Dokument: Essays on Repeated Strategic Interactions and the Organization of Multinational Firms
| Titel: | Essays on Repeated Strategic Interactions and the Organization of Multinational Firms | |||||||
| URL für Lesezeichen: | https://docserv.uni-duesseldorf.de/servlets/DocumentServlet?id=40935 | |||||||
| URN (NBN): | urn:nbn:de:hbz:061-20170123-115323-8 | |||||||
| Kollektion: | Dissertationen | |||||||
| Sprache: | Englisch | |||||||
| Dokumententyp: | Wissenschaftliche Abschlussarbeiten » Dissertation | |||||||
| Medientyp: | Text | |||||||
| Autor: | Fischer, Christian [Autor] | |||||||
| Dateien: |
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| Beitragende: | Prof. Dr. Südekum, Jens [Gutachter] Prof. Dr. Normann, Hans-Theo [Gutachter] | |||||||
| Dewey Dezimal-Klassifikation: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie » 330 Wirtschaft | |||||||
| Beschreibungen: | Headquarters and their specialized component suppliers have a vital interest in establishing long-term collaborations. When formal contracts are not enforceable, such efficiency-enhancing cooperations can be established via informal agreements, but relational contracts have been largely ignored in the literature on the international organization of value chains. In this paper, we develop a dynamic property rights model of global sourcing. A domestic headquarter collaborates with a foreign input supplier and makes two decisions in every period: i) whether to engage in a costly search for a better partner, and ii) whether to make a non-binding offer to overcome hold-up problems. Our key result is that the possibility to switch partners crucially affects the contractual nature of buyer-supplier relationships. In particular, some patient firms do not immediately establish a relational contract, but only when they decide to stop searching and thus launch a long-term collaboration with their supplier. Using firm-product-level data of fresh Chinese exporters to the US, we obtain empirical evidence in line with the predictions of our theory.I examine the use of payment contracts in export partnerships when the importer's payment moral is uncertain and there is a time gap between the production and sale of traded goods. In the absence of bank finance I find that by deciding upon the payment format the exporter is challenged with a trade-off between maximizing the profits from the current transaction and making use of screening opportunities that differ between format types. Such screening can help to attain information about the reliability of importers which is crucial to develop efficient and intensive export relationships. Trade credit insurance can catalyze export growth and transaction profitability but its positive impact is limited to the initial phase of export relationships.In asymmetric Cournot markets without side payments, maximizing joint profits is implausible, firms disagree on the collusive price, and production is necessarily inefficient. We investigate experimentally how firms collude (implicitly and explicitly), if at all, in such situations. When explicit communication is available, joint profits increase above the static Nash level, but nearly all the gains from talking go to the inefficient firm. Bargaining solutions do not satisfactorily predict collusive outcomes, except for the equal split solution. When the role of the efficient firm is earned in a contest, the efficient firm earns higher profits and firms often collude by producing equal amounts. Confirming previous results, our data also show that, without communication, firms fail to collude and essentially play the static Nash equilibrium. | |||||||
| Lizenz: |  Urheberrechtsschutz | |||||||
| Fachbereich / Einrichtung: | Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät » Volkswirtschaftslehre | |||||||
| Dokument erstellt am: | 23.01.2017 | |||||||
| Dateien geändert am: | 23.01.2017 | |||||||
| Promotionsantrag am: | 30.09.2016 | |||||||
| Datum der Promotion: | 11.01.2017 |
