv.uni-duesseldorf.de/servlets/DocumentServlet?id=54381
URN (NBN):	urn:nbn:de:hbz:061-20201008-114610-5
Kollektion:	Dissertationen
Sprache:	Englisch
Dokumententyp:	Wissenschaftliche Abschlussarbeiten » Dissertation
Medientyp:	Text
Autor:	Odenkirchen, Johannes Josef [Autor]
Dateien:	[Dateien anzeigen] Adobe PDF [Details] 3,01 MB in einer Datei [ZIP-Datei erzeugen] Dateien vom 05.10.2020 / geändert 05.10.2020
Beitragende:	Prof. Dr. Normann, Hans-Theo [Gutachter] Prof. Dr. Haucap, Justus [Gutachter]
Stichwörter:	Collusion, Competition, partial cross-ownership, partial cartels, population uncertainty
Dewey Dezimal-Klassifikation:	300 Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie » 330 Wirtschaft
Beschreibung:	In Chapter 2 titled ``Pricing Behavior in Partial Cartels'', I analyze in experiments the pricing behavior of firms, when only a subset of firms in the market can communicate. Therefore, I use a repeated, asymmetric capacity-constraint price game. The data reveal that partial cartels form in this situation, and that in line with theory, a partial cartel is sufficient to increase market prices for all firms. Moreover, I find that prices of cartel insiders and outsiders are not on the same level, which contradicts common theoretical predictions. This is because communication allows cartel members to overcome a potential coordination problem and enables an outcome in (joint) mixed strategies. The results therefore underline the difference between tacit and explicit collusion and the resulting market outcomes. Chapter 3, ``An Experiment on Partial Cross-Ownership in Oligopolistic Markets'', is joint work with Volker Benndorf. We experimentally study both unilateral and coordinated anti-competitive effects of passive minority shareholdings between horizontally competing firms. Firms have symmetric, non-controlling shares of each other in a static and a dynamic Bertrand setting. We provide novel theoretical predictions about the impact of minority shareholdings on prices based on the concept of Quantal Response Equilibrium. Contrary to previous Nash predictions, we explain that passive partial cross-ownership reduces the incentives to compete and favors unilateral effects that result in higher average prices. Theory further predicts coordinated effects to arise as the discount factor decreases with the degree of cross-ownership. We test these hypotheses in a laboratory experiment. Our results show that a lower discount factor based on partial cross-ownership actually materializes in more tacit collusion. This only further softens competition but is not necessary for higher prices. Even without coordinated effects we see an increase in price levels with the degree of partial cross-ownership due to the existence of unilateral effects. We find negative repercussions of passive minority shareholdings for consumers by means of both effects. The results are highly relevant for the current policy discussion on supranational level regarding the regulation of passive minority shareholdings, e.g., in the European Union or the United States. Chapter 4, ``Cournot Competition with an Unknown Number of Players: Experimental Evidence'', is joint work with Claudia Möllers and Hans-Theo Normann. We examine repeated Cournot oligopolies, when there is uncertainty about the number of players. We argue that this kind of uncertainty may lead to a novel strategy. A sophisticated player produces more than the static Nash equilibrium output, attempting to fool other players into believing there are more players than there actually are. In this case, total output increases but quantities are distributed asymmetrically. We use a laboratory experiment to investigate behavior in this setting. The data largely confirms the existence of such sophisticated play. Whereas a first supergame is predominantly characterized by Nash play, a second (and final) supergame shows distinct signs of increased and more asymmetric outputs. Using a k-means cluster analysis, we identify groups particularly characterized by sophisticated play and separate them from groups that play Nash or collude tacitly. The results suggest that uncertainty might lead to an outcome that resembles a more competitive market.
Lizenz:	Urheberrechtsschutz
Fachbereich / Einrichtung:	Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät » Volkswirtschaftslehre
Dokument erstellt am:	08.10.2020
Dateien geändert am:	08.10.2020
Promotionsantrag am:	12.05.2020
Datum der Promotion:	30.09.2020