Dokument: Privacy and Economics
| Titel: | Privacy and Economics | |||||||
| URL für Lesezeichen: | https://docserv.uni-duesseldorf.de/servlets/DocumentServlet?id=32780 | |||||||
| URN (NBN): | urn:nbn:de:hbz:061-20141201-111815-7 | |||||||
| Kollektion: | Dissertationen | |||||||
| Sprache: | Englisch | |||||||
| Dokumententyp: | Wissenschaftliche Abschlussarbeiten » Dissertation | |||||||
| Medientyp: | Text | |||||||
| Autor: | Benndorf, Volker [Autor] | |||||||
| Dateien: |
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| Beitragende: | Prof. Dr. Hans-Theo Normann [Gutachter] Prof. Dr. Wey, Christian [Gutachter] | |||||||
| Dewey Dezimal-Klassifikation: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie » 330 Wirtschaft | |||||||
| Beschreibung: | First, we elicit the willingness to sell personal data (contact information, Facebook details, preferences) in laboratory experiments, using a BDM and take-it-or-leave-it offers. Our experiments are novel in that (i) the experiments are incentivized, (ii) the focus on privacy issues is salient, and (iii) the use of the data---marketing purposes---is transparent and unambiguous. We find that only a minority of about 10% to 20% of the participants are unwilling to sell personal data, a share which is roughly constant across both the type of personal data and elicitation method. Subjects willing to sell request about €15 for their contact details and €19 for Facebook details.
Second, we study the voluntary revelation of private information in a labor-market experiment where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker's payoff, it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further revelation. Such unraveling can be observed frequently in our data although less often than predicted. Equilibrium play is more likely when subjects are predicted to conceal their productivity than when they should reveal. This tendency of under-revelation, especially of low-productivity workers, is consistent with the level-k model. A loaded frame where the private information concerns the workers' health status leads to less revelation than a neutral frame. Third, we experimentally analyze a lemons market with costly but credible quality certification. In this setup, economic theory suggests that unraveling takes place, and that a number of different types are correctly identified in equilibrium. We find that unraveling is typically not as complete as predicted by economic theory. The behavior of sellers as well as buyers impedes unraveling in that there is too little certification. Sellers are generally reluctant to disclose their private information, and buyers enforce this behavior by bidding less competitively if sellers reveal compared to the case where they conceal information. Finally, we present a lemons-market experiment that is suitable to elicit a distribution of k-levels. Despite various differences to a game proposed by Arad and Rubinstein (American Economic Review, 2012) for the same purpose, our game suggests a virtually identical distribution of level-k types. | |||||||
| Lizenz: |  Urheberrechtsschutz | |||||||
| Fachbereich / Einrichtung: | Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät » Volkswirtschaftslehre | |||||||
| Dokument erstellt am: | 01.12.2014 | |||||||
| Dateien geändert am: | 01.12.2014 | |||||||
| Promotionsantrag am: | 06.08.2014 | |||||||
| Datum der Promotion: | 21.11.2014 |
