Dokument: Four Essays in Industrial Organization
| Titel: | Four Essays in Industrial Organization | |||||||
| URL für Lesezeichen: | https://docserv.uni-duesseldorf.de/servlets/DocumentServlet?id=22771 | |||||||
| URN (NBN): | urn:nbn:de:hbz:061-20121015-091057-7 | |||||||
| Kollektion: | Dissertationen | |||||||
| Sprache: | Englisch | |||||||
| Dokumententyp: | Wissenschaftliche Abschlussarbeiten » Dissertation | |||||||
| Medientyp: | Text | |||||||
| Autor: | Dr. Jovanovic, Dragan [Autor] | |||||||
| Dateien: |
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| Dewey Dezimal-Klassifikation: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie » 330 Wirtschaft | |||||||
| Beschreibung: | The present thesis covers several topics in industrial organization which can be basically divided into two parts. In the
first part, we focus on managerial incentives in fi
rms facing competition in the product market (chapters 2 and 3). In the second part, we examine the effectiveness of antitrust and regulation (chapters 4 and 5). In other words, we ask whether or not certain regulatory changes and antitrust rules were (are) successful to create and to ensure efficiency and competition in particular markets. In the following, the course of analysis and our main results are presented in more detail.
In chapter 2, we analyze the impact of partial public ownership (PPO) on managerial incentives. Thereby, we combine agency issues of a moral hazard type with a market game where fi rms are horizontally differentiated and compete à la Vickrey-Salop. A novelty of our framework is that it explicitly considers competition in the product market. We fi nd that PPO negatively affects managerial incentives when all fi rms are partially owned by the government. When partially public fi rms compete with private fi rms, the effects on managerial incentives crucially depend on the degree of competitive pressure. Thereby, PPO induces either partially public fi rms or their private competitors to offer stronger managerial incentives. This result is essentially con firmed even if the government's primary concern is consumer protection rather than social welfare. In chapter 3, we analyze the effects of competition and indirect network externalities on managerial incentives within two-sided platforms. Using a moral hazard model, we specify that each platform consists of one principal and one agent. Thereby, managerial effort aims at increasing platform quality. First, we highlight that the effects of competition cannot be unambiguously characterized by the business stealing effect and the rent reduction effect. Second, we demonstrate that it is rather each platform's relative pro fitability and each group's adoption possibilities which shape managerial incentives when competition or indirect network externalities are varied. The fourth chapter is based on joint research with Christian Wey. We analyze the effi ciency defence in merger control. Thereby, we especially focus on the criterion of merger specifi city which plays a crucial role for an antitrust authority's decision whether or not to accept claimed efficiencies according to both the US merger guidelines and the EC merger guidelines. First, we show that the relationship between efficiency gains and social welfare is non-monotone. Second, we analyze endogenous efficiencies and introduce a counterfactual to account for the criterion of merger speci ficity. It is demonstrated that most efficiencies are not merger specifi c, i.e., fi rms' incentives to implement the efficiency are typically larger without a merger. Finally, we take the merger decision as endogenous, and we show that welfare enhancing merger proposals are largely not accompanied by merger specifi c efficiencies. We take these results to cast serious doubts on the effectiveness of the current efficiency defence. Chapter 5 is based on joint research with Justus Haucap and Ulrich Heimeshoff. We apply econometric methods to examine recent regulatory changes in the German electricity reserve power markets. The regulatory changes comprise nine reforms which led to a creation of a new market design through synchronization and interconnection of the four control areas. In this chapter, we analyze whether or not the reforms led to lower prices for minute reserve power (MRP). In contrast to existing works, we use a unique panel dataset to account for unobserved heterogeneity between the four German regional markets. Moreover, we control for endogeneity by using weather data as instruments for electricity spot market prices. Although we fi nd that the reforms were jointly successful in decreasing MRP prices, the reforms' effects on both consumer surplus and welfare are rather ambiguous. | |||||||
| Lizenz: |  Urheberrechtsschutz | |||||||
| Fachbereich / Einrichtung: | Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät » Volkswirtschaftslehre | |||||||
| Dokument erstellt am: | 15.10.2012 | |||||||
| Dateien geändert am: | 15.10.2012 | |||||||
| Promotionsantrag am: | 01.09.2009 | |||||||
| Datum der Promotion: | 18.09.2012 |
