Dokument: Fixed-Mobile Substitution, Consumer Tariff Choice and Exclusive Dealing: Four Essays on Telecommunications Economics
| Titel: | Fixed-Mobile Substitution, Consumer Tariff Choice and Exclusive Dealing: Four Essays on Telecommunications Economics | |||||||
| URL für Lesezeichen: | https://docserv.uni-duesseldorf.de/servlets/DocumentServlet?id=26812 | |||||||
| URN (NBN): | urn:nbn:de:hbz:061-20130916-110003-5 | |||||||
| Kollektion: | Dissertationen | |||||||
| Sprache: | Englisch | |||||||
| Dokumententyp: | Wissenschaftliche Abschlussarbeiten » Dissertation | |||||||
| Medientyp: | Text | |||||||
| Autor: | Barth, Anne-Kathrin [Autor] | |||||||
| Dateien: |
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| Beitragende: | Prof. Dr. Haucap, Justus [Gutachter] Prof. Dr. Dewenter, Ralf [Gutachter] | |||||||
| Dewey Dezimal-Klassifikation: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie » 330 Wirtschaft | |||||||
| Beschreibung: | This thesis deals with current aspects of competition, regulation, and consumers’ tariff choices in telecommunications markets.
The first part of the thesis (Chapters 2 and 3) analyzes the substitutional relationship between fixed and mobile networks across European countries. Fixed and mobile telecommunication markets are both subject to regulatory obligations, but the magnitude of regulation in the two markets is quite different. Due to bottleneck issues, fixed telephony markets are regulated quite heavily, whereas regulation in cellular markets is less restrictive. The development of the demand for fixed and mobile services raises the question, to what extent are fixed and mobile phones complements or substitutes. If substitutional patterns exist and are significantly large, different regulatory arrangements would be hard to justify. Chapter 2, entitled “Does the Growth of Mobile Markets Cause the Demise of Fixed Networks? Evidence from the European Union” and coauthored with Ulrich Heimeshoff, analyzes the substitutability between fixed and mobile services on the access level in the European Union by applying Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data techniques. We use a unique dataset which contains information on all 27 European Union members from 2003 to 2009 and estimate own- and cross-price-elasticities of usage prices on the fixed-line and mobile subscription level, respectively. We find strong empirical evidence for substitution from fixed to cellular networks throughout Europe. In addition, the article reveals resulting policy implications. Chapter 3, entitled “What is the Magnitude of Fixed-Mobile Call Substitution? Empirical Evidence from 16 European Countries” and coauthored with Ulrich Heimeshoff, investigates the degree of fixed-mobile call substitution (FMCS) within different European countries. We use quarterly data from 2004 to mid-2010 on 16 mainly Western European countries. By applying dynamic panel data techniques, we are able to estimate short- and long-run elasticities of the telecommunication usage prices on the fixed-line call demand. The own-price and cross-price elasticities found give strong empirical evidence for substitutional effects towards mobile services. In particular, the estimated cross-price elasticities of the mobile price on the fixed-line call demand are relatively large compared to other studies. Another recent topic in telecommunications economics is the exclusive distribution of certain mobile devices, e.g. the iPhone from 2007 to 2010, and its effects on consumer welfare. As one of the first, Hermalin and Katz (2010) study exclusive dealing of complementary goods between non-integrated firms and find that exclusive dealing can relax price competition and therefore may reduce consumer welfare. Other authors, such as Chen and Fu (2012), find controversial results. Therefore, Chapter 4, entitled Analyzing Competitive Effects of Exclusively Dealt iPhones in European Mobile Markets, aims at investigating the effects of these exclusive contracts on the level of competition in Europe’s mobile markets. We create a unique data set which comprises quarterly information on 55 mobile network operators in 15 European countries between Q4/2003 and Q3/2011. By applying dynamic panel data techniques and controlling for a possible selection bias, we find that the average monthly revenue per subscriber (ARPU) is on average approximately 1.2% higher for an operator engaged in an exclusive arrangement. Thus, our findings indicate that the exclusive rights concerning the iPhone had a strong influence on mobile operators’ competition. Another recent aspect in telecommunications economics concerns innovative tariff structures and consumers’ tariff choices. Especially for mobile services, many different tariffs are offered. Based on marketing science and behavioral economics, it is known that many consumers select tariffs that are not always cost minimizing. Hence Chapter 5, entitled “Irrationality Rings! Experimental Evidence on Mobile Tariff Choices” and coauthored with Julia Graf, investigates how consumers decide between mobile phone tariffs with different contract components and why irrational choices may occur. We run an experiment with 87 members of the Heinrich-Heine University and test for preferences in selecting mobile phone contracts. Abstracting from demand uncertainty and preferences regarding service quality, images of operators and network externalities, our focus lies on the choice between contracts with handset subsidies, direct purchase or deferred payments of the mobile device. Our approach is twofold: first, we account for general difficulties facing a tariff choice, as well as for biased preferences. To test these hypotheses, our experiment is structured in three distinctive parts. In the first part, participants are asked to estimate their average monthly consumption in terms of outgoing minutes. This estimation is compared to the average usage of their last three mobile phone bills. If the participants estimate their consumption correctly, meaning within a range of +/- 20%, they receive an extra payment. The second part of the survey consists of 10 tariff choices. Participants are asked to select their optimal tariff out of three given tariffs. In the third part, participants are asked to give detailed information on personal characteristics and their calling behavior. From our experiment we infer that participants are often not aware of their actual consumption and in line with the findings on flat-rate biases, respondents systematically overestimate their consumption. The final chapter, Chapter 6, summarizes the central findings and discusses further possible research. | |||||||
| Lizenz: |  Urheberrechtsschutz | |||||||
| Bezug: | Januar 2010 bis Mai 2013 | |||||||
| Fachbereich / Einrichtung: | Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät » Volkswirtschaftslehre | |||||||
| Dokument erstellt am: | 16.09.2013 | |||||||
| Dateien geändert am: | 16.09.2013 | |||||||
| Promotionsantrag am: | 03.05.2013 | |||||||
| Datum der Promotion: | 04.09.2013 |
