Dokument: Three Essays on Industrial Organisation Theory
| Titel: | Three Essays on Industrial Organisation Theory | |||||||
| URL für Lesezeichen: | https://docserv.uni-duesseldorf.de/servlets/DocumentServlet?id=21385 | |||||||
| URN (NBN): | urn:nbn:de:hbz:061-20120509-085036-4 | |||||||
| Kollektion: | Dissertationen | |||||||
| Sprache: | Englisch | |||||||
| Dokumententyp: | Wissenschaftliche Abschlussarbeiten » Dissertation | |||||||
| Medientyp: | Text | |||||||
| Autor: | Sapi, Geza [Autor] | |||||||
| Dateien: |
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| Dewey Dezimal-Klassifikation: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie » 330 Wirtschaft | |||||||
| Beschreibung: | Chapter 1: Technology Licensing by Advertising Supported Media Platforms: An Application to
Internet Search Engines The first chapter of this thesis is based on joint research with Irina Suleymanova. It has benefited a lot from helpful comments by Pio Baake, Steffen H. Hoernig, Martin Peitz, Christian Wey, participants of the ZEW Mannheim, Telecom Paris-Tech ICT Conferences and the EARIE and EEA Annual Meetings in 2009. We develop a duopoly model with advertising supported platforms and analyze incentives of a superior firm to license its advanced technologies to an inferior rival. We highlight the role of two technologies characteristic for media platforms: the technology to produce content and to place advertisements. Licensing incentives are driven solely by indirect network effects arising from the aversion of users to advertising. We establish a relationship between licensing incentives and the nature of technology, the decision variable on the advertiser side, and the structure of platforms' revenues. Only the technology to place advertisements is licensed. If users are charged for access, licensing incentives vanish. Licensing increases the advertising intensity, benefits advertisers and harms users. Our model provides a rationale for technology-based cooperations between competing platforms, such as the planned Yahoo-Google advertising agreement in 2008. Chapter 2: Joint Customer Data Acquisition and Sharing Among Rivals This chapter is based on joint research with Irina Suleymanova and Nicola Jentzsch. It has benefited a lot from the helpful comments of Pio Baake, Ulrich Kamecke, Kai-Uwe Kühn, Sudipta Sarangi and Christian Wey. It is increasingly observable that in different industries competitors jointly acquire and share customer data. We propose a modified Hotelling model with two-dimensional consumer heterogeneity to analyze the incentives for such agreements and their welfare implications. In our model the incentives of firms for data acquisition and sharing depend on the willingness of consumers to switch brands. Firms jointly collect data on transportation cost parameters when consumers are relatively immobile between brands. However, the firms are unlikely to cooperatively acquire such data, when consumers are relatively mobile. Incentives to share information depend on the portfolio of data firms hold and consumer mobility. Data sharing arises with relatively mobile and immobile consumers - it is neutral for consumers in the former case, but reduces consumer surplus in the latter. Competition authorities ought to scrutinize such cooperation agreements on a case-by-case basis and devote special attention to consumer switching behavior. Chapter 3: Bargaining, Vertical Mergers and Entry This chapter analyzes vertical integration incentives in a bilaterally duopolistic industry where upstream producers bargain with downstream retailers on terms of supply. In the applied framework integration does not affect the total output produced, but it affects the distribution of rents among players. Vertical integration incentives depend on the strength of substitutability or complementarity between products and the shape of the unit cost function. Furthermore I demonstrate that in contrast to the widely prevailing view in competition policy, vertical integration can, under particular circumstances convey more bargaining power to the merged entity than a horizontal merger to monopoly. The model is used to analyze strategic merger incentives that influence entry decisions. Mergers can facilitate and deter entry. While horizontal mergers that deter entry are never profitable, firms at different market levels may strategically choose to integrate vertically in order to keep a potential entrant out of the market. I provide conditions for such entry-deterring vertical mergers to occur. | |||||||
| Lizenz: |  Urheberrechtsschutz | |||||||
| Fachbereich / Einrichtung: | Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät | |||||||
| Dokument erstellt am: | 09.05.2012 | |||||||
| Dateien geändert am: | 09.05.2012 | |||||||
| Promotionsantrag am: | 31.08.2011 | |||||||
| Datum der Promotion: | 07.03.2012 |
