Dokument: Competition in concentrated markets: Three Essays on Experimental Industrial Organization
| Titel: | Competition in concentrated markets: Three Essays on Experimental Industrial Organization | |||||||
| URL für Lesezeichen: | https://docserv.uni-duesseldorf.de/servlets/DocumentServlet?id=41383 | |||||||
| URN (NBN): | urn:nbn:de:hbz:061-20170307-112347-5 | |||||||
| Kollektion: | Dissertationen | |||||||
| Sprache: | Englisch | |||||||
| Dokumententyp: | Wissenschaftliche Abschlussarbeiten » Dissertation | |||||||
| Medientyp: | Text | |||||||
| Autor: | Möllers, Claudia [Autor] | |||||||
| Dateien: |
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| Beitragende: | Prof. Dr. Hans-Theo Normann [Gutachter] Prof. Dr. Rasch, Alexander [Gutachter] | |||||||
| Dewey Dezimal-Klassifikation: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie » 330 Wirtschaft | |||||||
| Beschreibung: | First, we consider an upstream monopolist which supplies two non-integrated downstream firms. The monopolist may fail to monopolize the market because it is unable to commit not to behave opportunistically. We build on previous experimental studies of this well-known commitment problem by introducing communication. Allowing the upstream firm to chat privately with each downstream firm reduces total offered quantity from near the Cournot level (observed in the absence of communication) halfway toward the monopoly level. Allowing all three firms to chat together openly results in complete monopolization. Downstream firms obtain such a bargaining advantage from open communication that all of the gains from monopolizing the market accrue to them. A simple structural model of Nash-in-Nash bargaining fits the pattern of shifting surpluses well. Using third-party coders, unsupervised text mining, among other approaches, we uncover features of the rich chat data that are correlated with market outcomes. We conclude with a discussion of the antitrust implications of open communication in vertical markets.
Second, we experimentally study the role of search cost in duopoly markets where sellers may be able to coordinate pricing decisions. We vary the level of search cost and whether sellers can communicate. While we find that consumers are more likely to invest in search when the cost is reduced, we find that a reduction of search cost does not influence prices. This effect does not change with the availability of seller communication. Our results suggest that policy interventions that aim to increase the competitiveness of markets via reducing search cost may not be effective in concentrated markets. Third, I study the role of reputation building on input foreclosure in vertically related markets. In one-shot interactions, upstream firms can choose to build a reputation by revealing their price history to the current upstream competitor. In particular, integrated firms can establish a reputation to foreclose the input market - an outcome that would otherwise not be tenable due to a commitment problem. I get three main results: First, withdrawal from the input market is three times more common with reputation building of the integrated firm. Second, the anticompetitive effects of vertical integration are much stronger when the integrated firm builds a reputation. Third, integrated firms choose to build a reputation significantly more often than non-integrated firms. Withdrawal of the integrated firm which results in monopolization upstream occurs in markets with reputation building ten times more often. | |||||||
| Lizenz: |  Urheberrechtsschutz | |||||||
| Fachbereich / Einrichtung: | Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät » Volkswirtschaftslehre | |||||||
| Dokument erstellt am: | 07.03.2017 | |||||||
| Dateien geändert am: | 07.03.2017 | |||||||
| Promotionsantrag am: | 31.10.2016 | |||||||
| Datum der Promotion: | 08.02.2017 |
