"Putting Bourdieu into Action" –

Analyzing the Contributions of Pierre Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice to Research in Management and Organization Studies

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1. Introduction

The field of management and organization studies is known for its interactions with related scientific disciplines such as economics, psychology and sociology (e.g., Agarwal & Hoetker, 2007; Lockett & McWilliams, 2005; Oswick, Fleming, & Hanlon, 2011; Whetten, Felin, & King, 2009). Several influential theories in management and organization studies, such as the discourse theory, structuration theory, attribution theory, actor network theory, and the transaction cost theory, have been ‘imported’ to the field from disciplines such as psychology, sociology and economics (Oswick, et al., 2011, p. 320). Importing theories from other disciplines has contributed significantly to the development of management and organization studies as a field of research. Scholars gained new insights into organizations and their management by applying theories from related disciplines; for instance, the theories challenged conventional wisdom in the field or offered new explanations for empirical observations. Furthermore, they also offered unique perspectives on empirical phenomena; for instance, the sociologist Granovetter (1985) criticized the transaction cost theory’s (e.g., Williamson, 1975, 1981) focus on ‘atomized actors’, i.e., actors which are not embedded in social relations (Granovetter, 1985, p. 487). He argued that personal relationships between actors yield trust, thereby supporting business exchanges by reducing transaction costs. Therefore, Granovetter expanded the transaction cost theory’s perspective with the view on personal relationships between transaction partners. This embeddedness perspective has provided new insights into business exchanges and has also been applied in connection with the transaction cost economics (e.g., Kamann, Snijders, Tazelaar, & Welling, 2006; Williamson, 1993).
Although it is not an exception but rather usual that theories from related scientific disciplines are borrowed by management and organizational researchers to explain phenomena within their field of research (see, e.g., Oswick, et al., 2011; Whetten, et al., 2009), importing a theory from a related scientific discipline is only appropriate if the theory makes a valuable contribution to the new field of research. For instance, the theory might provide new insights into the questions: What factors affect an empirical phenomenon, how these factors are related, and why they affect the phenomenon (Whetten, 1989).

Another theory which might have the potential to make a valuable contribution to the field of management and organization studies is Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice. Bourdieu was a French sociologist, anthropologist and philosopher, who is regarded as one of the most influential exponent of the ‘practice turn’ in contemporary social sciences (Reckwitz, 2002; Schatzki, 2001). Similar to Giddens’s (1984) structuration theory, Bourdieu (1977) aimed at overcoming several dualisms in the social sciences, such as micro-macro and structure-agency, by introducing the concept of social practices. A social practice is a “routinized type of behavior” (Reckwitz, 2002, p. 249) of human actors. On the one hand, actors’ social practices are influenced by macro structures; on the other hand, the practices also influence these structures because the structures’ existence depends on their reproduction by the actors (Bourdieu, 1990; Giddens, 1984). Therefore, the concept of social practices offers a new perspective on human agency. Despite the current ‘practice turn’ in management and organization studies (Miettinen, Samra-Fredericks, & Yanow, 2009; Simpson, 2009; Whittington, 2006) and despite Bourdieu’s influence on the practice community, his theory of practice has gained little attention from management and organization scholars (see, e.g., Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008; Everett, 2002; Özbilgin & Tatli, 2005). For instance,
the theory is neither mentioned among the 15 most popular theories in management and organization studies (Oswick, et al., 2011, p. 320) nor is Bourdieu himself among the leading ‘grand theorists’ in the field, according to citation data from leading management and organization journals (Meyer & Boxenbaum, 2010, p. 745). Likewise, Özbilgin and Tatli (2005, p. 855) argued that “[d]espite his [Pierre Bourdieu; JS] many influential writings, a literature search in the three academies of management journals [Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review and Academy of Management Learning and Education; JS] generates only very few citations […], indicating that introducing his four key texts, listed above, could help remedy the scant attention to his works from the mainstream of organization and management studies.”

Bourdieu’s absence in management and organization research is surprising for three reasons: First, it surprises if we\(^1\) take into account management and organization scholars’ general tendency to import popular theories from related fields of research (see, e.g., Oswick, et al., 2011; Whetten, et al., 2009). For instance, Anthony Giddens’s (1979, 1984) structuration theory gained much interest in the field of sociology before it was introduced into management and organization research (Whittington, 1992). Furthermore, organizational identity research, which has received much attention by organizational scholars (see, e.g., Corley et al., 2006; Whetten, 2006), is based on the psychological concept of identity, which is one of the most influential concepts in psychology (Whetten, et al., 2009). Regarding Bourdieu and his theory of practice, some scholars have argued (see, e.g., Sallaz & Zavisca, 2007, p. 22; Wacquant, 2002, p. 549; 2003, p. 478) that Bourdieu was one of the most influential social scientists of the

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\(^1\) Although the word “we” is used throughout the thesis, all parts, except for chapter 4, have only been written by the thesis’s author. However, using the inclusive “we” is regarded as being more reader-friendly than using the word “I”.

twentieth century. However, since there is no empirical evidence to substantiate this claim, we conducted a citation analysis in which we compared the citation data of six social scientists (Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault, Anthony Giddens, Erving Goffman, Jürgen Habermas, and Max Weber), which have been identified as the most frequently cited ‘grand theorists’ in the field of management and organization studies (see Meyer & Boxenbaum, 2010, p. 744-747), from three linguistic communities (French, English and German). We decided to use citation data, since citations define what is regarded as relevant and irrelevant in the scientific field (Small, 2004, p. 72) and they also influence a scholar’s reputation significantly (Bourdieu, 1975). We collected the data by using Ann Harzing’s “publish or perish” tool (Harzing, 2007), which collects citation data from Google Scholar. Using Google Scholar as database for citation analyses is, however, contentious; for instance, it has been criticized for phantom citations (see, e.g., Jacso, 2006), insufficient citation accuracy (see, e.g., Kulkarni, Aziz, Shams, & Busse, 2009, p. 1095) and for including non-scientific sources in its database (see, e.g., Jacso, 2006), which inflates citation counts. Despite this, Google Scholar has the advantage of covering citations in books and non-English language journals (see, e.g., Meho & Yang, 2007), which is particularly a significant advantage when comparing citation counts for authors from different linguistic communities. Moreover, we argue that using Google Scholar as a database in our analysis has no deleterious effect because errors in the database are likely to be similar for each of the six analyzed theorists; as a result, the data can still be compared.

We searched for citations to the work of the theorists and excluded all works that were obviously not authored by these theorists (e.g., Google Scholar listed a work for Michel Foucault published in the year 1800). The results are shown in Table 1. The second column of Table 1 shows that the French sociologists Michel Foucault
and Pierre Bourdieu have received most citations with 152,221 and 126,611 citations, respectively. The other four ‘grand theorists’ had less than 100,000 citation counts (Anthony Giddens: 92,030; Jürgen Habermas: 75,187; Max Weber: 63,873; and Erving Goffman: 54,497). Moreover, the data reveals that the ranking does not significantly change if we sort for cites per year (third column, Table 1) or cites per paper (fourth column, Table 1). To sum up, the – rather perfunctory – analysis of citations belonging to six leading social theorists from three linguistic communities reveals that Bourdieu is among the most renowned scholars in the social sciences, just after Michel Foucault, which is further supported by research done in fields such as accounting (see, e.g., Chiapello & Baker, 2011). However, while theorists such as Foucault and Giddens have been introduced in management and organization research and have subsequently received much attention (see Oswick, et al., 2011, p. 320), Bourdieu has significantly received less attention (see e.g Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008; Özbilgin & Tatli, 2005).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theorist</th>
<th>Total number of citations</th>
<th>Cites per year</th>
<th>Cites per paper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Michel Foucault</td>
<td>152,221</td>
<td>2,580.02</td>
<td>152.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierre Bourdieu</td>
<td>126,611</td>
<td>2,434.83</td>
<td>137.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthony Giddens</td>
<td>92,030</td>
<td>1,736.42</td>
<td>131.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jürgen Habermas</td>
<td>75,187</td>
<td>1,253.12</td>
<td>103.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max Weber</td>
<td>63,873</td>
<td>1,013.86</td>
<td>82.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erving Goffman</td>
<td>54,497</td>
<td>878.98</td>
<td>163.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Overview of citation data from Google Scholar for six social theorists. (Retrieved: 1/27/2012)

Second, the absence of Bourdieu’s theory of practice surprises because some of his ideas have already been introduced in management and organization studies. His concept of field, for instance, significantly influenced DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) concept of ‘organizational field’, which has become one of the most influential concepts in contemporary management and organization studies (Greenwood & Meyer, 2008, p. 261). Furthermore, the concept of social capital,
which was originally developed by Bourdieu and subsequently refined, among others, by Coleman (Portes, 1998, p. 5), has also received much attention in management and organizational studies (e.g., Lee, 2009; Walker, Kogut, & Wijian, 1997; Wu, 2008). Bourdieu’s influence on the field of management and organization studies remains an indirect one because researchers often do not refer to Bourdieu while applying his ideas; for instance, although Powell (2007) later acknowledged that the concept of organizational field was inspired by Bourdieu, we do not find any citation to Bourdieu in DiMaggio and Powell’s seminal paper (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This substantiates our argument that, although management and organizational researchers often apply ideas and concepts from Bourdieu’s theory of practice in their work, they are often not aware of that; hence, they seldom refer to Bourdieu and cite his work.

Finally, the most important rationale as to why the absence of Bourdieu’s theory of practice in the field of management and organization studies is surprising is based on the theory’s potential contributions to the field. For instance, in their seminal article about new concepts of organization structure, Ranson et al. (1980, p. 2) argued that Giddens’s structuration theory and Bourdieu’s theory of practice might be promising ways to further develop the concept of organization structure. Both theories emphasize on a connection between structure and agency, which has provided a new perspective on organizational structures and has since then gained attention in research (see, e.g., Orlikowski, 1992; Rapert & Wren, 1998; Willmott, 1981). Similarly, DiMaggio and Powell (1991, p. 26) praised the contributions of Bourdieu’s work – particularly his habitus concept – to institutional theory by asserting that “[...] Bourdieu’s framework [habitus; JS] offers a particularly balanced and multifaceted approach to action. Although his work is just beginning to influence organization theory […], much of it dovetails with and may
1. Introduction

contribute to a broadening and deepening of the institutional tradition.” However, although these scholars directly argued that Bourdieu’s theory might provide new perspectives on and insights in important concepts and research objects in the field of management and organization studies, few researchers have explored and released the potential of Bourdieu’s theory of practice.

However, we follow other researchers (see, e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Dobbin, 2008; Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008; Ranson, et al., 1980) who argued that Bourdieu’s theory of practice has the potential to further research in the field of management and organization studies. For instance, Bourdieu’s theory might provide new insights into discussions such as the micro-foundation of institutional theory and the connection between culture and cognition (DiMaggio, 1997). Since these potentials are yet to be explored, the aim of this thesis is to analyze the contributions of Bourdieu’s theory of practice to the field of management and organization studies. However, Bourdieu’s theory of practice is a comprehensive theory that encompasses a number of concepts (e.g., field, capital, habitus, doxa, etc.). Although some researchers argue that the theory’s full potential can only be released if all concepts are mutually applied (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008), we argue that, in our specific case, using a single concept is appropriate. As stated above, our aim is not to introduce Bourdieu’s theory of practice into the field of management and organization studies (since introducing a new theory is not yet a contribution), but to analyze the theory’s contribution to existing research in management and organization studies. To pinpoint these contributions, we make use of some of Bourdieu’s concepts and combine them with other theories in the field of management and organization studies to provide new insights into some phenomena. Nevertheless, it is self-evident that the inner logic of the theory of practice is always taken into account.
1. Introduction

This thesis particularly focuses on Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, which he described as a central concept in his theory (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 120-122); however, Emirbayer and Johnson (2008, p. 2) argued that there is an “almost total inattention” to the habitus concept in management and organization studies. As we will show in the course of this thesis, the concept of habitus has great potential to propel research in several fields of management and organization research, which is why we set our focus on it. More precisely, we concentrate on the cognitive parts of the concept of habitus. Although Bourdieu emphasized that the habitus is a cognitive concept (Bourdieu, 1977, 1986a), this fact has received almost no attention by management and organization researchers. However, research in sociology reveals that a keen focus on the cognitive elements of the habitus is a fruitful approach to enriching discussions about culture and cognition (Ignatow, 2007; Lizardo, 2004; Vaisey, 2009). Also, Lizardo (2012) argued that this focus on the cognitive elements of the habitus is characteristic for the current, third phase of Bourdieu’s reception in U.S. sociology. We argue that the cognitive elements of Bourdieu’s habitus concept also have the potential to offer new insights into discussions in the field of management and organization studies. For instance, it might contribute to institutional theory’s “search” for a (cognitive) micro-foundation (see, e.g., Powell & Colyvas, 2008). Therefore, we herald the next phase of Bourdieu’s reception in the field of management and organization studies.

The structure of the thesis is depicted in Figure 1. It shows that the remaining chapters build on each other. The first foundation of the thesis is chapter 2, in which we give a short introduction about Bourdieu’s theory of practice; we concentrate on the three concepts of field, capital and habitus, which are often regarded as the core of the theory of practice (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008).
Additionally, we describe the main criticism regarding Bourdieu’s theory and its implications on this thesis. The second foundation of the thesis is chapter 3, in which we present the findings of a citation context analysis that focuses on the current application of Bourdieu’s theory in leading management and organization studies journals. Based on these findings, we identify that his concept of habitus has received scant attention among management and organization researchers, despite its potential. The following three chapters build on the chapters 2 and 3: In chapter 4, we empirically analyze the diffusion of Bourdieu’s theory of practice in the field of management and organization studies. Based on Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, we argue that a cognitive distance between the field of production (i.e., where the theory has been developed) and the field of consumption (i.e., the field where the reader is located) hinders the transfer of the theory. In chapter 5, we combine Bourdieu’s concept of habitus with institutional theory. We show that mimesis (i.e., the unconscious imitation of other actors’ practices) is an important mechanism in processes of institutionalization, which offers a new perspective to institutional theory. In chapter 6, we justify why institutional theory should take the human body into account. Again, we draw on Bourdieu’s concept of habitus to pinpoint the ways in which a focus on the human body provides new insights into institutional processes, thereby contributing to institutional theory. Finally, in chapter 7, we discuss the overall contribution of this thesis and pinpoint further discussions in the literature to which the concept of habitus might contribute. We point out that the thesis has no direct implications in managerial practice and justify why this is not a serious limitation for the thesis. Subsequently, we discuss the limitations of our studies; based on the chapters, particularly chapter 5 and 6, we develop directions for future research. We close the thesis with some
conclusions regarding the application of Bourdieu’s theory of practice in the field of management and organization studies.

Figure 1: Structure of the thesis.
2. Introduction into Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice

2.1. Introduction to the life of Pierre Bourdieu

As Bourdieu himself (1983, p. 313-314; 1993a, p. 268-270) and researchers in the field of the sociology of ideas (Camic & Gross, 2004, p. 245-246) argued, (scientific) texts are not free of context, but are influenced by the authors’ living conditions. For instance, theories are most likely to be influenced by those ideas that were regarded as legitimate at the time when a theorist developed his own theory (see, e.g., DiMaggio, 1995, p. 394). These conditions become part of the work, and they have to be taken into account when reading and interpreting theorists’ texts (Bourdieu, 1983; Camic & Gross, 2004). Therefore, we argue that it is important for readers to get insights into the authors’ living conditions in order to understand their theories. For this reason, we decided to give a brief introduction to Bourdieu’s life; since the particular conditions of his life significantly influenced his way of thinking and therefore his theory of practice.

Pierre Bourdieu was a French sociologist, anthropologist and philosopher, who was born in a small village in south-western France as a son of a post office clerk and a housewife (Wacquant, 2003, p. 478). After finishing school, he received a scholarship and joined the *Ecole Normale Supérieure*, one of the French elite schools (Wacquant, 2002). His later works are heavily influenced by his own experiences as member of a lower social class in an elite organization of the French society. For instance, Bourdieu never fully adapted to the ‘rules of the game’ in the French academic field, but kept a critical distance. Moreover, he realized that although he studied at one of the most highly recognized universities in France, he will never become a full member of the French upper class because
his extraction and the primary habitus that he had incorporated during his youth prevented him from fully adapting to the upper class (Schultheis, 2007).

After finishing his studies of philosophy, Bourdieu went to Algeria for his military service. There, he made his first scientific study about the Algerian society (Bourdieu, 1962), which had a significant influence on all his later works. During his field work in Algeria (see, e.g., Bourdieu, Darbel, Rivet, & Seibel, 1963), he developed his theory of practice. Particularly, Bourdieu investigated the changes among Algerian peasants in their transformation to urban workers (Wacquant, 2003, p. 478). These changes and the individuals’ reactions to them inspired Bourdieu to develop the concept of habitus, which is one of the core concepts of his theory of practice (see, e.g., Bourdieu, 1977, 1990). Bourdieu’s theory of practice is, on the one hand, a synthesis of thoughts from other highly renowned French philosophers and social scientists, such as Mauss, Durkheim, Lévis-Strauss, Saussure, and Althusser, and, on the other hand, it marks a conscious departure from their way of thinking (i.e., Bourdieu developed a new approach regarding social analyses and the way of thinking about society).

In the course of his later studies in which he analyzed, among others, the peculiarities of different fields, such as the French educational field (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977), the scientific field and its inner logic (Bourdieu, 1988a, 1991) and the field of arts (Bourdieu, 1983, 1993b), he further sharpened his theory. However, he argued that the development of a theory is never completed and that a theory’s value always depends on its accuracy in empirical contexts.
2. Introduction into Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice

2.2. Core concepts

2.2.1. Field

Bourdieu’s concept of field was influenced by earlier researches in psychology, particularly by the work of Kurt Lewin. As one of the first psychologists, Lewin (1939) acknowledged the influence of the (social) environment on individuals. For instance, he argued that small changes in persons’ social environment might have significant influences on their behaviors (Lewin, 1939, p. 878) and that “actual behaviour depends upon every part of the field” (Lewin, 1939, p. 884).

Bourdieu built on these insights from Lewin’s work when developing his concept of field. Similar to Lewin, Bourdieu argued that human cognition is influenced by the socially constructed environment in which actors’ are embedded. This environment is conceptualized under the notion of (social) fields. Fields are defined as a “network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 97). Contrary to the organizational field concept, which stresses direct interactions between actors (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), Bourdieu argued that there are only relationships between positions in the field (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 97) and not between the actors themselves. However, the positions in a field - Bourdieu (1988a) distinguished between dominant and dominated positions - are occupied by actors. Actors’ positions in the field depend on their amount of capital (i.e., resources such as university diploma, property rights or cultural skills) whose value differs between social fields. Actors who possess high amounts of capital occupy a dominant position in the field, while dominated positions are occupied by actors with low amounts of capital. For instance, scientists who have published in prestigious journals or have received high amounts of research grants occupy a
dominant position in the scientific field, while those who have not published in prestigious journals or received any research grants occupy a dominated position (Bourdieu, 1988a).

The position occupied by an actor is important because it influences the actor’s thinking and actions (Bourdieu, 2005). For instance, actors who occupy a dominant position in the field try to preserve the field’s current structure, while actors who occupy a dominated position seek to change the field’s structure to improve their position (Battilana, 2006; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Such struggles between dominant and dominated actors are not an exception but are rather common in fields. Therefore, fields are some kind of ‘social microcosms’ (Everett, 2002, p. 60), in which actors struggle to define a field’s structure; i.e., the rules of the field (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 98-99). Bourdieu used the analogy of ‘games’ to explain the processes that take place in a field (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 98-100). Like a game, fields follow certain rules or regularities that are not necessarily codified but rather embodied in the players; the players know a field’s rules, although they are not necessarily able to discursively express them. Furthermore, players believe in the game. For instance, most scientists believe in the accuracy of the game played in the scientific field; they believe that it is important to publish in top-tier journals, to apply for research grants or count citations to estimate a scientist’s influence (for a discussion of the scientific field, see Bourdieu, 1975; Bourdieu, 1991).

2.2.2. Capital

Capital is another important concept of Bourdieu’s theory of practice. In order to avoid misunderstandings, it is important to emphasize, right from beginning, that in Bourdieu’s terminology, capital cannot be equated with money. Although
money is a form of capital (economic capital). Bourdieu’s concept of capital is more comprehensive. On the one hand, he acknowledged that economic capital is an important form of capital; on the other hand, he argued that economic capital is just a specific form of capital that is important in the economic field, but less important in other fields such as the scientific or cultural fields (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 78-81; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 98f.). Thus, Bourdieu aimed at expanding researchers’ focus to the field specificity of capital; while the particular struggle for economic capital in the economic field has received much attention (e.g., by economics as well as management and organization studies), struggles for capital in other fields were almost neglected (Bourdieu, 1986b, p. 241; Moore, 2008, p. 101f.). However, Bourdieu argued that struggles for capital take place in each social field; only that the kind of capital that actors struggle for differs.

Although Bourdieu argued that in each field a different form of capital is at stake (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 98f.), he nevertheless identified three basic forms of capital which are at stake in almost all fields: Social, cultural and economic capital (Bourdieu, 1986b). First, social capital is defined as “the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 119). This definition pinpoints to the importance of personal relationships and networks for actors because these networks and relationships facilitate the assertion of actors’ interests. This assumption is supported by research on social networks, which revealed the positive impact of personal relationships and social networks on finding a job (see, e.g., Granovetter, 1979), acquiring financial capital (see, e.g., Uzzi, 1999) and creating intellectual capital (see, e.g., Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Second, cultural capital is defined as the totality of the actors’ cultural
resources (Bourdieu, 1986a, p. 80-83). It exists in three states: Embodied, objectified and institutionalized states (Bourdieu, 1986b). The embodied state of cultural capital encompasses the actors’ dispositions and tastes; for instance, it is a cultural capital to prefer French wines over the California ones or to prefer pictures of Van Gogh over those of Renoir (Bourdieu, 1986a). These tastes and dispositions are unconsciously learned by actors in the course of their socialization and depend on their social class. In its objectified form, cultural capital refers to the possession of cultural goods such as books, pictures or music instruments. However, merely possessing such cultural goods is not sufficient for cultural capital because they can be bought with economic capital. For instance, if actors possess music instruments but are not able to use those instruments appropriately, they do not possess cultural capital; this is only the case if they also possess the ability to adequately use those cultural goods (Bourdieu, 1986b). Finally, the institutionalized state of cultural capital refers to (educational) certificates, skills and knowledge. Examples are university diplomas and certificates of successfully accomplished qualifications. The third basic form of capital in Bourdieu’s theory is economic capital. Economic capital cannot be directly equated with money; it rather encompasses assets and rights that can be directly converted into money (Bourdieu, 1986b). Some examples of economic capital are the contractual right of receiving monetary income and ownership of productive assets or property rights (Sallaz & Zavisca, 2007, p. 23). This form of capital is particularly important in the economic field, in which companies struggle, among others, for market shares and profits (Bourdieu, 2005).

While these three forms of capital can be found and are relevant in almost all social fields, there are also some forms of capital that can only be found and are only relevant in very few fields. For instance, Bourdieu (1998, p. 16) mentioned
the example of political capital, which he argued was particularly valuable in communist states because it guaranteed its holders goods and properties in an economic system where private property was officially not existent. Moreover, the capital of scientific authority, which describes the recognition granted to scientists by their peers for finding legitimate solutions for legitimate problems, is a particular kind of capital that is of great value in the scientific field (Bourdieu, 1991), but of a rather low value in fields such as the economic one. Since the value of the different forms of capital depends on the social field being investigated, it is important that researchers do not apply a “one size fits all” approach for each social field, but that they carefully analyze which form of capital is present in the field under investigation and how is its value is compared with other forms of capital, such as social capital and cultural capital, which might also be of value in the particular social field (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).

2.2.3. Habitus

The concept of habitus is the last part of Bourdieu’s triad. The habitus is directed to the micro-level of analysis (i.e., the level of the individual actor). It connects the arbitrary, socially constructed reality with the actors’ mental structures (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 13-14).

The habitus is defined as “[…] systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures […]” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53). This definition directs our attention to two steps, which we can (only) analytically distinguish: In the first step, the habitus is structured by external social structures, which means the inscribing of the society in the actors. For instance, in his work about male domination, Bourdieu (2001, p. 8-9) argued that the arbitrary social structures that define the difference between the sexes are
inscribed in actors habitus. In the second step, the habitus directs actors’ practices, where practices are defined as “routinized type of behavior” (Reckwitz, 2002, p. 249). For instance, the habitus directs movements and postures that are adapted to what is regarded as being either a male or female (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 27). By carrying out actions that are adapted to social structures, actors unintendedly reproduce those social structures because the existence of those structures depends on their reproduction by actors (see also Giddens, 1979, 1984).

However, what exactly is a habitus? To answer this question, we have to direct our attention to one of the core contributions of Bourdieu’s concept of habitus to the social sciences (i.e., the focus on actors’ cognition). Indeed, Bourdieu was one of the first exponents of cognitive sociology (Lizardo, 2004). As Lizardo (2004) argued, the concept of habitus was influenced by Piaget’s psychological developmental theory (see, e.g., Piaget, 1971). Similar to Piaget, Bourdieu (1990) emphasized the centrality of cognitive schemata; i.e., knowledge structures that provide assumptions about objects characteristics, relationships and entailments (DiMaggio, 1997, p. 269). Actors incorporate knowledge about the social world through their experiences in the world (Bourdieu, 2000a); that is why Bourdieu argued that the habitus is a structured structure, which means that it is structured by the socially constructed external environment (Bourdieu, 1986a). The knowledge is stored in the form of cognitive schemata in the actor’s habitus. Bourdieu (1986a) distinguished three different kinds of schemata: Schemata of perception, appreciation and action. First, schemata of perception influence the actors’ perception in that the information that matches the schemata is more likely to be perceived than the information that is contrary to the existing schemata (see, e.g., Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002; Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). Since the actors’ schemata of perception are the
2. Introduction into Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice

product of a socially constructed environment, they tend to perceive the
environment as natural and ‘objective’. Second, schemata of appreciation enable
actors to evaluate practices such as sports, music or books in those actors that like
or dislike them; they develop a certain taste. Third, schemata of action direct the
actors’ behavior. They enable actors to behave in appropriate ways in familiar
social contexts without the need for consciously thinking about their actions;
however, if actors have to act within unknown social contexts, for instance in
social fields that they have newly entered, it is likely that the actions directed by
the habitus are inappropriate.

A society’s social structures inscribe in actors’ habitus through two main
mechanisms (Bourdieu, 1977): Discourse and mimesis. By discourse, Bourdieu
refers to the possibility to transmit social structures through linguistic processes.
For instance, social structures are present in the actors’ talk and also in
documents. So far, the mechanism of discourse has received much attention in the
social sciences (see, e.g., Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Green & Li, 2011; Phillips,
Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004); however, Bourdieu (1977, p. 87) argued that “the
essential part of the modus operandi [emphasis in the original] which defines
practical mastery is transmitted in practice, in its practical state, without attaining
the level of discourse.” Transmission in practice means that cognitive schemata
can be directly transferred from one actor to another through the process of
mimesis; i.e., the unconscious imitation of other actors’ practices (Bourdieu,
1990). As Bourdieu argued, actors unconsciously understand other actors’ reasons
for doing something when imitating their actions. Therefore, social structures also
inscribe in the imitators.

Recapitulating, the key claims of the concept of habitus are (1) that the socially
constructed external environment structures actors’ cognitive schemata and (2)
that it is through these cognitive schemata that actors perceive the social environment, appreciate practices and generate their actions (Bourdieu, 1986a). Because actors’ actions are generated by the very same cognitive schemata that are structured by the external environment, Bourdieu argued that actors tend to reproduce the external environment through their actions (Bourdieu, 1990). Thus, the habitus “produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their generative principle, while adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 78).

2.3. Criticism on Bourdieu’s theory of practice

Like every ‘grand’ theory in the social sciences, Bourdieu’s theory of practice has been an object of much criticism. Our aim in this section is not to discuss the arguments of each of Bourdieu’s critiques (for a comprehensive overview, see Calhoun, LiPuma, & Postone, 1993), but to discuss central points of critique that are particularly relevant to readers in assessing the applicability and contributions of the theory of practice in management and organizational research.

While analyzing the critique towards Bourdieu’s theory of practice, we observe two main critique points: First, it is argued that Bourdieu’s theory focuses too much on the reproduction of society, leaving little room for social change (see, e.g., Giroux, 1982; Gorder, 1980; King, 2000, 2009; Lash, 1993; Thomson, 2008). DiMaggio (1979, p. 1470), for instance, argued: “Despite the political tensions that pervade his work, Bourdieu’s is a world not of revolutions or even of social change, but of endless transformations.” The reason why Bourdieu’s theory is regarded as emphasizing the reproduction of society lies in his description of the habitus. Bourdieu argued that the habitus comprises “cognitive structures which
2. Introduction into Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice

social agents implement in their practical knowledge of the world” and that these cognitive structures “are internalized, ‘embodied’ social structures” (Bourdieu, 1986a, p. 468). This indicates that the cognitive structures that are internalized in the actors’ habitus are derived from the objective conditions of the actors’ existence, for instance their socioeconomic positions (King, 2000). However, if the actors’ habitus, which directs actors’ practices and influences their actions and tastes, is structured by the objective structures of the actors’ living conditions, the habitus will bring forth practices that are adapted to these objectives structures. Therefore, actors’ habitus reproduce the objective structures of society so that a transformation or a social change is not possible (Gorder, 1980; King, 2000). King (2000, p. 427) summarized the critique as follows: “If the habitus were determined by objective conditions, ensuring appropriate action for the social position in which any individual was situated, and the habitus were unconsciously internalized dispositions and categories, then social change would be impossible. Individuals would act according to the objective structural conditions in which they found themselves, and they would consequently simply reproduce those objective conditions by repeating the same practices.”

While the critique regarding Bourdieu’s theory of practice is legitimate, since Bourdieu frequently mentioned reproducing aspects in the society (see, e.g., Bourdieu, 1998, p. 19-30; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977), we argue that it would be a mistake to believe that Bourdieu’s theory is a theory about the reproduction of the society or of societal fields, leaving very little room for social change. On the contrary, Bourdieu frequently acknowledged that social change is possible and does take place. For instance, in his work about the French scientific field, he explicitly addressed changes that lead to a transformation of the field (Bourdieu, 1988a). However, a closer reading of Bourdieu’s theory revealed that, for him,
social change is not a theoretical but an empirical question (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 80). As argued in section 2.2.1, fields are a place of struggles between dominant actors, who aim stability in the field, and dominated actors, who seek to change the field’s structure. According to Bourdieu, change in fields takes place if dominated actors are able to assert their interest against the interest of the dominant actors (Bourdieu, 1988a). Therefore, it is no coincidence that Bourdieu (1998, p. 19) highlighted the existence of “reproduction strategies” that aim to preserve the objective structures in the society. These strategies are unconsciously applied by the dominant actors to secure their positions. Hence, Bourdieu’s focus on reproduction in the society is rather influenced by empirical observations of reproduction (Bourdieu, 1988a, 1998; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977) than by any theoretical “preference” for reproduction over social change.

A second major point of critique is that Bourdieu’s theory tends to have deterministic explanations (see, e.g., Jenkins, 1982; King, 2000, 2005; Throop & Murphy, 2002), leaving little room for actors’ voluntary actions (Noble & Watkins, 2003). This critique is particularly addressed to Bourdieu’s concept of habitus. Although Bourdieu frequently clarified (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) that the habitus does not determine the actors’ actions, several researchers argued that if Bourdieu’s concept of habitus is taken seriously, there is a tendency toward deterministic explanations (see, e.g., Jenkins, 1982; King, 2000). This critique is also related to Bourdieu’s definition of habitus as consisting of objective structures that are stored in cognitive schemes, which direct actors’ practices (see, e.g., Jenkins, 1982). However, King (2000, p. 424) additionally argued that the habitus – as defined by Bourdieu – tends towards deterministic explanations because actors have no conscious mastery over their
habitus. Therefore, actors are similar to marionettes, since their practices are – without being consciously aware – determined by objective structures.

While the definitions of habitus cited by Bourdieu’s critics are correct, their interpretations as well as their implications of the definitions can themselves be criticized. Hilgers (2009) clarified that Bourdieu’s concept of habitus does not fall into determinism, but leaves room for voluntary actions. For instance, Bourdieu frequently argued that actors’ internalize general rules or principles of action and not actions as such in their habitus (Bourdieu, 1977, 2000a). These few rules or principles guide actors’ actions in an infinite number of contexts (Hilgers, 2009). This indicates that the habitus does not consist of an infinite number of action plans – one plan of action for every situation and context. Similar to Feldman’s research on the association between routines and organizational change, in which she showed that routines do not only influence organizational stability but that they also have a great potential for organizational change (see, e.g., Feldman, 2000, 2003; Feldman & Pentland, 2003), Bourdieu’s concept of habitus also considers both stability and change. Although actors internalize rules or principles that guide their actions, these rules or principles do not determine a single action but actions orient on them (Hilgers, 2009). This indicates that in a specific context, actors might “choose” from a range of actions, which is influenced by the principles incorporated. Hence, a relative amount of stability is guaranteed by the fact that actions are based on an incorporated principle, which constrains actors’ range of feasible actions. However, at the same time, change might occur because actors’ actions are not determined and, therefore, in similar contexts, actors do not necessarily use similar practices. As a result, change might occur, but only within a certain, rather narrow range.
Besides the clarification that Bourdieu’s concept of habitus is not deterministic but leaves room for – smaller – changes, we also have to discuss the general critique that Bourdieu’s theory of practice leaves too little room for actors’ conscious actions (see, e.g., King, 2000). What these critics did not take into account is that it is not the task of a sociological (or of any other) theory to leave room for human’s voluntary and conscious actions. Instead, a theory’s task is – simplified - to describe what happened and to explain why something happened (see, e.g., Bacharach, 1989; Sutton & Staw, 1995). Bourdieu (1977) emphasized in his theory of practice that actors’ unconsciously incorporate the objective structures of their living conditions in their habitus, and that the habitus then bring forth actions that are related to the objective structure. However, the question is not whether Bourdieu’s theory leaves room for voluntary actions, but whether its explanations are supported by empirical findings or not. Despite some discussions, in various research fields such as psychology (see, e.g., Baumeister, 2008; Wegner, 2002), philosophy (see, e.g., Haggard & Libet, 2001; Kane, 1999) and neuroscience (see, e.g., Hallett, 2007; Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008), about the existence of a conscious will, there is so far no clear evidence for or against it (McClure, forthcoming). However, several studies have revealed that human behavior is often caused by factors that actors are not aware of (see, e.g., Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Bargh & Morsella, 2008; Dijksterhuis et al., 1998). Therefore, we might argue that Bourdieu’s assumptions about the importance of unconscious actions are supported by empirical evidence.

To sum up, although we acknowledge that Bourdieu’s theory has certain weaknesses and that his critics address some important problems related to his theory, we assert that several points of critique highlighted by Bourdieu’s critics
can only be empirically and not conceptually clarified. Since the basic assumptions regarding Bourdieu’s concept of habitus are in accordance with findings from other scientific disciplines, such as psychology and the cognitive sciences (Lizardo, 2004; Lizardo & Strand, 2010), we argue that it is appropriate to apply Bourdieu’s concept of habitus in this thesis.
3. Pierre Bourdieu in management and organization studies –
A citation context analysis

3.1. Introduction

The work of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu has recently received increased attention in management and organization research (see, e.g., the special issue in *Organization*). First, popular concepts in management and organizational research such as the organizational field and social capital have been significantly influenced by Bourdieu’s theory (Greenwood & Meyer, 2008). Second, an increasing number of researchers apply concepts such as habitus, field or capital from Bourdieu’s theory to investigate phenomena in management and organization studies (e.g., Battilana, 2006; Lounsbury & Ventresca, 2003; Mutch, 2003). Third, in the course of the so-called ‘practice turn’ (Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, & Savigny, 2001) in the social sciences, management and organizational researchers began to view organizations through a ‘practice lens’ and applied Bourdieu’s theory of practice for this purpose. Some examples include the strategy-as-practice community (e.g., Splitter & Seidl, 2011; Whittington, 2006), research on (organizational) learning (e.g., Nicolini, Gherardi, & Yanow, 2003; Slutskaya & De Cock, 2008) and the institutional theory community (see, e.g., Battilana, 2006; Oakes, Townley, & Cooper, 1998), particularly scholars who are interested in institutional work (see, e.g., Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Voronov & Vince, 2012).

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2 A previous version of the chapter has been presented at the Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management 2010.
Although these developments have led to increased interest in Bourdieu’s work among management and organization scholars, some researchers made the criticism that ideas from Bourdieu’s theory were decontextualized from the theory’s inner logic and that some key aspects of the theory have been misrecognized (Mutch, Delbridge, & Ventresca, 2006). For instance, Emirbayer and Johnson (2008) argued that scholars tend to separate Bourdieu’s theoretical triad (field, capital and habitus), thereby ignoring the theory’s inner logic (see also Golsorkhi, Leca, Lounsbury, & Ramirez, 2009). Likewise, Dobbin (2008, p. 53) argued that “[t]he whole of this theory [Bourdieu’s theory of practice] is more than the sum of its parts and so the potential of the theory has not been realized in American practice even if some of the parts have been embraced”.

To overcome the limited applications of Bourdieu’s theory in management and organization studies, several researchers presented comprehensive and well-crafted introductions to Bourdieu’s work (e.g., Everett, 2002; Özbilgin & Tatli, 2005) and showed how the theory can be put into action in management and organization studies (see, e.g., Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008; Özbilgin & Tatli, 2005). Although these works presented means of applying Bourdieu’s theory of practice in management and organization research, they fell short of systematically analyzing how the theory is currently applied in management and organization studies. However, we argue that such an analysis is important for pinpointing deficits in the theory’s usage. For instance, prior studies revealed that theories are often applied unsystematically and rather perfunctorily (see, e.g., Lounsbury & Carberry, 2005). Moreover, it has also been found that often only a small number of a theory’s knowledge claims are applied in research (see, e.g., Anderson, 2006; Anderson & Sun, 2010; Golden-Biddle, Locke, & Reay, 2006).
In addition to pinpointing deficits in the usage, a systematic analysis of the theory’s current application, which goes beyond merely counting citations, is also able to indicate the ways in which the theory may contribute to research in the field of management and organization studies. Although such an analysis has already been conducted for Bourdieu’s theory of practice in the field of sociology (Sallaz & Zavisca, 2007), we argue that the growing interest in practice theories in general, particularly in Bourdieu’s theory of practice, among management and organizational scholars justifies a detailed investigation. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to provide a systematic analysis of the application of Bourdieu’s theory of practice in the field of management and organization studies to pinpoint the theory’s contributions to further develop management and organizational research. For this reason, we investigate three research questions:

1. How have citations to Bourdieu in management and organization journals developed over time?

2. What contents from Bourdieu’s theory of practice are cited by management and organization scholars?

3. How comprehensive are citations to Bourdieu’s theory?

The first research question investigates how citations to Bourdieu’s work developed over time. Although it is frequently argued that there is increased interest in Bourdieu’s work in the field of management and organization studies (see, e.g., Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008; Golsorkhi, et al., 2009), there is so far no systematic analysis of this claim. Such an analysis is important for the field of management and organization studies in that it provides evidence for the proclaimed turn towards practice (Schatzki, et al., 2001; Whittington, 2006). Furthermore, the citation analysis indicates how Bourdieu’s position in the field of management and organizational studies, i.e., his influence in the field, developed
over time. As argued by several studies (see, e.g., Anderson, 2006; Greenwood & Meyer, 2008; Macdonald & Kam, 2010), citation counts represent a good proxy for analyzing a theorist’s influence in a field.

The second research question aims to analyze which parts of Bourdieu’s theory are applied. Some researchers (see, e.g., Anderson, 2006; Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008) argued that scholars often do not apply all parts of a theory but refer to some of the theory’s concepts, which can be defined as subcategories of theories (Bacharach, 1989; Bort & Kieser, 2011). For instance, researchers citing Giddens (1984) often refer to his idea of ‘structuration’ (see, e.g., Barley & Tolbert, 1997; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) without applying all knowledge claims and assumptions of structuration theory (Whittington, 1992). Therefore, our analysis of the applied concepts contributes to a better understanding of which parts of Bourdieu’s work are (un)known among management and organization scholars. Based on this analysis, we are able to make recommendations on which parts of his theory might be introduced to management and organization studies to make contributions to ongoing discussions in the field.

The third research question takes into account that not all citations are of equal importance for an article’s rationale. For instance, Moravcsik and Murugesan (1975) found that some citations are not truly needed but have the function of acknowledging previous work. Similarly, Lounsbury and Carberry (2005) distinguished between ceremonious and substantive citations of Max Weber’s work and identified a high ratio of ceremonious citations, which indicates that scholars do not substantially engage in his work but merely acknowledge its impact. Therefore, we argue that this analysis is important to assess management and organization scholars’ depth of discussion with Bourdieu’s theory, which is
3. Pierre Bourdieu in management and organization studies

important for pinpointing new ways in which Bourdieu’s theory of practice may contribute to research in management and organization studies.

The paper is structured as follows: in the first part, we provide a short introduction to Bourdieu’s work. This introduction, however, is far from being comprehensive and specific to the field of organization studies, as such work already exists (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008; Özbilgin & Tatli, 2005). Subsequently, in the second part, we describe the methodology of our citation analysis with regard to the data collection and analysis. The third part presents the results of our citation analysis. The fourth part discusses our findings, whereas the fifth part outlines how Bourdieu’s theory of practice might contribute to research in the field of management and organization studies.

3.2. Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice

Providing a short introduction to Bourdieu’s theory is a difficult undertaking because of its complexity. Nevertheless, we argue that it can be best summarized by describing the theoretical triad, habitus, capital and field, as this triad is at the theory’s core (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008).

We start our discussion with the concept of fields. Fields are defined as a “network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 97). Contrary to the organizational field concept, which stresses direct interactions between actors (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), Bourdieu argued that there exist relationships only between positions in a field (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 97) and not between actors themselves. Fields can be compared with games (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Like games, fields follow certain rules or regularities that are not necessarily codified but rather embodied in the players. Within fields, we can find networks of social relations between the
actors. These actors have certain positions within a field (in a three-dimensional space) and compete with other actors over the resources within the field (Bourdieu, 1990). The positions within the field and the power that can be exerted by the actors depend on their share of the capital in the field. Actors possessing high amounts of capital occupy a dominant position in the field, whereas dominated positions are occupied by actors with low amounts of capital.

Capital is the second key concept in Bourdieu’s theory of practice. According to Bourdieu (1986b), capital can take on different forms, which depend on the social field. Nevertheless, he identified three basic forms of capital, which are at stake in almost all fields: social, cultural and economic capital (Bourdieu, 1986b). First, social capital is defined as “the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 119). The definition highlights the importance of personal relationships and networks for actors, as these networks and relationship facilitate the assertion of actors’ interests. Second, cultural capital is the totality of actors’ cultural resources (Bourdieu, 1986a, p. 80-83). It exists in three states: embodied, objectified and institutionalized states (Bourdieu, 1986b). The embodied state of cultural capital encompasses actors’ dispositions and tastes; for instance, the preference for pictures of Van Gogh over those of Renoir represents a type of cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986a). These tastes and dispositions are unconsciously learned by actors in the course of their socialization. In its objectified form, cultural capital refers to the possession of cultural goods such as books, pictures or music instruments. However, merely possessing such cultural goods is not sufficient for cultural capital. For instance, if actors possess a musical instrument but are not able to use this instrument appropriately, they do not
possess cultural capital; they only possess cultural capital if they also possess the ability to adequately use their cultural good (Bourdieu, 1986b). Finally, the institutionalized state of cultural capital refers to (educational) certificates, skills and knowledge. Examples of this type of cultural capital include university diplomas and certificates of successfully accomplished qualifications. The third basic form of capital in Bourdieu’s theory is economic capital, which cannot be equated with money; it rather encompasses assets and rights that can be directly converted into money (Bourdieu, 1986b). Some examples of economic capital are the contractual right to receive monetary income and the ownership of productive assets or property rights (Sallaz & Zavisca, 2007, p. 23).

In addition to field and capital, the concept of habitus is the final part of Bourdieu’s theoretical triad. It is defined as “[…] systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures […]” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53). (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53). This definition directs our attention to two steps, which can only be analytically distinguished: In the first step, the habitus is structured by external social structures, which means that society is inscribed in actors. In the second step, the habitus directs actors’ practices according to the internalized social structures. However, what exactly is a habitus? To answer this question, we must direct our attention to one of the core contributions of Bourdieu’s concept of habitus to the social sciences, i.e., the focus on actors’ cognition. Actors incorporate knowledge about the social world through their experiences in the world (Bourdieu, 2000a); for this reason, Bourdieu argued that the habitus is structured by the socially constructed external environment (Bourdieu, 1986a). The knowledge is stored in the form of cognitive schemata in the actor’s habitus. Bourdieu (1986a) distinguished three different kinds of schemata: schemata of perception, appreciation and action. First,
schemata of perception influence actors’ perception in that information that matches existing schemata is more likely to be perceived than information that is contrary to existing schemata (see, e.g., Correll, et al., 2002; Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). Because actors’ schemata of perception are the product of a socially constructed environment, they tend to perceive the environment as natural and ‘objective’. Second, schemata of appreciation enable actors to evaluate practices such as sports, music or books in practices that actors like or dislike; the actors develop a certain taste. Third, schemata of action direct actors’ behavior. They enable actors to behave in appropriate ways in familiar social contexts without the need for consciously thinking about their actions; however, if actors must act within unknown social contexts, such as in social fields that they have newly entered, it is likely that the actions directed by the habitus are inappropriate.

To summarize, Bourdieu’s triad of field, capital and habitus seeks to bridge the macro-micro dualism in the social sciences. Fields, representing the macro-level concept, influence and are influenced by the habitus, the micro-level concept. Furthermore, capital is on the one hand related to the micro-level, as it is a resource that actors can use to achieve their goals and to carry their interests. However, on the other hand, capital is related to the macro-level, as it is the logic of the field that defines the specific value of each form of capital.

3.3. Methods

3.3.1. Data Gathering

To analyze the application of Bourdieu’s theory of practice in management and organization studies, we conducted a content analysis of articles including references to Bourdieu’s work. However, because we are only interested in the
specific context in which Bourdieu is cited, we chose to conduct a ‘citation context analysis’ (Small, 1982). Citation context analyses have recently received some attention in management and organization studies (see, e.g., Anderson, 2006; Anderson & Sun, 2010; Golden-Biddle, et al., 2006; Lounsbury & Carberry, 2005) because they allow researchers to analyze in greater detail which knowledge claims of a theory are cited. In difference to a content analysis of an entire article, a citation context analysis examines only those parts in the citing article that contain citations to the work under investigation (Anderson & Sun, 2010). We argue that a citation context analysis offers us the advantage of an in-depth analysis of the claims from Bourdieu’s theory retrieved by management and organization scholars while at the same time limiting the number of relevant passages to a minimum, enabling the empirical analysis of large-scale data sets.

The citation context analysis began with a search of citations of works by Pierre Bourdieu. We used the Social Science Citation Index to collect articles in the field of management and organization studies citing Bourdieu. However, during the analysis, we recognized that Bourdieu’s work is too frequently cited, rendering a citation context analysis of all citations in the field of management and organization studies impossible. For instance, according to the Social Science Citation Index, the four books Outline of a Theory of Practice, Distinction, The Logic of Practice and An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology are cited in approximately 660 management and organization studies articles. Therefore, we decided to follow previous studies (see, e.g., Anderson, 2006; Lounsbury & Carberry, 2005) and limited our analysis to top outlets for research on management and organization studies. We selected nine journals (Academy of Management Journal (AMJ), Academy of Management Review (AMR), Administrative Science Quarterly (ASQ), British Journal of Management (BJM),
Journal of Management (JoM), Journal of Management Studies (JMS), Organization (Org), Organization Science (OrgSci) and Organization Studies (OrgSt)) for our analysis for two reasons: first, the journals have their roots in the European (BJM, JMS, OrgSt and Org) and North American scientific communities (AMJ, AMR, ASQ, JoM and OrgSci). Because previous research revealed significant differences in citation patterns between researchers from North America and Europe (see, e.g., Battilana, Anteby, & Sengul, 2010; Meyer & Boxenbaum, 2010; Üsdiken & Pasadeos, 1995), we argue that it is important to include journals from both geographical regions to obtain a comprehensive overview of the application of Bourdieu’s theory of practice in management and organization studies. Second, the journals are among the most prestigious in the field of management and organization studies (see, e.g., Harzing, 2011) and have been used in previous studies (see, e.g., Bort & Kieser, 2011; Lounsbury & Carberry, 2005; Meyer & Boxenbaum, 2010).

Because each volume of the journals was electronically available, we used search engines to conduct a search in articles’ full texts using the keyword “Bourdieu”. We included all published articles except book reviews published until December 2010. After an initial reading of the articles, we excluded all articles in which Bourdieu’s name is mentioned but without any reference to his work. Moreover, we observed some occasional misspellings of Bourdieu (‘Bordieu’). To include articles that constantly misspelled him, we also searched for ‘Bordieu’ in full text. We identified five additional papers, which increased our sample to 298 articles.
3.3.2. Analysis

At the beginning of our citation context analysis, we developed a codebook to systematically analyze the articles with regard to our research interests. First, we analyzed which concepts of Bourdieu’s theory are applied by management and organization scholars. In line with the literature (see, e.g., Bacharach, 1989; Bort & Kieser, 2011), we argue that concepts are subcategories of theories and that theories consist of several concepts that are related to each other. With regard to Bourdieu’s theory of practice, we can identify concepts such as field, capital, habitus and doxa, which are in relation with each other but which can also be separately applied. In preparation for the analysis, we reread four of Bourdieu’s major books (Outline of a Theory of Practice, Distinction, The Logic of Practice and An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology) and excerpted several concepts. This list of concepts was adjusted if an unlisted concept was cited. To identify the cited concept, we scanned the context of the citation for any direct reference to a concept of Bourdieu. In cases without any direct reference to a concept, we read the entire paragraph to understand its content, interpreted the meaning of the statement and then classified the context in terms of Bourdieu’s work. Because some articles referred to more than one concept, multiple codings were possible.

Second, we analyzed the depth of the references to Bourdieu. We followed Sallaz and Zavisca (2007) and classified citations as “limited”, “intermediate” or “comprehensive”. The classification of the citation context by no means indicates an evaluation of the article’s quality; it is merely an evaluation of scholars’ engagement in the work of Pierre Bourdieu. A citation was classified as being “limited” if the citation briefly referred to one of Bourdieu’s concepts without any further elucidation (see, e.g., Oh, Chung, & Labianca, 2004). Citations classified as “intermediate” discuss Bourdieu’s work or built measures around one of his
3. Pierre Bourdieu in management and organization studies

concepts (see, e.g., Mutch, 2007). Finally, if an article shows a significant engagement with Bourdieu, for instance, if it discusses one of Bourdieu’s concepts in great length (see, e.g., Battilana, 2006), it is classified as being “comprehensive”. Further information about the classification criteria can be found in the appendix.

The coding was made by one researcher. The coding of the referred concept was in some cases difficult, as the citations were rather vague. In these cases, we expanded the context of the citation by including the paragraphs before and after the citation. If the classification remained ambiguous, the context was discussed with a colleague familiar with Bourdieu’s theory until we came to a consensus regarding its classification. Similar problems occurred when classifying citations as “limited”, “intermediate” and “comprehensive”. In ambiguous cases, we again discussed these contexts with a colleague to resolve the problem. To control the reliability of the codings, we performed an intra-coder reliability test, in which we recoded 72 randomly chosen articles (24.2% of the total sample) four weeks after the initial coding. We had reasonably high agreement with regard to the cited concepts (95.8%) and citation depth (93.1%), providing evidence for the reliability of the codings.

3.4. Results

Our first research question investigates the development of citations to Bourdieu’s work over time. Figure 2 shows a steady increase in the ratio of articles citing Bourdieu between the years 1980 and 2010. Whereas only a small number of articles cited Bourdieu in the 1980s, the ratio was on average approximately one citation per 250 articles (0.04% of all articles), and this number increased to about one citation every 55 articles (1.8% of all articles) in the 1990s. From the years
2000 to 2010, the ratio of articles citing Bourdieu further increased to approximately one citation per 20 articles (5.2% of all articles).

In addition to the general increase in articles citing Bourdieu in management and organization studies, Figure 2 also reveals a higher citation frequency for Bourdieu in management and organization studies journals that are located in Europe. In every decade, the citation count for European journals is at least twice as high as that of North American journals. Although this finding does not necessarily indicate a higher interest in Bourdieu among European researchers, as European researchers often publish their work in North American journals and North American researchers in European journals, it at least indicates that the European journals included in this study appear to be more interested in his work than their North American counterparts.

Figure 2: Ratio of articles citing Bourdieu in nine management and organization studies journals.

Our second research question asked what contents of Bourdieu’s theory of practice are cited by management and organization scholars. This question is important for investigating whether the common notion of a rather fragmented application of Bourdieu’s theory in the literature can be confirmed (e.g., Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008). Moreover, it reveals which ideas and knowledge claims of Bourdieu have already been retrieved. Following Anderson (2006), we
categorized the citation context of each citation among the 298 articles. However, we only investigated whether authors refer to a concept in the article and not how often they refer to that specific concept, so that more frequent citations of a context within a text were not considered. Our analysis yielded a total of 54 different concepts and 391 citation contexts within the 298 articles. Table 2 reports the ten most frequently cited concepts, along with the number of times each was cited along with an example citation. Each of these concepts was cited at least nine times, and together, these concepts represent 71.6% of the total number of cited concepts.

Our analysis reveals that ‘capital’ is by far Bourdieu’s most frequently cited concept, with 73 (18.7%) citations. However, Sallaz and Zavisca (2007) found differences in the number of citations of different forms of capital. For instance, they showed that cultural capital is by far the most frequently cited form of capital in sociological journals. Therefore, we further analyzed which form of capital scholars refer to in the 73 articles in which the concept of capital is cited. We find that social capital (51 citations; 43.6%) is by far the most frequently used form of capital, followed by cultural (22; 18.8%), symbolic (21; 17.9%) and economic capital (15; 12.8%). Furthermore, four citations (3.4%) refer to other forms of capital, such as political and academic capital, and in another four articles (3.4%), no specific form of capital is cited.

In addition to the concept of capital, scholars most frequently refer to Bourdieu’s two other main concepts, ‘habitus’ (56 citations; 14.3%) and ‘field’ (55; 14.1%). The three concepts capital, habitus and field combined cover 184 citation contexts, which represent 47.1% of all 391 citation contexts. The two other concepts to which authors referred at least 20 times were Bourdieu’s attempt to overcome the ‘duality of structure and agency’ (23; 5.9%) and the concept of
social practices’ (20; 5.1%). The next five most frequently cited categories are the following (with the number of citation contexts/the percentage of citation contexts): ‘theory of practice’ (13/3.3%), ‘logic of practice’ (12; 3.1%), ‘power’ (10/2.6%), ‘taste/distinction’ (9; 2.3%) and ‘language’ (9; 2.3%). These figures reveal that most of the papers in organization studies citing Bourdieu concentrate on his three theoretical concepts – habitus, field and capital – and almost neglect other important contributions such as his concept of the human body, field logics, hysteresis and doxa.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th># of citations (in %)</th>
<th>Example citation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>73 (18.8)</td>
<td>“Generally, it [social capital] is conceptualized as an intangible resource of support that emanates from membership of a social group which can be mobilized in times of need (Adler and Kwon 2002; Bourdieu 1986; Coleman 1988).” (Wiertz &amp; de Ruyter, 2007, p. 351)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habitus</td>
<td>56 (14.2)</td>
<td>“A main feature of the habitus in response to the demands of the branch or social field is the ability to ‘fit in’ with regard to conventions and regulations (Bourdieu 1979, 1984).” (Alvesson, 1994, p. 539)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field</td>
<td>55 (13.7)</td>
<td>“For Bourdieu, fields are networks of social relations, structured systems of social positions within which struggles or maneuvers take place over resources, stakes, and access.” (Oakes, et al., 1998, p. 260)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duality of structure and agency</td>
<td>23 (5.9)</td>
<td>“This article preserves that analytical distinction, but argues that the continual counterposing of framework and interaction is unhelpful because of its implicit and inaccurate opposition of “constraint” to “agency.” The recent works of Bourdieu (1971, 1977,1979) and Giddens (1976, 1977) suggest a more fruitful perspective, focusing upon the interpenetration of framework and interaction as expressing a relationship that is often mutually constituting and constitutive.” (Ranson, et al., 1980, p. 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social practices</td>
<td>20 (5.2)</td>
<td>“Other scholars have also repeatedly noted that the collective enactment of practices over time can produce and reproduce social order and meanings (Ortner, 1984; de Certeau, 1988; Bourdieu, 1990; Knorr-Cetina, 1999; Swidler, 2001).” (Anteby, 2010, p. 631)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory of practice</td>
<td>13 (3.4)</td>
<td>“Bourdieu’s theory of practice (1990) helps to explain why business ownership continues to be such unfavourable territory for women.” (Wilson, Carter, Tagg, Shaw, &amp; Lam, 2007, p. 156)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logic of practice</td>
<td>12 (3.1)</td>
<td>“Bourdieu (1990: 90) writes: ‘The logic of practice is a logic which understands only in order to act, a logic that is performed directly in bodily gymnastics, without passing through explicit apprehension.’” (Gherardi, 1999, p. 115)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Pierre Bourdieu in management and organization studies

Table 2: Overview of Bourdieu’s ten most frequently cited concepts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th># of citations (in %)</th>
<th>Example citation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>10 (2.6)</td>
<td>“The link between power and the legitimation of knowledge-use practices is supported by the work of Goffman (1967) and Bourdieu (1977), who observed that power inheres in the practices and interactions in which people collectively engage.” (Nag, Corley, &amp; Gioia, 2007, p. 843)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taste/Distinction</td>
<td>9 (2.3)</td>
<td>“Each entertainment producer, like Betty, has a sense of which orchestra leaders they feel are better able to ‘cut a show’ [...]. This sense of taste or ‘manifest preference’ (Bourdieu 1980) is not grounded solely in personal or subjective values; the conventional categories for understanding orchestras and their leaders, and for selecting them, produces and reproduces the collective, shared identity that allows this organization to perpetuate itself.” (Rusted, 1999, p. 652)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>9 (2.3)</td>
<td>“And, as Bourdieu (1991: 31) remarked, such an understanding of the socially instituted limits of the ways of speaking and thinking constitutes “the first step in creating new social relations, alternative ways of organising social and political life.”” (De Cock &amp; Land, 2006, p. 529)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>111 (28.6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>391 (100)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Our third research question focuses on the scholars’ depth of discussion regarding Bourdieu’s work. Following Sallaz and Zavisca (Sallaz & Zavisca, 2007), we classified articles according to their ‘limited’, ‘intermediate’ or ‘comprehensive’ engagement of Bourdieu’s theory. Our findings are summarized in Figure 3. The data reveal that the depth of citations has increased over the years; whereas citations to Bourdieu’s work were mostly limited during earlier periods, particularly in the 1980s and early 1990s, we can see an increase both in the ratio of intermediate and comprehensive citations up to the period 2005-2010.
Although the analysis provides insights into the depth of citations to Bourdieu’s work, it does not reveal whether there are differences in the depth of citation with regard to the cited concepts. For instance, Emirbayer and Johnson (2008) argued that Bourdieu’s concept of field and capital have been well-established in the field of management and organization studies, whereas the concept of habitus has received less attention. Because these three concepts together reach almost half of the citations, it is reasonable to examine them in greater depth. For this purpose, we analyzed each citation to the concepts in the 298 articles and classified it as having ‘limited’, ‘intermediate’ or ‘comprehensive’ engagement of the concepts. Overall, the analysis reveals that over 50% of all articles in which the three concepts are cited address them in a limited manner (see Figure 4). However, we can observe differences in the depth of citations between the three concepts. The concept of capital has the lowest citation depth; in 64.4% of the articles that refer to the concept, it is cited limitedly, whereas only in 28.8% and 6.8% of all articles is it cited intermediately and comprehensively, respectively. Regarding the concept of habitus, the findings show that in 53.6% of the articles, researchers deal limitedly with it, whereas we find a relatively high number of intermediate
citations (39.3%) but a lower number of comprehensive ones (7.1%). Finally, articles referring to Bourdieu’s concept of field cited it limitedly in 54.5%, intermediately in 32.7% and comprehensively in 12.7% of all cases.

![Figure 4: Depth of citation of Bourdieu’s three core concepts: capital, habitus and field.](image)

3.5. Discussion and contributions

3.5.1. Discussion

The aim of this paper is to provide a systematic review of the application of Bourdieu’s theory of practice in the field of management and organization studies. We analyze three research questions to which we refer in the following, thereby putting our findings into perspective.

Our first research question analyses citations to Pierre Bourdieu in nine leading management and organization journals between the years 1980 and 2010. We find a steady increase in the number of citations to Bourdieu’s work over time. The growth in the ratio of articles citing Bourdieu in the field of management and organization studies parallels that in North American sociology journals, where the ratio increased from approximately 2% between the years 1980 and 1984 to
more than 10% between the years 2000 and 2004 (Sallaz & Zavisca, 2007). Following Bort and Kieser (2011), we might argue that citing Bourdieu has become a “fashion” in the field of management and organization studies (see also Abrahamson, 2009; Starbuck, 2009). However, Abrahamson (1996) argued that the diffusion of fashions—he referred to so-called management fashions—is characterized by a bell curve, which means that after a rapid increase in the number of applications, a swift drop is observable. Several studies on (management) fashions support Abrahamson’s claim of a fashion bell curve (see, e.g., Kieser, 1997; Nicolai, Schulz, & Thomas, 2010; Süß & Kleiner, 2007). Because we identify a rather slow and steady increase of citations to Bourdieu over the years, which bears little resemblance to a bell curve, we argue that it is rather unlikely that citing Bourdieu has become a “citation fashion”. Instead, our findings indicate that the interest of management and organization scholars in Bourdieu’s work and, as a consequence, his influence in the field has increased over time. Because there are few similar studies of citations to the work of other theorists, it is difficult for us to compare Bourdieu’s influence in the field of management and organization studies with that of other theorists. However, compared to Max Weber, who was cited in approximately 15.0% of all ASQ and OrgSt articles published between 1980 and 2002 (Lounsbury & Carberry, 2005), we can assert that Bourdieu has significantly less influence. However, this finding is not surprising if we take into account that Bourdieu conducted little research on management and organizations, whereas Weber is regarded as one of the founding fathers of organization studies (Lounsbury & Carberry, 2005).

Moreover, our analysis of citations to Bourdieu’s work revealed that Bourdieu is more frequently cited in European journals (OrgSt, Org, JMS and BJM) than in North American journals (AMJ, AMR, ASQ, JoM and OrgSci). This finding
might be explained by difficulties in the cross-Atlantic dissemination of ideas (see, e.g., Bourdieu, 2000b; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1999; Brubaker, 1993; Camic & Gross, 2004; Hofstede, 1996). Researchers on the sociology of ideas argued that the meaning of ideas is not transparent but embedded in societal and intellectual contexts and traditions (see, e.g., Bourdieu, 1983, 1993a; Camic & Gross, 2004). For instance, Bourdieu frequently argued that problems concerning the diffusion of his theory in the field of American sociology are related to differences in intellectual traditions (see, e.g., Bourdieu, 1993a; Bourdieu, 2000b). The conditions in the French field of the social sciences during the 1950s and 1960s, the context in which Bourdieu developed his theory, differed substantially from the conditions and traditions in the North American field of sociology. According to Bourdieu (1983, 1993a), these differences in conditions inhibit the transfer of ideas from the European to the North American field of sociology (see also Brubaker, 1993; Sallaz & Zavisca, 2007; Wacquant, 1993). The cognitive schemata of scholars in the North American field are likely to be inappropriate to interpret and make sense of the ideas of Bourdieu, as they were socialized in different social and academic contexts than Bourdieu. Research findings from the field of management and organization studies provide evidence for this assumption. For instance, Battilana and colleagues (2010) found that OrgSt articles (co-)authored by researchers affiliated with institutions in North America are much more likely to be cited within North American academia. Similarly, Meyer and Boxenbaum (2010) revealed that articles in European journals (Org and OrgSt) cite European ‘grand’ theorists (e.g., Giddens, Weber, Habermas and Foucault) more often than articles in North American journals (AMJ, AMR and OrgSci). In sum, we argue that it is a likely interpretation of our findings that the higher number of citations for Bourdieu in European as compared to North
American management and organization journals is caused by differences in the intellectual and societal context in which Bourdieu developed his ideas and the context of reception, i.e., the European and North American contexts of management and organization studies.

Our second research question investigates what content of Bourdieu’s theory of practice is cited by management and organization scholars. We find that the three concepts of capital, habitus and field combined cover almost half of the citations. This finding provides a more nuanced picture of the reception of Bourdieu’s theory in the field of management and organization studies. On the one hand, it supports the impression that researchers mostly focused on Bourdieu’s triad of capital, habitus and field (see, e.g., Everett, 2002). Although Bourdieu’s theory comprises more than the concepts capital, habitus and field, researchers often set their focus on this triad. Our findings are supported by Sallaz and Zavisca’s (2007) study about the reception of Bourdieu in North American sociology, which found that Bourdieu’s triad combined cover almost 60% of all citation contexts, which is approximately 10% higher than in this study. Moreover, Anderson’s (2006) study of citations to the work of Karl Weick revealed that a selective reception of a theorist’s work is not uncommon; for instance, Weick’s concept of ‘enactment’ accounts for 16.6% of all citations to Weick’s work in leading management and organization studies journals. On the other hand, our findings contradict the statement of Emirbayer and Johnson (2008), who observed an “almost total inattention to habitus [emphasis in the original]” among management and organization scholars. Indeed, we found that habitus is the second most often cited concept of Bourdieu in the nine analyzed journals.

Finally, our third question analyzes the comprehensiveness of citations to Bourdieu’s work. We find that over time, management and organization
researchers engaged more deeply with Bourdieu’s concepts; whereas citations in the 1980s were mostly limited, we can observe a more comprehensive usage of Bourdieu’s theory of practice in the 2000s, which parallels findings from citations for the work of Max Weber (Lounsbury & Carberry, 2005). However, if we compare these findings with those of Sallaz and Zavisca (2007) for the North American field of sociology, we can observe differences; although Sallaz and Zavisca (2007) found that citations to Bourdieu increased over time, their analysis revealed a decreasing ratio of comprehensive and intermediate citations from 1980 to 2004. An explanation for the opposite trend in the field of management and organization studies might lie in the current popularity of the ‘practice perspective’ among management and organization scholars. For instance, we observe an increased interest in practices in general (see, e.g., Miettinen, et al., 2009) as well as an inclusion of practice theory in discussions in the field of management and organization studies such as strategy-as-practice (see, e.g., Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009) and institutional work (see, e.g., Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2011). Because Bourdieu is one of the most prominent practice theorists, this observation may explain why his theory is currently applied more comprehensively.

An additional finding of our analysis is that the depth of citations to Bourdieu’s concepts of capital, habitus and field significantly differs between the concepts. Contrary to the observation of Emirbayer and Johnson (2008), we find that capital and not habitus is the least comprehensively used concept of Bourdieu in the field of management and organization studies. This finding might be caused by our focus on nine leading management and organization journals. For instance, we cannot rule out that Bourdieu’s concept of capital is used in a more comprehensive way in other journals. Sallaz and Zavisca (2007) argued, based on
Bourdieu’s (1988a) study of the French academic field, that they would expect earlier and more frequent citations to Bourdieu’s work in peripheral and less prestigious journals due to Bourdieu’s “outsider status”. Another explanation is that the rather high number of citations to Bourdieu’s concept of capital, although many of them were limited, generates the perception of a rather comprehensive engagement with the concept among management and organization researchers. The perception of an almost complete inattention of Bourdieu’s concept of habitus (see Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008) may be caused by a rather low number of comprehensive citations. Although we can find a rather high number of intermediate citations, many of them being definitions of habitus, we find very few studies that work with the habitus and apply the concept as a central part of their research (see, e.g., Kerr & Robinson, 2009; Mutch, 2003). Whereas the concepts of capital and habitus are rather seldomly applied in a comprehensive way by management and organization scholars, we find a deeper engagement with Bourdieu’s concept of field. A possible explanation for the finding is the similarity between Bourdieu’s concept of field and the institutionalist concept of organizational fields. Several authors stressed that DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) concept of organizational fields was originally inspired by Bourdieu (see, e.g., Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008; Greenwood & Meyer, 2008). Therefore, Bourdieu’s field concept is often applied by institutional scholars (see, e.g., Battilana, 2006; Oakes, et al., 1998), which may explain the high number of comprehensive engagements with Bourdieu’s concept of field.
3. Pierre Bourdieu in management and organization studies

3.5.2. Contributions of Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice to Research in Management and Organization Studies

Although there are already some articles discussing means of applying Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice in management and organization studies (see Chudzikowski & Mayrhofer, 2011; Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008; Everett, 2002; Özbilgin & Tatli, 2005), they mainly provided a general introduction into Bourdieu’s theory without pinpointing and introducing currently neglected parts of his theory. Our paper adds to this discussion by introducing some rather unrecognized aspects of Bourdieu’s work. Particularly, our focus is on what Lizardo (2012, p. 242) called “the (coming) third phase” of Bourdieu’s reception in U.S. sociology: the cognitive foundation of Bourdieu’s theory of practice. Although our review revealed that very few articles adopt the cognitive perspective, we argue that it represents a significant part of Bourdieu’s theory (see, e.g., Lizardo, 2004) and has the potential to make a significant contribution to research in the field of management and organization studies. For instance, studies in the field of cultural sociology showed that this perspective offers the possibility to connect cultural research with research in cognitive science to develop a more realistic perspective on the relation between culture and cognition (see, e.g., DiMaggio, 1997; Ignatow, 2009; Lizardo, 2009; Lizardo & Strand, 2010; Vaisey, 2009; Vaughan, 2002), which may also be of interest for research on topics such as organizational culture (Hatch, 1993; Hatch & Zilber, 2012). Moreover, Bourdieu’s cognitive foundation may also contribute to institutional theory, which currently lacks a cognitive micro-foundation (Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Zucker, 1991), although the theory’s main focus is on cognitive institutions (Phillips & Malhotra, 2008). Therefore, we argue that introducing the cognitive
perspective of Bourdieu’s work is of interest to researchers in the field of management and organization studies.

The first important foundation of Bourdieu’s cognitive foundation is the concept of habitus (Lizardo, 2004). Although our study revealed that the habitus is among the most frequently cited concepts of Bourdieu’s theory of practice in management and organization journals, we observed that researchers seldom release its full potential. In particular, the cognitive dimension of the habitus has so far been neglected (Lizardo, 2004, 2009), although it represents one of the most important contributions of the concept (Bourdieu, 2000a; Lizardo, 2004). We discuss contributions of the concept of habitus to research in management and organization studies using the example of micro-processes of institutional theory, i.e., processes on the level of the individual actor, as institutional theory is currently one of the most important theories in management and organization studies (Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin, & Suddaby, 2008) and because it continues to lack a micro-foundation that explains cognitive processes at the micro-level (Powell & Colyvas, 2008). Such a cognitive micro-foundation is important because “any macrosociology rests on a microsociology, however tacit” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 16). Following some institutional researchers (see, e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Voronov & Vince, 2012), we argue that the habitus may serve as such a cognitive micro-foundation. For instance, the concept of habitus may explain how arbitrary social conventions become institutions, i.e., taken-for-granted beliefs about social best practices (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Bourdieu (1986a) argued that over the course of their socialization, actors unconsciously incorporate cognitive schemata of perception, appreciation and action, which are influenced by actors’ conditions of existence. This means that the cognitive schemata through which actors perceive the world are influenced by
the very same world. Therefore, actors are likely to perceive socially constructed parts of the world as being natural, as these parts match their cognitive schemata (Bourdieu, 2001). Because socially constructed parts of the world are perceived not as being arbitrary and constructed but as being natural, they become “facts which must be taken into account by actors” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 341) and are not questioned by actors; Bourdieu (1977) called this doxa.

The second foundation of Bourdieu’s cognitive concept is the human body. At first sight, it is curious that Bourdieu emphasized the body’s role in cognitive processes (Bourdieu, 1977, 2000a), as management and organization researchers implicitly believe in Cartesian dualism, which regarded the human body as a material object constrained by physical laws, whereas the human mind is responsible for human thinking and is detached from any physical law (Crossley, 1995). However, research in cognitive science, summarized under the label of ‘embodied cognition’ (Shapiro, 2011), has recently provided evidence for Bourdieu’s claim, indicating that the body influences cognitive processes including thinking (see, e.g., Brinol & Petty, 2003; Chandler & Schwarz, 2009; Goldin-Meadow & Beilock, 2010), memorization (see, e.g., Casasanto & Dijkstra, 2010; Dijkstra, Kaschak, & Zwaan, 2006; Glenberg, 1997) and learning (see, e.g., Broaders, Cook, Mitchell, & Goldin-Meadow, 2007; Cook, Mitchell, & Goldin-Meadow, 2008; Goldin-Meadow, 2004). However, this new perspective on the human body has barely been adapted to discussions in the field of management and organization studies (for an exception, see, e.g., Harquail & King, 2010). For instance, the body may add to our understanding of organizational rituals, which have received much attention in management and organization studies (for a review, see Smith & Stewart, 2011). Although bodily actions are the essence of many (organizational) rituals (Bell, 1992; Flores-Pereira, Davel, & Cavedon,
2008; McCauley & Lawson, 2002), they have received rare attention. However, organizations such as the army and the church have paid considerable attention to the human body in their rituals (Bourdieu, 1988b). We might explain the attention paid to the human body with the body’s mnemonic function (Bourdieu, 1988b), i.e., its function of remembering things. For instance, psychological studies revealed that humans remember events they bodily experienced much better than events they have only heard of (Neisser et al., 1996), which indicates that experiencing events bodily improves recollection. Because one of the main functions of organizational rituals is to transmit organizational culture (Flores-Pereira, et al., 2008), we may argue that the human body and bodily actions may also provide new insights to the literature on organizational culture (Hatch & Zilber, 2012).

In sum, this discussion revealed that the “third phase” (Lizardo, 2012) of Bourdieu’s reception has much to offer to management and organizational research. Among others, it might offer new insights to institutional theory, particularly to research on the theory’s micro-level, but also to research on organizational culture. We acknowledge that this was a brief discussion and does not capture all potential contributions of Bourdieu’s cognitive foundation to the field of management and organization studies. However, we argue that it provides some first insights into this so far rather unacknowledged portion of Bourdieu’s work and depict means of implementing these aspects in practice.
Appendix

Classification criteria for limited, intermediate and comprehensive citations

**Limited citations**: Limited citations were defined as mentioning Bourdieu but doing so briefly (typically only once in the article, often in a string of related citations) and without any further elucidation of his theory or works.

**Intermediate citations**: We attached the label of an intermediate citation to those citations that move beyond a cursory reference but stop short of a comprehensive engagement with Bourdieu’s theory. An intermediate citation provides some discussion of specific writings, often engages Bourdieu at multiple points in the article and may even structure a measure around one of his concepts.

**Comprehensive citation**: We in turn label an article a comprehensive citation if it sustains a theoretical engagement with Bourdieu. Such articles derive their central research questions and/or hypotheses from his theory or build their theoretical arguments on Bourdieu.

The classifications are adapted from Sallaz and Zavisca (2007).
4. The dissemination of the theory of practice in management and organization studies

4.1. Introduction

Several researchers have analyzed theory dissemination (Acedo, Barroso, & Galan, 2006; Davis, 2008; Davis, 1971; Kieser, 2007; Peter & Olson, 1983) and the dissemination of schools of thought (McKinley, Mone, & Moon, 1999; Ofori-Dankwa & Julian, 2005). Their studies indicated that dissemination in academic fields depends on contextual as well as content factors. McKinley and colleagues (1999), for instance, argued that factors such as a theory’s novelty, continuity and scope influence its dissemination. Ofori-Dankwa and Julian (2005) extended McKinley and colleagues’ framework and added contextual factors such as the reputation of the publication medium and of the theory originator (see also Peter & Olson, 1983). While these authors focus on contextual and content factors, Hofstede (1996) introduced a cultural perspective into theory dissemination. As he argued, theories are culture-bound; theorists’ deeply held assumptions about the world, which depend on their national culture, influence a theory’s perspective and propositions, so that theories are not independent of national culture (see also Bourdieu, 1993a; Wacquant, 1993).

Although Hofstede’s rationale provides evidence for the influence of culture on theory dissemination, organization and management studies lack research that investigates his assumption. This article aims to fill this gap by analyzing the

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3 A previous version of the chapter has been presented at the meeting of the Wissenschaftliche Kommission Organisation im Verband der Hochschullehrer für Betriebswirtschaft 2011 (with Stefan Süß).
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The dissemination of a theory in three distinct cultural spheres, namely the North American, British and European fields of management and organization studies. Although researchers from the three regions exhibit many commonalities, there are still significant differences in the fields under consideration. For instance, research showed that scholars from these spheres, as a rule, tend to cite different articles and scholars (Battilana, et al., 2010; Meyer & Boxenbaum, 2010; Üsdiken & Pasadeos, 1995) and differ in their research practices (Collin, Johansson, Svensson, & Ulvenblad, 1996; Koza & Thoenig, 1995). As an empirical case study to substantiate the initial findings, the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu has been selected, since there is currently a concerted and broad-based attempt to establish his ideas within the management and organization sphere (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008; Golsorkhi, et al., 2009; Özbilgin & Tatli, 2005) and because the dissemination of his theory in the American sociological field was hindered by cultural factors such as its perceived ‘Frenchness’ (Sallaz & Zavisca, 2007; Wacquant, 1993). The dissemination of his theory is empirically analyzed by means of a citation context analysis of nine leading European and North American management and organization journals.

The article contributes to research on theory dissemination in different cultural spheres by enriching the current focus on the production side (McKinley, et al., 1999; Ofori-Dankwa & Julian, 2005) with insights from the consumption side, i.e., the scholars who apply a theory. Although some researchers have investigated differences in the citations of theorists (Anderson, 2006; Lounsbury & Carberry, 2005), their analysis has distinguished between North American and European journals without more detailed analyses of the articles’ authors. This study provides just such a detailed analysis and is therefore an attempt to more fully
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analyze Hofstede’s (1996) thesis of a cultural dependence of theories. Furthermore, the article contributes to the research on the differences between the European and North American fields of management and organization studies. Although several articles have already described in what ways European and North American management and organization studies differ from each other (Collin, et al., 1996; Meyer & Boxenbaum, 2010), there is, thus far, no article to my knowledge that analyses the differences in the dissemination of a theory on both sides of the Atlantic.

4.2. The dissemination of management and organization theories

Management and organization studies is often characterized as a field with low consensus among researchers, in particular regarding the validity of theories (Donaldson, 2009; Kieser, 2007; Miner, 1984; Pfeffer, 1993; Van Maanen, 1995; Webster & Starbuck, 1988). As Pfeffer (1993, p. 615) argued, there is no leading theoretical paradigm in the field but “any theoretical perspective or methodological approach is as valid as any other”. If any theory is as valid as any other, however, non-scientific factors such as the rhetoric of theories (Davis, 1986; Kieser, 2007) or the stories they tell (Daft, 1983) become more important criteria for theory dissemination than the scientific value contained within such theories. Ofori-Dankwa and Julian (2005), for instance, argued that contextual factors such as the reputation of the theory originator, the publication outlet and the reputation of the university of the theory originator significantly influence a theory’s popularity. Similarly, Peter and Olson (1983) suppositioned that theories share similarities with products, since theories have to be ‘marketed’ to disseminate them among the audience. They claim that contextual factors such as
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the reputation of the theory originator and the reputation of the scientific discipline from which a theory is borrowed influence its dissemination.

While these authors emphasized the importance of contextual factors for a theory’s dissemination, Hofstede (1996) introduced the idea of a cultural embeddedness of theories. His rationale is based on observations of differences in North American and European organization theories. While the starting point in North American organization theories is the market, French theories tend to focus on power. Moreover, he pointed out that European and North American researchers have different perspectives on organizations and differ in their basic assumptions about organizations (see also Kassem, 1976; Meyer & Boxenbaum, 2010). Hofstede (1996) attributed the differences to researchers’ national culture; since theorists grow up in a national culture, their way of thinking, and therefore their theories, are a product of their respective national culture.

Hofstede’s rationale is also present in the ideas of Pierre Bourdieu, particularly in his concepts of habitus and field. As Bourdieu (1990, p. 53) argued, the agent’s habitus is a system “of durable, transposable disposition, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures”. The habitus is structured by the agent’s past and present circumstances (e.g. school education) and by the agent’s position in social fields (Bourdieu, 1986a), which depends on her level of capital (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). On the other hand, the habitus is structuring, which means it both generates and organizes the agent’s present and future practices as well as her schemes of perception and appreciation (Bourdieu, 1986a).

Bourdieu’s ideas have significant impact on the international transferability of texts. Each text, as Bourdieu (1993a) argued, is the product of the author’s
habitus, the field of production as well as her position in that field. Therefore, as Bourdieu (1988a) described, a text’s meaning is influenced by the field of production. A text’s field of consumption, however, often differs from its field of production, as in the case of the international transfer of theories. While it seems as if the difference between the fields has no direct impact on a text, Bourdieu (1983, p. 313) argued that “the meaning of a work (artistic, literary, philosophical, etc.) changes automatically with each change in the field within which it is situated for the spectator or reader.” The reader’s habitus, for instance, is also the product of social fields, which indicates that the reader’s perception and taken-for-granted assumptions are likely to differ from those of the author, since the social fields of author and reader differ. The reader, however, applies her schemata to the author’s work and, therefore, reads the text in a different way than that intended by the author: “the categories of perception and interpretation that readers apply to them [texts], being themselves linked to a field of production subject to different traditions, have every chance of being more or less inadequate” (Bourdieu, 1993a, p. 263).

Bourdieu, for instance, developed his ideas while he was an agent in the French scientific field. Before entering the field, however, his habitus was structured by his past experiences as a son of a postal worker born in a tiny village in the south of France. As he described, when he entered the field of science, anti-intellectualism had already become inscribed in his habitus (Bourdieu, 1993a). This anti-intellectualism was a key reason why Bourdieu’s ideas broke with the intellectual tradition of the French scientific field. However, although Bourdieu broke with the intellectual tradition of the French scientific field, his work was a product of the very same scientific field and of his position in the field. This
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means that his work was influenced by powerful agents in the field, such as Claude Lévi-Strauss and his structuralism or Jean-Paul Sartre and his phenomenology (Bourdieu, 2000b; Wacquant, 1993), although he aimed at overcoming these traditions. Because of the relative power of these theoretical traditions compared to Bourdieu’s own position in the field (see Bourdieu, 1988a, p. 276), they influenced his ideas. The particular tradition of the field of production, in which Bourdieu’s work is embedded, however, limits its transferability to other contexts. Wacquant (1993), for instance, argued that the transfer of Bourdieu’s ideas into US sociology was difficult, since US sociologists have incorporated the history of their scientific field and apply their assumptions and perceptions to make meaning of Bourdieu’s work. Their schemata to make meaning of Bourdieu’s work, e.g. classifying his work in dualistic alternatives such as micro–macro or structure–agency, are products of their scientific field, i.e., the field of consumption, and are not similar to Bourdieu’s schemata in which the theory originated (Bourdieu, 1993a). Therefore, since the condition of the field of production, that is the French scientific field, significantly differs from that of the field of consumption, that is the US field of sociology, an adequate understanding of Bourdieu’s work, at least with regard to the intended meaning, is barely possible (Brubaker, 1993).

Hofstede and Bourdieu provide evidence that the transfer of ideas, in this case theories, from ‘producer’ to ‘consumer’ is influenced by the social context of production and consumption. Since the social context influences the taken-for-granted assumptions of consumer and producer, a transfer of ideas between contexts that significantly differ is constricted, since they are differently interpreted. This has, we argue, an influence on theory dissemination. Davis
4. The dissemination of the theory of practice in management and organization studies (1971) argued that a theory’s popularity is influenced by its content; in order to become popular, a theory has to deny common assumptions held by researchers: “All interesting theories […] constitute an attack on the taken-for-granted world of their audience” (Davis, 1971, p. 311). An interesting theory, as argued by Davis, attacks some of the taken-for-granted assumptions. It is important, however, that the theory denies only some and by no means all assumptions held by an audience. If the theory denies the whole assumption-ground, the audience’s “[p]henomenology is completely contrary to [o]ntology” (Davis, 1971, p. 327), which makes them believe that a theory is absurd (see also Eden & Rynes, 2003). Therefore, the audience is likely to reject the theory. Davis’s rationale is supported by McKinley and colleagues (1999), who argued that the establishing of a new school of thought depends on both the novelty and the continuity of thoughts. While a new school has to provide novel ideas, its basic assumptions need a linkage with well-established intellectual frameworks (McKinley, et al., 1999). Both criteria are critical for a school’s development: if thoughts are not novel, they are not visible to scholars, which reduces the likeliness of their assimilation. On the other hand, if thoughts display little continuity with well-established thoughts, interpretation is hindered, which also reduces the likeliness of their assimilation.

The findings of Davis, and McKinley and colleagues indicate a – in Hofstede’s case – national or – in Bourdieu’s case – field embeddedness of theories. Since a theory is produced by a scholar, who held certain taken-for-granted assumptions that are influenced by the field of production, and consumed by a reader, who is also situated within a field of consumption that influences her taken-for-granted assumptions (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Bourdieu, 1990), we argue that the
consumer’s interest in a theory depends on the ‘cognitive distance’ between producer and consumer, which is defined here as the differences in the taken-for-granted assumptions in social fields. We expect that if the cognitive distance between the field of production and consumption is small, which means that a theory denies some and holds many of the reader’s taken-for-granted assumptions, it is likely that the theory is regarded as ‘interesting’; if, however, cognitive distance between the field of production and consumption is large, which indicates that the theory will deny many assumptions held by researchers in the field of consumption, it is likely that the readers will classify the theory as absurd.

Research indicates that in management and organization studies, taken-for-granted assumptions significantly differ between European and North American researchers. Meyer and Boxenbaum (2010, p. 738), for instance, argued that European organization studies are “commonly associated with macro-oriented, critical, voluntarist and/or processual approaches”, while North American organization studies are “regarded as more micro-oriented, universalistic and prescriptive in orientation” (see also Hofstede, 1996; Kassem, 1976). Similarly, Üsdiken and Pasadeos (1995) found that European and North American organization researchers cite different schools of thought, while they further observed slight differences between European and British researchers, too. Therefore, I expect differences in the level of ‘interest’ in Bourdieu’s ideas from these different regions. Since Bourdieu wrote his theory while he was an agent in the French scientific field, his ideas are probably more related to European than to North American ideas. The problems in the transfer of his theory to the North American field of sociology support this assumption (Sallaz & Zavisca, 2007; Wacquant, 1993). However, we expect that Bourdieu’s ideas receive more
attention in the British than in the European field of management and organization studies. As argued by Üsdiken (2010), European researchers are more akin to the North American than to the British field of management and organization studies. The particular interest of British researchers in the ideas of Michel Foucault (Carter, 2008) indicate that the British field of management and organization studies is open to ideas from critical French theorists such as Bourdieu, especially since Bourdieu’s and Foucault’s positions in the French scientific field were similar at the time when they developed their ideas (Bourdieu, 1988a), indicating similarities therein.

4.3. Methods

There are several ways to analyze the hypothesis of a cultural dependence of theories. A first reasonable approach is a citation analysis, in which citation counts of theorists can be analyzed across different journals. This approach was used, for instance, by Meyer and Boxenbaum (2010), who analyzed citation counts of ‘grand’ theorists in European and North American organization journals. Research indicates, however, that citations are inaccurate measures with which to analyze the application of theories, since theories are sometimes cited cursorily (Anderson, 2006; Anderson & Sun, 2010; Golden-Biddle, et al., 2006). Therefore, citation counts ignore whether a theory was applied in a text or not. To overcome the weakness, a context analysis has been conducted to analyze the text containing the citation at a deeper level (Moravcsik & Murugesan, 1975).

In the first step, all articles (research articles and notes as well as editors introductions, but no book reviews) that cited Pierre Bourdieu were searched for. The analysis was limited to nine OMS journals (Academy of Management Journal (AMJ), Academy of Management Review (AMR), Administrative Science
Quarterly (ASQ), British Journal of Management (BJM), Journal of Management (JoM), Journal of Management Studies (JMS), Organization (Org), Organization Science (OrgSci) and Organization Studies (OrgSt)). The journals were selected for several reasons: First, the journals have their roots in the European (BJM, JMS, OrgSt and Org) and North American scientific community (AMJ, AMR, ASQ, JoM and OrgSci). For instance, in the first editorial of OrgSt, the founding editors argued that the journal “unmistakably originates in Europe and expresses much that is European“, although “it is not solely for Europe” (Hickson et al., 1980, p. 1). Indeed, research reveals that journals with roots in North America and Europe differ regarding their scope and the applied theories (Bort & Kieser, 2010). Hence, in order to analyze the dissemination of a theory, journals with roots on both sides of the Atlantic have to be analyzed to reduce biases. Second, the journals are among the most prestigious ones in management and organization studies; for instance, according to citation data from the Social Sciences Citation Index, the journals are among the 40 most frequently cited journals in the category “Management”, having at least a five year impact factor of 2.3. Moreover, they are also among the best rated journals in the field of management and organization studies based on Harzing’s journal quality list (Harzing, 2011). Since these journals tremendously influence what is “in” or “out”, a theory that has established itself in the community would also be present in these journals. A total of 293 articles citing Bourdieu were collected that were published in the nine journals between 1980 and 2010. The period of time was chosen, since the first article in these journals that cited Bourdieu was published in 1980 (Ranson, et al., 1980).
We started with a first reading of all relevant articles, where some occasional misspellings of Bourdieu (‘Bordieu’) were recognized. Therefore, an additional search with the new key word was conducted, which yielded five additional articles and extended my sample of articles to 298. Before starting with the context analysis, we developed a codebook to systematically analyze the articles. They were coded along four dimensions, namely, \textit{country in which the PhD was received}, \textit{institutional affiliation}, \textit{citation depth} and \textit{cited concept}. First, the country of the authors’ PhD and \textit{institutional affiliation} at the time of publication were coded. This information is important for analyzing differences in the diffusion of Bourdieu’s theory of practice. Mere collecting authors’ institutional affiliation or the country in which the PhD was received is not regarded as sufficient for analyzing our research question, since researchers often move from one university to another, even across national borders. Therefore, we decided to collect this information. The information could often be found in the bibliographical record of the articles. In cases where this information was missing, we searched for researchers’ CVs or directly contacted the authors to request the information. To calculate the adjusted appearance for authors from each geographical region, we followed authors such as Furrer \textit{et al.} (2008) and allocated one point per article and divided each point equally among the article’s authors. For example, in case of a single authored paper, the country would receive a score of 1.00; two co-authors from different countries would receive a score of .50 for each country, and so on. Counting adjusted appearances has the disadvantage that it assumes that each author contributed equally to the article, which is in fact not always the case. However, since it was not possible to get data on the actual contribution of each author, we decided to use the adjusted appearance, since it better reflects the contributions of each author than coding
only the institutional affiliation of the article’s first author. In case an author had institutional affiliations in more than one country, each affiliation was included and received equal points. After adding up the points for each individual country, the points were aggregated into different regional clusters.

Second, the citation contexts were analyzed with regard to the citation depth; citations were classified as “limited”, “intermediate” or “comprehensive” (Sallaz & Zavisca, 2007). First, we classified a citation as “limited” if the citation briefly mentioned Bourdieu’s concepts without any further elucidation. An example for a limited citation – without any evaluation of the article’s quality – can be found in Harvey et al. (2002, p. 763): “Networks are effective in creating social and intellectual capital (Bourdieu, 1986; Burt, 1992; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998) and allowing individuals to gain access to complementary resources and competencies which they do not directly possess (Arias, 1995).” Second, we classified a citation context as “intermediate” if concepts and/or arguments of Bourdieu were discussed or measures were built around one of his concepts. Third, if an article shows a significant engagement with Bourdieu, for instance if it discusses one of Bourdieu’s concepts in great length (see, e.g., Battilana, 2006), it is classified as “comprehensive” (Sallaz & Zavisca, 2007). A more detailed description of the classification criteria can be found in the appendix.

Finally, the assessment of the cited concept dimension involved identifying the specific concepts from Bourdieu’s theory that were cited. In the forefront of the coding, we reread four of Bourdieu’s most important works (Outline of a Theory of Practice, Distinction, The Logic of Practice and An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology) and excerpted some of his most important concepts. This list was the basis for the coding of the concepts cited in the articles. It was adjusted if a cited
concept was not on the list. To identify the cited concept, the context of each
citation was thoroughly analyzed. If the context was unclear, we read the entire
paragraph to understand its content and classified the content in terms of
Bourdieu’s work. Since some articles referred to more than one concept, multiple
codings were possible.

All codings were made by one researcher. When codings were ambiguous, the
context was discussed with a colleague. Reliability of the codings was controlled
by re-coding 72 articles chosen at random (24.2% of the total sample) four weeks
after the initial coding (Neuendorf, 2002). We had reasonably high agreement
with regard to the cited concepts (95.8%) and citation depth (93.1%), providing
evidence for the reliability of the codings.

4.4. Results

Figure 5, which shows the percentage of articles that cited Bourdieu in each year
and journal, reveals that Bourdieu is more frequently cited in European
management (BJM and JMS) and organization journals (Org and OrgSt), than in
North American management (AMJ, AMR and JoM) and organization journals
(ASQ and OrgSci) in almost every year over the 31 years of the analysis. A
comparison of the average percentage of articles citing Bourdieu shows that he is
most frequently cited in European (7.3%) and North American organization
journals (2.9%), while authors in European (2.8%) and North American
management journals (1.0%) cited him less often. The data support, however, that
interest in Bourdieu is significantly higher in European journals, in which he is
cited, on average, almost three times as often compared to North American
journals.
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Figure 5: Citations of Pierre Bourdieu in European and North American management and organization journals.

Since authors publish their work in journals on both sides of the Atlantic, we further investigated the institutional affiliation of the authors who cited Bourdieu. Table 3 reveals significant differences in the share of citations between the three analyzed regions. The second column shows that Bourdieu receives most citations from authors from North America, whose adjusted appearance in articles is 39.9%, while authors with institutional affiliation in Great Britain (30.8%) and Europe (19.5%) have a significantly lower share. Authors from other regions (Australia, Asia and South America) represent only a small share of the citations (9.8%). These findings are further supported if we take into account in which geographical region authors completed their PhD. As the third column of table 3 shows, most authors who cited Bourdieu completed their PhD in North America (43.7%), while authors who received their PhD from a university in Great Britain (34.6%) and Europe (19.1%) have a significantly lower share. These findings are contrary to the assumption that the international transfer of ideas is restricted and influenced by the cognitive distance between the field of production and consumption. As the data indicate, Bourdieu’s ‘popularity’ is higher in the North
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American field of organization and management studies than in the British and European field. The finding is surprising, since one might expect that the cognitive distance between the field of production and consumption is higher in the case of North America than in the case of Great Britain or Europe, because Bourdieu developed his theory while he was in the French scientific field.

Since the finding might be biased by inter-country differences in the share of articles in the analyzed management and organization journals, we additionally collected data on the total share of each country in articles published in the journals in order to analyze whether their share in articles that cite Bourdieu is above or below their total share. We used data from the Web of Science, which provides information regarding the institutional affiliation of authors at the time when an article was published. The Web of Science, however, does not analyze the adjusted appearance of authors in articles. Furthermore, the Web of Science does not provide information in which country authors completed their PhD. These limitations constrain the comparability of these data with those collected in our analysis. However, we expect that the deviations are relatively low, since it is unlikely that authors from certain countries are more or less likely to publish co-authored articles.

The fourth column of table 3 shows the share of each country in the total number of articles published in the nine journals between 1980 and 2010. Authors from North America have the highest share in articles (58.8%), followed by British (16.9%) and European (13.2%) authors. To analyze whether or not authors from certain regions are over- or underrepresented in articles citing Bourdieu, the second and fourth columns were compared. The data reveal that British and European authors are overrepresented in articles citing Bourdieu, while authors
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with institutional affiliation in North America are significantly underrepresented. While British (European) authors have a total share of 16.9% (13.2%) in all articles published in the nine journals, their share in articles citing Bourdieu is 30.8% (19.5%). On the other hand, the total share of US authors in all articles is 52.6%, while their share in articles citing Bourdieu is just 32.9%. The findings provide support for the expected higher interest in Bourdieu’s ideas in the European and British fields of management and organization studies than in the North American field. As argued above, since the cognitive distance between the field of production and consumption is larger between France and North American than between Great Britain/Europe and France, Bourdieu’s ideas are of interest in these countries, while the interest in Bourdieu is comparatively low in the North American field.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Adj. app. Institutional affiliation (in %)</th>
<th>Adj. app. PhD affiliation (in %)</th>
<th>Total share in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>119.0 (39.9)</td>
<td>130.19 (43.7)</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>98.18 (32.9)</td>
<td>113.01 (37.9)</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>20.82 (7.0)</td>
<td>17.18 (5.8)</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>91.83 (30.8)</td>
<td>103.0 (34.6)</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>58.05 (19.5)</td>
<td>57.0 (19.1)</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Spain, Switzerland and the Netherlands)</td>
<td>38.81 (13.0)</td>
<td>34.92 (11.7)</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavia (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden)</td>
<td>19.24 (6.5)</td>
<td>22.07 (7.4)</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (Australia, Brazil, China, Dubai, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore and South Corea,)</td>
<td>29.09 (9.8)</td>
<td>7.83 (2.6)</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>298 (100)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3:** Total share of authors from regions for papers citing Pierre Bourdieu and for all articles in the analyzed journals.
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Citation counts, however, ignore citation depth, which relates to the authors’ depth of discussion concerning the theorist’s ideas. Since citation depth is a good indicator for interest in an idea (Anderson & Sun, 2010), we now turn to a detailed analysis of the citation context; in particular, we analyze whether authors deal with Bourdieu’s ideas or if they merely cite him without any discussion. We argue that a mere citation is an indicator of little interest in ideas, while a discussion – even a critical one – indicates a general interest. Table 4 summarizes the findings of our analysis. We distinguished citation depth in limited, intermediate and comprehensive (Sallaz & Zavisca, 2007). Furthermore, we differentiated between authors’ institutional affiliation and their country of PhD for all three citation categories; however, the data show that there were only little differences between data regarding authors’ institutional affiliation and their country of PhD, so that we concentrate our analysis to their institutional affiliation.

The data show some significant differences in the ratio of limited citations between British, European and North American authors. First, we observe that researchers from North America have a relatively high share of limited citations (73.9%) compared to researchers from Europe (60.2%) and Great Britain (59.3%). Second, regarding intermediate and comprehensive citations, the data reveal a relatively low share by authors from North America (intermediate citations: 22.5%/ comprehensive citations: 3.6%) compared to the share of authors from Europe (36.7%/3.0%) and especially Great Britain (31.9%/8.7%). This finding provides further evidence for the claimed cognitive distance between Bourdieu’s ideas and the North American field of management and organization studies.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Limited citations</th>
<th>Intermediate citations</th>
<th>Comprehensive citations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institutional affiliation</td>
<td>Country of PhD</td>
<td>Institutional affiliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>88.00 (73.9)</td>
<td>97.43 (74.8)</td>
<td>26.76 (22.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>74.26 (75.6)</td>
<td>84.76 (75.0)</td>
<td>21.59 (22.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>13.73 (65.9)</td>
<td>12.67 (73.7)</td>
<td>5.17 (24.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>54.50 (59.3)</td>
<td>61.82 (60.0)</td>
<td>29.33 (31.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>34.98 (60.2)</td>
<td>34.58 (60.7)</td>
<td>21.33 (36.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>22.98 (59.2)</td>
<td>20.17 (57.8)</td>
<td>15.08 (38.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavia</td>
<td>12.00 (62.3)</td>
<td>14.41 (65.3)</td>
<td>6.25 (32.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>22.51 (77.4)</td>
<td>6.17 (78.7)</td>
<td>5.58 (19.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Ratio of adjusted appearances in papers with substantive citations compared to the total number of adjusted appearances.
To further investigate the interest in Bourdieu’s ideas, we finally focus on his theoretical core concepts of habitus, capital and field, which are also the three most frequently cited concepts of Bourdieu in organization and management studies’ journals, and analyze what differences in the citation depth are observable. In this analysis, we only focus on authors’ institutional affiliations to reduce complexity. An analysis focusing on the country in which authors’ received their PhD showed similar findings. Moreover, since the majority of citations to Bourdieu’s three concepts of habitus, field and capital were classified as being limited (58.2%), we limit our analysis to limited citations.

Table 5 indicates differences in the citation depth of the concepts as well as between authors with different institutional affiliations. Regarding Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, our analysis reveals that the majority of citations of authors from the US to the concept are limited (69.8%), while the ratio of authors from Europe (48.3%) and Great Britain (45.5%) is significantly lower. However, if we focus on the concept of field, we observe that authors from North America have a rather low ratio of limited citations (50.8%) compared to authors from Europe (55.8%) and Great Britain (61.5%). Finally, regarding the concept of capital, our analysis again shows a relatively high ratio of limited citations by authors with an institutional affiliation in North America (65.1%) compared to authors from Great Britain (62.1%) and Europe (58.9%).
4. The dissemination of the theory of practice in management and organization studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional affiliation</th>
<th>Habitus</th>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Capital</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>10.66</td>
<td>62.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Scandinavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
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<td>3.67</td>
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Table 5: Ratio of limited citations of Bourdieu’s three concepts of habitus, capital and field.
4.5. Discussion and contributions

4.5.1. Discussion

Summarizing our findings, we first find that researchers from Great Britain and Europe cite Bourdieu more frequently than researchers from North America. Moreover, we also identify that their share of intermediate and comprehensive citations is significantly higher than that of authors from North America. Finally, we find that citation depth significantly differed between Bourdieu’s three core concepts habitus, field and capital. Researchers from North America have a significantly lower share of limited citations regarding the concept of field compared to the concepts habitus and capital, while authors from Great Britain and Europe have a significantly lower share of limited citations regarding the concept of habitus compared to the concepts of field and capital.

We explain these findings with regard to problems in the cross-national transfer of (management and organization) theories. Researchers in the sociology of ideas argued that the meaning of ideas is embedded in societal and intellectual contexts and traditions (see, e.g., Bourdieu, 1983, 1993a; Camic & Gross, 2004). For instance, Bourdieu frequently argued that problems concerning the diffusion of his theory in the field of American sociology are related to differences in intellectual traditions (see, e.g., Bourdieu, 1993a; Bourdieu, 2000b). The conditions in the French field of the social sciences during the time Bourdieu developed his theory differed from those in the North American field of sociology. These differences hinder the transfer of ideas from the European to the North American field of sociology (see also Brubaker, 1993; Sallaz & Zavisca, 2007; Wacquant, 1993), since ideas are understood in different ways in both
fields. For instance, we might argue that the cognitive schemata of scholars in the North American field are likely to be inappropriate to interpret and make sense of the ideas of Bourdieu, since they were socialized in a different context than Bourdieu and scholars who are located in Europe or Great Britain. This finding is similar to that of Meyer and Boxenbaum (2010), who showed that articles in European journals (Org and OrgSt) cite European ‘grand’ theorists (e.g., Giddens, Weber, Habermas and Foucault) more often than articles in North American journals (AMJ, AMR and OrgSci).

However, how can we explain differences in citation depth regarding Bourdieu’s three concepts habitus, field and capital? First, the higher interest of North American scholars in Bourdieu’s concept of field can be explained by the intellectual proximity between Bourdieu’s field concept and the institutional concept of ‘organizational field’; for instance, Greenwood and Meyer (2008) revealed that Bourdieu’s concept of field heavily influenced DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) concept of organizational fields, which has become one of the most influential concepts in management and organization research (Bort & Schiller-Merkens, 2011). However, DiMaggio and Powell ‘translated’ Bourdieu’s concept of field and adapted it to the North American tradition (Greenwood & Meyer, 2008). However, since the general idea behind DiMaggio and Powell’s, and Bourdieu’s concepts is similar, North American management and organization scholars do not experience a significant cognitive distance between both concepts and there tend to frequently apply it substantially. Second, the high interest of British and European researchers in Bourdieu’s concept of habitus can be explained by the proximity of the concept to research traditions in these academic fields. For instance, Bourdieu’s concept of habitus builds on prior work
4. The dissemination of the theory of practice in management and organization studies

of grand (European) thinkers such as Aristotle, Hegel, Mauss, Piaget, Panofski and Husserl (Lizardo, 2004; Maton, 2008). Therefore, we might argue that the concept is embedded in a greater European intellectual tradition, which explains the greater interest by European researchers.

4.5.2. Contributions

Our study makes several contributions to discussions in the literature: First, it contributes to current discussions about the dissemination of theories in management and organization studies (Kieser, 2007; McKinley, et al., 1999; Ofori-Dankwa & Julian, 2005). Previous research has argued that content (McKinley, et al., 1999) as well as contextual factors (Ofori-Dankwa & Julian, 2005) influence theory dissemination and development into a school of thought. From a Bourdieusian perspective, these factors are likely to influence theory dissemination if the field of production equals the field of consumption. Content factors such as novelty and continuity ensure that the schemes applied by readers are suitable for the interpretation of the theory (McKinley, et al., 1999), while contextual factors, such as reputation of publication outlet and researcher, emphasize that theorists with a high degree of capital in the field have a higher chance of exercising their power over the other agents in the field, which increases the likelihood of their theory’s application and dissemination into the field. If the field of consumption and field of production differ, as in the case of the international transfer of ideas, their framework, however, has to be extended with an analysis of the ‘cognitive distance’ between the field of production, i.e. the author’s scientific field, and consumption, i.e. the reader’s scientific field. This extension is required, since research traditions in the field as well as cognitive schemes applied by readers might influence the interpretation and
4. The dissemination of the theory of practice in management and organization studies

therefore the meaning of a theory, which influences readers’ ‘interest’ levels. If the agents’ taken-for-granted assumptions are similar in both fields, theories are likely to be regarded as ‘interesting’ by the readers. If taken-for-granted assumptions significantly differ, however, a transfer of an idea is restricted and its application unlikely.

The article further contributes to research on the differences between the European and US fields of management and organization studies. Similar to previous studies (Battilana, et al., 2010; Collin, et al., 1996; Meyer & Boxenbaum, 2010), the findings indicate that both fields differ from each other with, in this case, regard to the ‘interest’ level in a certain theory. However, the findings also indicate that European and US researchers, at least with regard to Bourdieu’s theory, are more alike than European and UK researchers. The finding supports Üsdiken and Pasadeos’s (1995) observation of the differences in the orientation between European and British researchers, as well as Üsdiken’s (2010) classification of Great Britain as a ‘secondary centre’ in management and organization studies with the US community as the core and European authors on the semi-periphery, more attracted to the US research approach than to the British one. The findings, however, question the claim of a homogeneous field of ‘North American management and organization studies’, as argued for in several studies (Battilana, et al., 2010; Üsdiken & Pasadeos, 1995). As the article has shown, ‘interest’ in Bourdieu’s ideas significantly differs between US and Canadian researchers, which might be an indicator for the different research traditions in both countries. Whether this difference is influenced by Bourdieu’s status as a French intellectual or not remains as the object of future research.
Finally, the study adds to endeavors to establish Pierre Bourdieu’s ideas in management and organization studies (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008; Golsorkhi, et al., 2009; Özbilgin & Tatli, 2005; Ranson, et al., 1980) by providing a review of Bourdieu applications in leading journals in the field. Although not the direct focus of the study, the findings indicate a growing interest in Bourdieu’s ideas over the last ten years. However, as the in-depth analysis of citation contexts revealed, Bourdieu’s concepts, in particular his concept of capital, are seldom applied in a substantive way, which limits their analytical value. Therefore, more studies that apply Bourdieu’s ideas in a substantive way are needed in order to pinpoint their value in research on management and organizations. Based on the findings of the study, however, we are skeptical if such endeavors can lift the cognitive barriers. Bourdieu, however, is aware that a change in an agent’s habitus is possible if the field changes; findings from citations of Bourdieu in North American sociology indicate that such a change can occur in scientific fields, too (Sallaz & Zavisca, 2007). Therefore, it will be interesting to see whether or not such a change can also be observed in the US field of management and organization studies.

4.6. Limitations and implications for future research

The results need to be treated in light of the study’s limitations. First, the findings might be influenced by the generalist orientation of the analyzed journals. Since Bourdieu’s ideas are currently not in the ‘mainstream’ of organization and management studies (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008; Özbilgin & Tatli, 2005), they are probably discussed in a more substantive way in specialized journals in the field or in journals connected to sociological research. Second, the study focused on dissemination in only three chosen communities, North America, Europe and
Great Britain, while its dissemination among Australian, Asian and African management and organization scholars was ignored, which limits the findings’ general validity.

The study provides several possibilities for future research. First, researchers might add to the research on theory dissemination and the international transfer of ideas by combining the specific perspective presented in this study with the concepts developed by McKinley and colleagues (1999) as well as by Ofori-Dankwa and Julien (2005). A detailed study of the transfer of several theories into different fields of consumption might pinpoint the influence of content, contextual and cultural factors on theory dissemination. Second, it is worthwhile focusing on those regions that are currently at the periphery of the field, i.e., in particular on Africa and Asia. It would be interesting to see what theories and concepts are regarded as ‘interesting’ by scholars from these regions. Are they more interested in the European or North American field of management and organization studies? What theories and concepts are most popular? In addition, (how) does the colonial history of the countries influence the dissemination of theories and concepts? Finally, the study only focused on published articles, which limits the analysis to those articles that have passed through at least two reviewers and an editor. Based on the above argumentation, we can assume that reviewers’ and editors’ evaluation of theories, which influences publication chances, might be influenced by their cultural origin, too. Analyzing reviewers’ and editors’ comments, in particular when reviewers are from different cultural backgrounds, might unfold such influences and contribute to discussions about peer reviews (see, e.g., Altman & Baruch, 2008; Starbuck, 2003).
Appendix

Classification criteria for limited, intermediate and comprehensive citations

**Limited citations**: Limited citations were defined as mentioning Bourdieu but doing so briefly (typically only once in the article, often in a string of related citations) and without any further elucidation of his theory or works.

**Intermediate citations**: We attached the label of an intermediate citation to those citations that move beyond a cursory reference but stop short of a comprehensive engagement with Bourdieu’s theory. An intermediate citation provides some discussion of specific writings, often engages Bourdieu at multiple points in the article and may even structure a measure around one of his concepts.

**Comprehensive citation**: We in turn label an article a comprehensive citation if it sustains a theoretical engagement with Bourdieu. Such articles derive their central research questions and/or hypotheses from his theory or build their theoretical arguments on Bourdieu.

The classifications are adapted from Sallaz and Zavisca (2007).
5. Imitation and processes of institutionalization – Insights from Bourdieu’s theory of practice

5.1. Introduction

While institutional researchers have mostly focused on the theory’s macro-level for a long time, there is recently a growing interest in micro-level research (see, e.g., Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002; Reay, Golden-Biddle, & Germann, 2006; Zilber, 2002). Researchers argued that analyzing micro-level processes is important for explaining macro-level phenomena (see, e.g., Dacin, Munir, & Tracey, 2010), because macro-phenomena are the result of actions from individual actors (Powell & Colyvas, 2008).

Although the growing interest in micro-level processes has opened the micro-level ‘black box’ of institutional theory, there are still several open questions about micro-level processes (Powell & Colyvas, 2008). One such example is the process of institutionalization. Institutionalization, i.e., the transmission of institutions from actor to actor (Tolbert, 1988; Zucker, 1977), is a key concept in institutional theory, since it explains (1) the diffusion of institutions within organizational fields and/or organizations (Tolbert, 1988; Zucker, 1977) as well as (2) institution’s maintenance and/or change (Zilber, 2002).

However, despite the importance of institutionalization for institutional theory, there are few approaches to explain the process. Zucker’s (1977) provided first empirical evidence that processes of institutionalization take place within

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4 A previous version of the chapter has been presented at the 7th Workshop on New Institutionalism and at the meeting of the Wissenschaftliche Kommission Organisation im Verband der Hochschullehrer für Betriebswirtschaft 2012. A revised version of the chapter has been accepted for publication in Schmalenbach Business Review.
organizations. Barley and Tolbert (1997) combined institutional theory and structuration theory to develop a framework of institutionalization that linked actions and institutions, thereby providing a behavioral perspective on institutionalization. Finally, Phillips, Lawrence and Hardy (2004) combined institutional theory with discourse theory to emphasize the importance of linguistic processes for institutionalization (see also Berger & Luckmann, 1967).

Although these perspectives contributed significantly to a detailed understanding of institutionalization, we argue that Bourdieu’s (1990) theory of practice provides an additional perspective that might extend frameworks of institutionalization, but which has so far not been considered in institutional theory. In his theory, Bourdieu (1977) emphasized that transmission processes do not necessarily involve language, as argued in some approaches (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Phillips, et al., 2004), but also take place through the mimicking of actions, i.e., the unconscious imitation of other actors’ actions. Although there is growing evidence in the fields of social psychology (see, e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Dalton, Chartrand, & Finkel, 2010), cultural anthropology (see, e.g., Tomasello, 2001; Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993) and neuroscience (see, e.g., Gallese, 2009; Iacoboni, 2005) that mimicking is important for (cultural) learning, this perspective has so far not been taken into account by institutionalists. Therefore, we argue that a Bourdieusian perspective on institutionalization might add new insights to current approaches. The aim of this paper is to develop a framework that explains processes of institutionalization based on Bourdieu’s theory of practice. Although Bourdieu’s concept of mimesis has already been discussed in psychological and sociological research (e.g., Lizardo, 2007, 2009), there have been little discussions in management and organization studies, particularly among institutionalists. Since the approach has the potential to shed
new light into processes of institutionalization, we argue that institutional theory might significantly benefit from this Bourdieusian perspective. However, some researchers were skeptical if a transfer of institutions from practice to practice without the involvement of linguistic processes is possible (e.g., Turner, 1994), since Bourdieu does not offer a cognitive and/or neuronal explanation. Therefore, we extend Bourdieu’s approach regarding transmission processes with recent findings from other fields of research such as cultural anthropology, cognitive science, social psychology and neuroscience to explain processes in actors’ brain during processes of institutionalization.

The paper makes several contributions to the literature: First, we contribute to institutional theory by presenting a new approach towards processes of institutionalization. While the linguistic perspective has received considerable attention (see, e.g., Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Phillips, et al., 2004; Phillips & Malhotra, 2008), we argue that institutionalization might also take place on an unconscious level without the presence of linguistic processes. Second, this paper is one of the first that combines institutional theory with Bourdieu’s habitus concept. Although some scholars argued that Bourdieu’s concept of habitus might “contribute to a broadening and deepening of the institutional tradition” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 26), there are few approaches to combine both (for an exception, see Vaughan, 2002). We show that Bourdieu’s concept of habitus and institutional theory can be fruitfully combined. Third, our paper contributes to calls for connecting management and organizational research with findings from the cognitive sciences (see, e.g., Becker & Cropanzano, 2010; Becker, Cropanzano, & Sanfey, 2011; Senior, Lee, & Butler, 2011). We show that findings from the cognitive sciences have much to add to institutional theory, particularly on the micro-level. Although institutional theory initially focused on
5. Imitation and processes of institutionalization

...cognitive institutions (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Phillips & Malhotra, 2008), there are few approaches to integrate findings from psychology and/or neuroscience in the theory (for an exception, see George, Chattopadhyay, Sitkin, & Barden, 2006; Vaughan, 2002).

5.2. Institutional theory

5.2.1. Institutions

Although institutions are the central concept in institutional theory, it is still ambiguous what institutions are (Greenwood, et al., 2008). Researchers frequently refer to Scott’s (2008) three pillars of institutions to define institutions (e.g., Lawrence, Winn, & Jennings, 2001; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Tempel & Walgenbach, 2007). Scott argued that institutions are held in place by the regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive pillar of institutions. The regulative pillar supports the stability of institutions by sanctioning deviating behavior through laws or explicit rules. Similar, the normative pillar also affects human behavior by sanctioning deviating behavior based on societal expectations about appropriate behavior (Scott, 2008). Finally, the cultural-cognitive pillar supports an institution’s stability by limiting the actor’s range of feasible actions (Giddens, 1984; Lizardo, 2010). Instead of sanctioning deviating behavior, actors are (almost) not able to think of any alternative way of acting, so that they (unintendedly) reproduce institutions through acting.

Although a main contributions of institutional theory to management and organization research was its focus on the cultural-cognitive dimension of institutions (Scott, 2008), researchers have thus far mainly focused on the regulative and normative pillars (Phillips & Malhotra, 2008). However, it is argued that basic assumptions about institutions differ between the regulative and...
the normative pillar on the one side and the cultural-cognitive pillar on the other side (Hirsch, 1997). While the former two pillars assure stability by sanctioning deviating behavior, such sanctions are not required in case of the latter pillar (Hirsch, 1997). Zucker (1977) even argued that sanctions might contribute to the de-institutionalization of an institution that is based on the cultural-cognitive pillar, since it appears less objective and impersonal, which are crucial characteristics of cognitive institutions. Actors are (almost) unable to think of any alternatives, since cognitive institutions appear to be how things have to be done (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Some institutionalists even go so far as to say that “other types of behavior are inconceivable” (Scott, 2008, p. 58). However, inconceivability might be too strong a claim, since actors may know different ways of acting, which just seem to make no sense (Lizardo, 2010). Hence, it might be more appropriate to argue that cognitive institutions constrain an actor’s range of actions, since they appear as the only feasible way of doing something.

Although cognitive institutions are the central concept in institutional theory, it is still contentious what exactly they are (see, e.g., Greenwood, et al., 2008; Zilber, 2002). We challenge approaches that define institutions as taken-for-granted behaviors or practices (e.g., Giddens, 1979; Greenwood, et al., 2008). Behaviors and practices are rather observable results of institutions than institutions as such, since the same behaviors or practices can be “associated with different meanings, hence reflecting and maintaining different institutions” (Zilber, 2002, p. 250). We argue that institutions are rather taken-for-granted beliefs about how things have to be done in social spaces. This concept of institutions bears resemblance to Meyer and Rowan’s (1977, p. 341) concept of institutions as “facts which must be taken into account by actors” and to Berger and Luckmann (1967, p. 54), who argued that an institution is “a reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by
types of actors.” These definitions focus on the cognitive level by defining institutions as being socially constructed and as having no existence outside the human mind. Although institutions are still regarded as “socially constructed templates for action” (Barley & Tolbert, 1997, p. 94), they are not conflated with observable behavior or social practices. Institutions influence actors’ behavior by appearing to be ‘objective’ facts, on which actors direct their behavior.

5.2.2. The process of institutionalization

The process of institutionalization is a central concept in institutional theory (e.g., Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Phillips, et al., 2004; Zilber, 2002, 2008; Zucker, 1977, 1991). Institutionalization is often described as the “social process by which individuals come to accept a shared definition of social reality” (Scott, 1987, p. 496) or as “the process by which individual actors transmit what is socially defined as real” (Zucker, 1977, p. 728). Essential for the process of institutionalization is that actors develop a shared definition of reality, which means that they come to accept institutions as having an existence of their own and as being part of a social reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1967).

It is argued that through the process of institutionalization, institutions diffuse within societies, organizational fields or organizations (Phillips, et al., 2004; Zucker, 1977). Several studies have so far analyzed institutionalization (for a review, see Zilber, 2008). For instance, they investigated the institutionalization of management concepts (e.g., Kennedy & Fiss, 2009; Süß, 2009; Walgenbach & Beck, 2005), organizational structures and practices (Etzion & Ferraro, 2010; Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983), and institutional theory itself (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). However, the literature criticized that institutional theory “has tended to focus on the effects rather than the process of institutionalization”
Furthermore, there is a tendency among institutionalists to focus on institutionalization on the macro-level, thereby neglecting micro-level processes (Zilber, 2002, 2008).

Nevertheless, there are studies that explain micro-level processes of institutionalization. Berger and Luckmann (1967), for instance, identified three stages in the process of institutionalization: Externalization, objectivation and internalization. First, individuals perceive institutions as being external to them. Although institutions’ existence depends on being continuously reproduced by actors, individuals perceive them as being external to them and as existing independent of any particular individual (externalization). In the second step, institutions attain the status of an ‘objective’ social reality, which means that they are no longer questioned, since they appear to be ‘natural’ and not socially constructed (objectivation). Finally, individuals internalize the social world in their consciousness so that it becomes taken-for-granted (internalization) (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Regarding the transmission of institutions, Berger and Luckmann (1967) identified two mechanisms. First, institutions are transmitted when actors observe and interpret other actors’ actions and understand the actions’ meaning. Second, institutions are transmitted through language, since language enables actors to share their experiences with other members of their linguistic community (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). While Berger and Luckmann mentioned both mechanisms, they clarified that language is “the most important means by which the objectivated and objectified sedimentations are transmitted [...]” (Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 68).

Following Berger and Luckmann (1967), Phillips et al. (2004) also focused on the linguistic perspective by connecting institutions and discourses. Based on the proposition that discourses and institutions are deeply intertwined, they developed
a discursive model of institutionalization that seeks to capture how discourses produce institutions. In the first step, they argued that actions, particularly those actions (1) that require sensemaking, since they are either novel or surprising, and (2) that affect an organization’s legitimacy, produce texts. In the second step, some texts are adopted and incorporated by agents, thereby becoming embedded in a discourse. Finally, discourses produce institutions, which means that they produce taken-for-granted ways of acting in specific social situations. As Phillips and colleagues (2004) further argued, institutions are connected with actions, since institutions constrain and enable actions, which means that they also influence future texts and discourses, which emanate from actions.

Besides these linguistic frameworks, Barley and Tolbert (1997) presented a rather behavioral approach of institutionalization. They combined thoughts from institutionalism and Giddens’s (1984) structuration theory to develop a sequential model of institutionalization. First, institutional principles are encoded in scripts, which can be used in certain social settings. By encoding institutional principles in scripts, appropriate behavior in social settings is internalized by actors. This step is followed by the enacting of the encoded scripts that encode institutional principles in social situations. Barley and Tolbert (1997) argued that enacting a script does not necessarily entail a conscious choice by the agent; they are often not aware of any alternative behavior. Therefore, the authors argued that agents “simply behave according to their perception of the way things are” (Barley & Tolbert, 1997, p. 102). In the third moment of institutionalization, the scripts are revised or replicated in concrete social action. If a script is constantly replicated without any major revision, the script is in the fourth moment of institutionalization – externalization and objectification. This implies that patterns
are disassociated from particular actors and historical circumstances and are regarded as having an own existence which is decoupled from any human being.

While these approaches provide explanations for processes of institutionalization and depict means by which institutions are transmitted (e.g., linguistic processes, see Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Phillips, et al., 2004), they can be extended in several ways: First, depicting how institutions are transmitted through non-linguistic processes contributes to a more comprehensive model of institutionalization. Second, current concepts of institutionalization have paid little attention to cognitive processes underlying institutionalization processes (Barley & Tolbert, 1997), thereby treating institutionalization as a cognitive ‘black box’ (Zucker, 1991). In the next sections, we open this ‘black box’ and develop a framework for non-linguistic processes of institutionalization. In the first step, we introduce Bourdieu’s theory of practice, particularly his habitus concept, which is the foundation of our concept of institutionalization. In the second step, we describe our framework that builds on Bourdieu’s theory and on findings from social psychology and the neurosciences and explains the transmission of institutions.
5.3. Bourdieu’s theory of practice

5.3.1. The concepts of habitus

Although Bourdieu’s stressed that the three concepts habitus, field and capital are interdependent and should not be used separately (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), we argue that for the purposed of this paper, it is sufficient to apply the concept of habitus.

The habitus is a powerful tool for micro-level studies. Bourdieu (1990, p. 53) described the habitus as actors’ “[…] systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures […]”. This definition of habitus directs our attention to its cognitive dimensions. As Lizardo (2004) argued, the habitus was significantly influenced by Piaget’s psychological developmental theory (see, e.g., Piaget, 1971). Similar to Piaget, Bourdieu (1990) emphasized the centrality of cognitive schemata, i.e., “knowledge structures that represent objects or events and provide default assumptions about their characteristics, relationships, and entailments under conditions of incomplete information” (DiMaggio, 1997, p. 269). Actors incorporate knowledge about the social world through their experiences in the world (Bourdieu, 2000a); that is why Bourdieu argued that the habitus is a structured structure, which means that it is structured by the socially constructed external environment (Bourdieu, 1986a). The socially constructed knowledge is stored in the form of cognitive schemata in the actor’s habitus. Bourdieu (1986a) distinguished three different kinds of schemata: schemata of perception, appreciation and action. First, schemata of perception influence actors’ perception in that information that match schemata are more likely to be perceived than information that are contrary to existing schemata (see, e.g., Correll, et al., 2002;
Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). Since actors’ schemata of perception are the product of a socially constructed environment, they tend to perceive the environment as natural and ‘objective’. Second, schemata of appreciation enable actors to evaluate practices such as sports, music or books in those that actors like or dislike; they develop a certain taste. Third, schemata of action direct actors’ behavior. They enable actors to behave in appropriate ways in familiar social contexts without the need for consciously thinking about their actions; however, if actors have to act within unknown social contexts, for instance in social fields that they have newly entered, it is likely that the actions directed by the habitus are inappropriate.

Recapitulating, the key claims the concept of habitus are that the socially constructed external environment structures actors cognitive schemata and that it is through these structured schemata that actors perceive the social environment, appreciate practices and generate their actions (Bourdieu, 1986a). Although it is frequently criticized that the habitus determines actors’ actions (see, e.g., King, 2000), it is more reasonable to argue that actors’ habitus directs and organizes social practices (Brubaker, 1993) and that habitus “produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their generative principle, while adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 78).

5.3.2. The process of mimesis

Although Bourdieu acknowledged the role of language and discourse in processes of institutionalization, he argued that the most essential parts of the habitus are “transmitted in practice, […] without attaining the level of discourse” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 87). Transmission in practice means that cognitive schemata can be
directly transferred from one actor to another (Bourdieu, 1990). The process underlying the transfer is called mimesis (Bourdieu, 1977). Mimesis means the imitation of other actors’ actions. This imitation, however, is not a conscious process but takes place on a level below consciousness; the imitating actor is not aware that she is mimicking (Bourdieu, 1977).

Bourdieu’s concept of mimesis bears resemblance to Mauss’s (1973) process of prestigious imitation. Mauss (1973) observed differences in the techniques of the body, for instance running or marching, between members of different societies. He explained these differences with regard to the process of prestigious imitation. Prestigious imitation means that human’s tend to imitate actions “which have succeeded and which he [the actor] has seen successfully performed by people in whom he has confidence and who have authority over him” (Mauss, 1973, p. 73).

Despite some similarities between Mauss’s prestigious imitation and Bourdieu’s mimesis, there are also significant differences: First, while Bourdieu emphasized that mimesis is an unconscious process, Mauss did not clarify whether prestigious imitation takes place on a conscious or unconscious level, although this makes a significant difference: We can argue that in case of a conscious imitation, the actor is aware that she imitates actions and that she is able to discursively express if, what and why she imitates actions. In the case of an unconscious imitation, however, she is neither aware that she imitates nor able to answer questions regarding the imitation. Second, there are also differences with regard to the extent of imitation. While Mauss (1973) argued that actors observe actions of others and imitate them, Bourdieu goes as far to say that people not just mimic actions, but that they even incorporate those cognitive schemata that generated the action (Bourdieu, 1977; Lizardo, 2009). Therefore, mimicry is not only the
imitation of actions, but also the acquisition of the principles that underlie the action (Bourdieu, 1990).

5.4. The process of institutionalization

5.4.1. Institutionalization and Bourdieu’s theory of practice

In this section, we develop our argument regarding the transmission of institutions through processes of mimesis. We argue that such processes take place whenever actors enter a new social field. As Bourdieu (1975) and institutional researchers (see, e.g., Friedland & Alford, 1991; Lounsbury, 2007; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999) argued, fields differ regarding their specific logic, which defines how things have to be done within the field. For instance, although actors in the field of science have certain interests, they differ significantly from actors in the field of economy. While the generation of scientific knowledge or the publication of this knowledge in scientific journals are the interest of scientists (see, e.g., Bourdieu, 1975), the field of economy, at least in capitalist societies, rather follows the logic of profit maximization so that actors think in categories such as costs and profits instead of publish or perish (see, e.g., Jackall, 1988).

Following Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, we argue that actors in a field built schemata that direct their perceptions and allow them to generate actions according to the field’s logic. However, if actors enter a field in which they have little knowledge about the institutions; they have no cognitive schemata that are able to direct their practices. Therefore, they are not able to unconsciously follow the field’s institutions. However, Bourdieu (2000a) argued that besides a primary habitus, which is structured by earlier experiences, actors might also acquire a specific habitus, which is built in later life. This indicates that actors might still incorporate a field’s institutions when entering a new field. Our argument, which
we develop in the next two sections, is that mimesis plays a crucial role in such processes of institutionalization, i.e., the transmission of institutions from more experienced actors in a field to newcomers. Our framework is shown in Figure 6.

We argue that mimesis has to be distinguished in a behavioral and a cognitive perspective. This distinction is necessary to separate two different effects of mimesis: First, mimesis has a behavioral perspective in that humans mimic other actors’ actions, which is directly observable for participants. Second, mimesis also influences human cognition in that schemata of perception and action are built, which direct actors’ future practices.

Figure 6: Framework for the process of institutionalization.

5.4.2. Behavioral perspective

The starting point in our framework is the connection between institutions and practices. Practices and institutions cannot be equated (Lounsbury, 2008), though they are connected with each other. Practices, as “routinized type of behaviour” (Reckwitz, 2002, p. 249), depend on fields’ institutions (see, e.g., Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Zilber, 2002). As “templates for action” (Barley & Tolbert, 1997, p. 94), institutions influence which practices are
regarded as appropriate within a field (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). Zilber’s (2002) study in an Israeli rape center provided several examples regarding the connection between practices and institutions. For instance, the practice of regularly rotating speakers in social gatherings was brought in the center by feminist volunteers to avoid domination among the women. Similarly, reaching decisions only by consensus is also based on the institutionalized belief of equality. In a study of the NASA, Vaughan found that work groups developed “collectively constructed realities” (Vaughan, 1996, p. 65), i.e., shared beliefs about the ‘normalization of deviance’ and ‘acceptable risks’. Work group members believed in these institutions and accepted them as ‘objective reality’ (Berger & Luckmann, 1967) within the organization. Moreover, they also direct their practices on these institutions. For instance, in the forefront of the Challenger catastrophe in 1986, risks and deviances were known to work groups’ members. However, the deviances were perceived as being within the institutionalized tolerance range, which is one reason why the NASA decided to launch the space shuttle (Vaughan, 1996).

Since practices depend on the institutionalized beliefs within a field, it is likely that if actors enter fields for the first time, they do not know how to behave, since they have not incorporated fields’ institutions. Hence, actors feel to be at the wrong place or of being not able to act in the field, which Bourdieu (1977) called the hysteresis effect (see also Kerr & Robinson, 2009). Hysteresis effect means that actors’ cognitive schemata are not adapted to the field, either because actors enter a new field or because an existing field significantly changes. However, incorporating schemata that are adapted to the specific circumstances of the field is necessary for actors to generate field specific practices. For instance, studies on socialization in organizations found that organizational newcomers adjust more
quickly to their new organization if their values match those of the firm and that recruits, whose values are similar to the organizations’, remain longer with the organizations (Chatman, 1991; Tolbert, 1988). Similarly, studies argued that “newcomers [in organizations] need situation or culture-specific interpretation schemes in order to make sense of happenings in the setting and to respond with meaningful and appropriate actions” (Louis, 1980, p. 233).

To act appropriately in unknown fields, Bourdieu (1977, 1990) argued that actors will mimic other actors’ practices; they unconsciously imitate practices they observe from more experienced actors (Mauss, 1973). In fact, studies from social psychology revealed that actors are mimicking other actors’ gestures, postures, behavior, speech and facial expressions (see, e.g., Bourgeois & Hess, 2008; Dalton, et al., 2010; Heyes, 2011; Lakin, Chartrand, & Arkin, 2008; van Baaren, Janssen, Chartrand, & Dijksterhuis, 2009). For instance, Chartrand and Bargh (1999) found a so-called ‘chameleon effect’ among human adults, which means that actors imitated actions of interaction partners. However, actors do not imitate every actor (van Baaren, et al., 2009). Lakin and colleagues (2008) revealed that actors are more likely to mimic if they feel excluded from a group; in that case, they are particularly likely to mimic in-group members compared to out-group members (see, e.g., Lakin, et al., 2008; Mondillon, Niedenthal, Gil, & Droit-Volet, 2007), which reduces social exclusion, since mimicked actors tend to feel more sympathy to mimicking actors (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). Moreover, studies also indicated that actors tend to imitate actors that are similar to themselves, e.g., with regard to ethnicity or gender (see, e.g., Désy & Théoret, 2007; Molnar-Szakacs, Wu, Robles, & Iacoboni, 2007). Similar findings have also been found in the field of management studies. For instance, Ibarra (1999) showed that managers who have recently been promoted orient themselves on the
practices of more experienced colleagues; they observe how experienced managers interact with clients to convey some underlying principles. Through such observations, the promoted managers acquire tacit knowledge about their new role, which they subsequently apply in action (Ibarra, 1999). Similarly Michel and Wortham (2009) also revealed the importance of imitation processes in organizations; in their study of two big investment banks, newcomers learned working styles by observing and imitating senior bankers.

Although these studies do not provide direct empirical evidence that actors will unconsciously imitate other actors’ practices in situations in which they lack knowledge about the institutionalized way of acting, we argue that the findings indicate that they are at least likely to imitate to adapt to the cultural conventions in an unfamiliar situation. Even very young children around the age of 12 months have been found to imitate other persons’ actions and to learn cultural behaviors from imitation (Tomasello, et al., 1993), which provides further evidence for human’s imitating capabilities.

5.4.3. Cognitive perspective

Besides the behavioral perspective, we argue that mimesis has also a cognitive perspective, which focuses on processes in the human mind during mimesis. This perspective is significantly influenced by Bourdieu’s (1990) claim that mimesis does not only implicate mimicking others actors’ practices but also the transfer of cognitive schemata from actor to actor. Our aim in this section is to analyze processes in the human mind during imitation, which are crucial for processes of institutionalization.

Our first assumption is that when actors imitate practices, they unconsciously encode the practice and understand its underlying meaning, i.e., the institution
from which the practice is derived (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Bourdieu, 1990; Zilber, 2002). For instance, we argue that female volunteers in the Israeli rape center analyzed by Zilber (2002) do not only mimic practices, but also unconsciously understand that these practices are derived from the logic of feminism that has been institutionalized in the center. This assumption is supported by research in social psychology that revealed that imitation does not mean that actors make a carbon copy of an action, but that imitation is related to understanding actors’ intentions for an action (Reynolds Losin, Dapretto, & Iacoboni, 2009). For instance, research found that actors are able to put themselves in other actors’ positions to understand their emotions (see, e.g., Blakemore, 2008; de Waal, 2008; Lieberman, 2007) and goals related to an action (see, e.g., Gattis, Bekkering, & Wohlschlager, 2002; Iacoboni, 2009; Meltzoff, 1995; van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). Furthermore, actors are also able to understand other actors’ intentions for an action, i.e., they unconsciously understand why actors are doing something the way they do (see e.g. Behne et al., 2008; Iacoboni et al., 2005; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005).

Understanding the meaning of an action is a fundamental prerequisite for the non-linguistic transmission of institutions. As early institutionalists argued, institutions represent not necessarily the most efficient way of doing something, but rather the socially accepted, expected and/or taken-for-granted way (see, e.g., Meyer & Rowan, 1977). If actors only understand actions’ goals, they would not necessarily imitate the socially expected way of reaching the goal. Instead, they would use a range of different means to achieve the goal without considering which means are appropriate within a certain field (Jackall, 1988). However, research revealed that institutions are rather connected to means and not to goals. For instance, Battilana and Dorado (2010) showed that if hybrid organizations,
i.e., organizations that combine conflicting institutional logics, direct their employee hiring and socializing policies on goals and not on means to achieve these goals, conflicts among employees about appropriate means to achieve goals arise. However, if these organizations hire employees that had been previously socialized in one of the two conflicting logics and socialize them to develop commitment to means to achieve the organization’s goal, there were fewer conflicts among the staff, although the hybrid organizations pursued similar goals. Battilana and Dorado’s (2010) claim for focusing on means and not on goals is supported other institutionalists (see, e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Scott, 2008; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), who argued that the crucial aspect for the reproduction of institutions is not that actors understand which goals are pursued, but that they understand that a goal has to be achieved by using certain means. Their rationale is supported by culture learning theory (see, e.g., Tomasello, 2001; Tomasello, et al., 1993), which argued that culture is closely related to learning arbitrary cultural conventions (Tomasello & Moll, 2010), i.e., institutionalized behavior that represents the way how things have to be done. Therefore, theorists argued that culture learning is “not just learning things from other persons but is learning things through them – in the sense that he or she [a child] must know something of the adult’s perspective on a situation to learn the active use of this same intentional act” (Tomasello, 2001, p. 141).

While research provided evidence that humans are able to understand emotions, goals and intentions, the mechanisms that enables them to encode actions’ underlying meanings and actors’ intentions are unclear. Furthermore, Bourdieu (1990) also provided no explanation for cognitive processes related to mimesis, which has given rise to criticism and skepticism regarding the concept (Lizardo, 2009; Turner, 2007). Our approach follows Lizardo (2007, 2009) by arguing that
5. Imitation and processes of institutionalization

the so-called mirror neurons in the human brain might explain these processes (see, e.g., Di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Mirror neurons have first been identified in area F5 of the monkey premotor cortex; because of difficulties to study single neurons in the human brain, there are few studies that provides direct evidence for a human mirror neuron system (see Keysers & Gazzola, 2010). However, there is a rich amount of data that provide indirect evidence for a human mirror neuron system (for a review, see Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Studies revealed that neurons in the human brain fire both when actors execute actions and when they observe actions’ execution (Iacoboni, 2005). Some studies even showed that neurons fire when actors hear the sound of an action (Gazzola, Aziz-Zadeh, & Keysers, 2006). Although there is skepticism that mirror neurons are involved in imitation (see Molenberghs, Cunnington, & Mattingley, 2009), several studies provided evidence for this assumption (see, e.g., Iacoboni, 2005; Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Wohlschläger & Bekkering, 2002). Moreover, researchers also argued that mirror neuron systems enable actors to understand others’ actions and intentions (see, e.g., Cattaneo & Rizzolatti, 2009; Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Ocampo & Kritikos, 2011; van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). The rationale is that through the firing during action observation, mirror neurons enable actors to simulate other actors’ mental states (Becker & Cropanzano, 2010; Becker, et al., 2011). Thereby, actors are able to understand other actors’ intentions, which enable them to imitate the actions. Hence, although there are also some critical voices who question that human mirror neuron systems provide the basis for action understanding (see Hickok, 2009), it is at least a possible mechanism on the neural level that explains Bourdieu’s concept of
mimesis as well as empirical findings regarding the understanding of others’ actions and intentions.

The final step in our framework is the building of cognitive schemata. Knowledge about institutions within a social field is stored in actors’ long-term memory in form of cognitive schemata (Bekinschtein, Cardozo, & Manes, 2008; Hardt, Einarsson, & Nader, 2010; Sweller, van Merrienboer, & Paas, 1998). Schemata simplify human cognition by enabling to retrieve knowledge fast and automatic (see, e.g., DiMaggio, 1997; Rumelhart, 1984; Sweller, et al., 1998). While Bourdieu (1977) argued that schemata are transmitted from actor to actor through mimesis, we believe that the word “transmission” does not correctly express the process that happens during mimesis. Cognitive schemata are not transmitted from actor to actor, but actors learn about institutions by mimicking other actors and by developing ideas about other actors’ mental states (Reynolds Losin, et al., 2009). The unconscious understanding about institutions within a social field is stored as knowledge in actors’ memory. After some time, they will built cognitive schemata (Tse et al., 2007). This is an important step in actors’ socialization (Harris, 1994), since schemata allow them to retrieve knowledge fast and automatic, so that they are able to follow the institutions in a social field without the need for any conscious thinking (Bourdieu, 1990; Harris, 1994).
5.5. Implications and conclusion

5.5.1. Implications for institutional theory

In this article, we have outlined a framework of institutionalization that proposes that institutions are learned by actors through the unconscious imitation of other actors’ actions, thereby complementing current frameworks in the literature that emphasize the importance of linguistic processes (Phillips, et al., 2004). Our rationale is based on the work of Pierre Bourdieu (1990) and connects the Bourdieusian perspective with evidence from other fields of research such as anthropology, social psychology, cognitive science and neuroscience in order to provide a cognitive explanation for the proposed processes. We argue that researchers have to distinguish between a behavioral and a cognitive perspective regarding processes of institutionalization to capture both the observable and unobservable parts.

Our study makes several contributions to institutional theory. First, our proposed framework highlights the importance of imitation in processes of institutionalization. Although imitation has been found to be crucial in macro processes of institutionalization, for instance in DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) concept of mimetic isomorphism, it has so far not been identified as contributing to similar processes on the theory’s micro-level. Our framework proposes the importance of imitation. Particularly, we argue that imitation might complement other frameworks of institutionalization, for instance Phillips and colleagues’ (2004) discursive approach. We argue that institutionalization is neither a linguistic nor an imitative process, but that both processes might be simultaneously involved in institutionalization. For instance, even if actors unconsciously mimic other actors’ actions, they will also talk to actors about these.
actions and probably also about why they acted in a certain way. Hence, linguistic processes might further enforce processes of imitation in the transmission of institutions. Moreover, we argue that it is empirically unlikely to identify processes of institutionalization that are either based on imitation or on linguistic processes. It is more likely that both can be found simultaneously in empirical settings. Therefore, our recommendation for future research is to conduct studies, for instance ethnographic fieldwork, that try to capture both linguistic processes and imitative processes in order to identify how both interrelate in processes of institutionalization. A good example, at least for the imitative perspective, is Wacquant’s (2004) ethnographic study in a Chicago boxing gym, in which he depicted the incorporation of the boxing gym’s institutions in his habitus.

Second, our study contributes to discussions about connecting institutional theory with Bourdieu’s theory of practice (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Vaughan, 2002). While there are some approaches to connect institutionalism with Bourdieu’s concept of field and capital (see, e.g., Battilana, 2006; Lounsbury & Ventresca, 2003; Oakes, et al., 1998; Wright, 2009), there are few that connect institutionalism with the concept of habitus (for an exception, see Vaughan, 2002; Viale & Suddaby, 2010). Our study reveals that Bourdieu’s theory of practice, particularly his concept of habitus, might serve as a micro-foundation of institutional theory. Up to date, institutional theory struggles with explaining how cognitive institutions become institutionalized in human’s brain and how actors bring forth practices that are adapted to a field’s institutions. Bourdieu’s concept of habitus with its concept of cognitive schemata that direct actors’ perceptions and generates their actions might be a reasonable approach to overcome the current lack of a micro-foundation of institutional theory (Powell & Colyvas, 2008). Particularly, the habitus might explain how actors that have incorporated a
field’s logic are able to produce practices that are adapted to this logic (Battilana & Dorado, 2010), even without any need for conscious reasoning. Hence, our recommendation for future research is to further (empirically) analyze to what extent the assumptions of Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, particularly his cognitive approach, fit to the concept of institutions and to the incorporation of institutions. These findings might clarify whether or not the habitus is applicable to research in institutionalism and its appropriateness as micro-foundation of institutionalism.

Third, our study reveals that research in fields such as cognitive science, neurosciences, social psychology and cultural anthropology might contribute to institutional theory. There are so far few studies that connect institutional theory with theories and/or findings from related fields of research (see, e.g., George, et al., 2006; Johnson, Smith, & Codling, 2000). Our study reveals, however, that the theory might considerably benefit from these fields, since they offer new perspectives on important processes in the theory, for instance institutional persistence, creation or change. For instance, the literature on institutional work (see, e.g., Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009) emphasized that in some situations, actors can reflect on institutions and try to purposefully maintain or change them or even engage in creating institutions (see also Lawrence, et al., 2011). This literature might benefit from adapting to research in psychology that analyzed automatic behavior of human beings and that might answer questions such as under which circumstances human beings are able to challenge the as objective perceived social reality (Bargh & Morsella, 2008; Dijksterhuis, et al., 1998). Furthermore, findings from related fields might also provide new insights into some of the important concept of institutional theory such as institutional logics. If we analyze research on institutional logics (e.g., Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Lounsbury, 2007; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), we
find few discussions what institutional logics are or where institutional logics reside within actors. From a cognitive perspective, however, the question is what exactly is an institutional logic and how are institutional logics incorporated by actors. While these questions have so far not been answered by institutional researchers, we follow DiMaggio (1997) and argue that schema theory might provide some interesting insights into how institutional logics are institutionalized at the micro-level. Summarizing, we argue that research from related fields might provide explanations for so far unexplored topics in institutional theory, particularly on the theory’s micro level (Becker, et al., 2011).

5.5.2. Conclusion

In this paper, we develop a new approach to processes of institutionalization, which is based on Bourdieu’s concept of habitus. Although our framework of processes of institutionalization currently lacks empirical support, we believe that it provides an important contribution in beginning a discussion about the role of imitation in processes of institutionalization. It might complement existing work on processes of institutionalization with a perspective that is based on Bourdieu’s concept of habitus and which is supported by findings from related fields of research such as psychology, neuroscience, cognitive science and anthropology. Because of the complexity of processes of institutionalization, we argue that institutional theory requires more exchange with related disciplines that might open the cognitive ‘black box’ of institutionalization. Our paper is just one attempt in this direction.
6. Introducing the human body in institutional theory – Insights from Bourdieu's theory of practice

6.1. Introduction

Recently, institutional researchers have devoted more interest to the micro-level, i.e., the level of the individual actor (see e.g. Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Dacin, et al., 2010; Hallett, 2010; Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Reay, et al., 2006; Zilber, 2002). Although institutional theory is commonly regarded as a macro-level theory (Scott, 2008), some researchers have argued that “the macro-lines of analysis could also profit from a micro-motor” (Powell & Colyvas, 2008, p. 276). However, it has been noted that the micro-foundation of institutional theory is so far underdeveloped (see, e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997; Phillips & Malhotra, 2008; Powell & Colyvas, 2008). This underdevelopment is especially the case for human cognition. Although one of institutional theory’s most significant contributions has been its focus on cognitive institutions (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Phillips & Malhotra, 2008), i.e., taken-for-granted beliefs about how things are to be done (see, e.g., Meyer & Rowan, 1977), cognitive processes continue to be treated as a “black box” (Zucker, 1991). However, knowledge about such processes are important, as macro-level concepts such as institutional logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991) are connected with micro-level cognitive processes. On the one hand, institutional logics affect actors’ behavior by influencing their perceptions about which actions are appropriate within a field (Thornton, 2004; Thornton &

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5 A previous version of the chapter has been presented at the EGOS Colloquium 2011.
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On the other hand, the existence of institutional logics depends on their reproduction by actors in social practices (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Giddens, 1984; Thornton, 2004). Moreover, knowledge about cognitive processes is important because it enables research not only to explore the effects of (macro-level) institutional processes but also to explain their influence at the micro-level (Phillips & Malhotra, 2008; Zucker, 1991).

Several researchers have argued that to develop a realistic concept of human cognition, institutional theory should connect with disciplines, such as cognitive science and psychology (see, e.g., DiMaggio, 1997; George, et al., 2006; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009), that explore the basis of human cognition. However, few researchers have so far transferred findings from these disciplines into institutional theory. For instance, George et al. (2006) connected institutional theory with psychological theories (prospect theory and the threat-rigidity hypothesis) to analyze how patterns of institutional persistence and change depend on decision makers’ perception of environmental shifts. Similarly, Johnson and colleagues (2000) combined institutional theory with script development theory to explore the processes of institutional change at the micro-level (see also Iederan, Curseu, Vermeulen, & Geurts, 2011; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009). Finally, Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury (2012) used the concept of dynamic constructivism to develop a cognitive micro-foundation of institutional logics.

By transferring insights from cognitive science and psychology to institutional theory, these studies made significant contributions to a (cognitive) micro-foundation of institutional theory, thereby opening institutional theory’s cognitive ‘black box’ (Zucker, 1991). However, we argue that these studies have neglected a factor that has been found to significantly influence human cognition: the human body. At first sight, the focus on the human body appears odd, as research in
many scientific fields continues to be based on the Cartesian dualisms distinguishing the mind from the body (Damasio, 1994; Shapiro, 2011). This mind-body dualism is based on the assumption that cognitive processes fall in the domain of the human mind and that the body is merely the ‘executor’ of the mind’s orders (Shapiro, 2011). This perspective not only was the leading paradigm in cognitive science (Shapiro, 2011) but also influenced management and organization researchers’ perspective on the human body (Styhre, 2004). However, research under the label of ‘embodied cognition’ revealed that the human body is not a mere provider of sensory information for or a receiver of ‘orders’ from the human mind and that it instead plays an important role in higher-level cognitive processes such as learning and memorizing (Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005).

We argue that these findings question the absence of the human body in institutional research. Because the body is involved in cognitive processes, it is reasonable to argue that it also plays a role in micro-level institutional processes such as the persistence of or change in cognitive institutions (Phillips & Malhotra, 2008). However, two questions remain: how does the body influence micro-level institutional processes, and how can its influence be explained? Our aim in this paper is to answer these questions by analyzing the human body’s role in micro-level institutional processes. For this analysis, we combine institutional theory with Bourdieu’s (1977, 1990) theory of practice. Bringing Bourdieu’s theory into the discussion enables us to connect institutional theory with research on embodied cognition. First, Bourdieu’s theory shares many similarities with institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Vaughan, 2002; Voronov & Vince, 2012), such as the premise of a social construction of reality and their
focus on cognition, leading to little risk of incommensurability (Scherer & Steinmann, 1999). Second, even before research on ‘embodied cognition’ provided empirical evidence, Bourdieu (1977, 2000a) built on the assumption that the human body plays a crucial role in cognitive processes. Therefore, Bourdieu’s theory of practice may act as a mediator between institutional theory and embodied cognition and offers us starting points for analyzing the body’s influence on institutional processes.

In this paper, we focus on a process in which the body, according to Bourdieu (2000a), plays a significant role: institutional persistence. Institutional persistence refers to institutions’ stability and their resistance to change. Although we acknowledge that institutions may change over time (see, e.g., George, et al., 2006; Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002), we agree with other scholars (Dacin, et al., 2010; Scott, 2008) who argued that institutional researchers paid too little attention to the micro-level mechanisms that influence institutional persistence. However, gaining more insights into these mechanisms is important to explain the (re-)production of institutions at the organizational, field and societal levels (Dacin, et al., 2010).

The paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to organization and management research in general by challenging the taken-for-granted assumption that the human body plays no significant role in human cognitive processes. Based on findings from cognitive science and cognitive psychology, our paper reveals that the body is of considerable importance even to higher-level cognitive processes, such as learning, and thus may provide new perspectives into discussion within the field of organization and management studies. Second, our research contributes to institutional theory. We show that the absence of the human body from institutional theory is a serious limitation, as the
body plays a crucial role in micro-level institutional processes. Therefore, a focus on the human body may provide new perspectives for research on institutions. Furthermore, our paper contributes to a cognitive micro-foundation of institutional theory by pinpointing how research in cognitive science and cognitive psychology challenges the current concept of human cognition in institutional theory and by providing insights into a more realistic conception of human cognition.

The paper is structured as follows. In the following section, we introduce the human body. Because most research in the field of management and organization studies is relatively “bodiless”, we begin with a short introduction to the concept of the human body in fields such as sociology. Moreover, we also pinpoint how Bourdieu conceptualized the human body in his theory of practice, which is the basis for our argumentation in the paper. Finally, we present findings from our research on ‘embodied cognition’ that show the body’s influence in cognitive processes. In the second part of the paper, we connect the human body with institutional theory. First, we define the concept of cognitive institution and summarize research on institutional persistence. Subsequently, we discuss the connection between the human body and cognitive institutions more generally before analyzing in greater detail how the human body influences the persistence of institutions. In the third section, we discuss the implications of our discussion for research in the field of management and organization studies and pinpoint its contributions for institutional theory.

6.2. The human body

6.2.1. Concept of the human body

Although each human being possesses a body, the body has been largely neglected by many scientific disciplines. Following the Cartesian dualism
between mind and body, scientists regarded the human body as belonging to the order of physical matter, extending into space and obeying the laws of physical science (Crossley, 1995). In contrast, the mind was conceptualized as “a thinking substance which is indivisible and which neither extends into space nor obeys the laws of physical determination” (Crossley, 1995, p. 44). According to this conceptualization, the body is solely a material object governed by physical laws, whereas the human mind is detached from any physical law and is responsible for human thinking.

However, the supremacy of the mind over the body has recently been challenged in several disciplines within the social sciences. For instance, research fields such as ‘sociology of the body’ (Crossley, 1995) and an ‘anthropology of the body’ have been established (van Wolputte, 2004). However, what is the body, or, more precisely, what conceptualization of the body do researchers analyze? Broadly speaking, the human body has a dual existence in the social sciences (Freund, 1988): First, it exists as a biological and physiological body, i.e., as a combination of flesh, nerves, bones, physiological processes and organs that build the biological system; this body is often referred to as natural or naturalistic body (Styhre, 2004; Varga, 2005). Second, the body is also conceptualized as a social body (Freund, 1988), i.e., as a place where social control is executed (Foucault, 1979) or as a place where society inscribes in human beings (Bourdieu, 2000a).

Our concept of the human body follows Grosz (1994) in that we seek to combine both perspectives on the human body. On the one hand, we acknowledge the existence of a biological and physiological body. This body is a system that is formed by nature; its functioning depends on physical, biological and biochemical processes. On the other hand, we argue that there is a social body, meaning that society inscribes in the human body and that the body is influenced by society
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(Grosz, 1994; Styhre, 2004). This social body is in the focus of our next section, in which we introduce Bourdieu’s concept of the human body. In particular, we focus on Bourdieu’s (2001) argument that it is through the body that actors internalize social institutions. We then return to the biological and physiological body by reviewing the literature in the fields of cognitive science and psychology, which analyze the human body’s role in higher-order cognitive processes.

6.2.2. The human body in Bourdieu’s theory of practice

The human body is a central part in Bourdieu’s theory of practice. Consistent with our perspective on the body, Bourdieu argued that the body is not simply a biological object but that a large portion of human knowledge – particularly social knowledge – is embodied, which means that it has the state of practical or implicit knowledge and is (unconsciously) retrieved in practical actions (Bourdieu, 2000a). Bourdieu connected the body with the concept of habitus (Bourdieu, 1977, 2000a), one of the theory’s central concepts (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008). Due to the interconnectedness between the body and the habitus, we first provide a short introduction to Bourdieu’s concept of habitus before we discuss how he conceptualized the human body.

Bourdieu defined the habitus as “[...] systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures [...]” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53). On the one hand, the habitus is structured by actors’ past and present circumstances (e.g., education, family or social position), by the social fields they are involved in (e.g., schools, scientific fields or organizations) and by their positions in the social fields (Bourdieu, 1986a), which depend on their amount of capital (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). As Bourdieu (1977) argued, all fields leave traces in the habitus by incorporating practices or
tastes or by influencing perception. This statement also indicates that the habitus is a dynamic concept; if a field changes, or if actors enter a new field, the habitus will change. On the other hand, the habitus is structuring actors’ present and future practices as well as their schemes of perception and appreciation (Bourdieu, 1986a). However, this relationship does not mean that the habitus determines actors’ actions, as some of Bourdieu’s critics argued (see, e.g., King, 2000); in fact, it directs and organizes actors’ social practices (Brubaker, 1993). Bourdieu (1977, p. 78) argued that the habitus “produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their generative principle, while adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation.” The habitus explains why actors with similar histories share practices and are able to relate their actions to one another. Because they have incorporated similar objective structures in their habitus, similar practices are brought forth. Therefore, the habitus links the micro- and macro-level, as macro structures structure actors’ habitus, while they themselves are structured by the habitus (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008).

The habitus and the body can only analytically be separated, as the habitus is inscribed in actors’ bodies (Bourdieu, 2000a). According to Bourdieu (1977, 2000a), the human body is a central object in processes such as the internalization of the social world and institutional persistence. First, regarding the body’s role in the internalization of the social world, Bourdieu (2000a, p. 141) emphasized its role in learning processes: “We learn bodily. The social order inscribes itself in bodies through this permanent confrontation, which may be more or less dramatic but is always largely marked by affectivity and, more precisely, by affective transactions with the environment.” Actors internalize the social world through the permanent confrontation of their bodies with the world (Wacquant, 2004).
Therefore, the human body is conceptualized as an active part in such social learning processes. Second, Bourdieu argued that the body serves as a ‘memory pad’ (Bourdieu, 2000a, p. 141); the social knowledge that is learned by the human body is not directly accessible for actors, as it is stored in unconscious parts of human memory (Bourdieu, 1990; Vaisey & Frye, forthcoming). Therefore, actors are barely able to reflect on, verbally express or deliberately change their knowledge (Bourdieu, 1977). Moreover, actors regard embodied knowledge as being ‘objective’ and ‘natural’ instead of socially constructed. Therefore, it is unlikely that actors question embodied knowledge, leading it to be more persistent than social knowledge or beliefs that are consciously accessible (Bourdieu, 1988b).

6.2.3. The human body and cognition

Whereas Bourdieu argued that the human body plays an important role in processes related to the internalization and persistence of cognitive institutions, research in cognitive science neglected this perspective for a long time. ‘Standard cognitive science’ focused on the human mind without considering the role of the human body in cognitive processes (Damasio, 1994; Gallagher, 2005; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991). As Shapiro (2011) argued, this research strand had a rather computational view on cognitive processes; researchers tried to identify computer-like processes in the human mind. For instance, Newell and Simon (1961) developed a computer program that aimed at presenting insights into human thinking and problem solving. They analyzed how humans transform expressions and what they think – the persons should speak out their (conscious) thoughts – while solving a problem and compared these thoughts with a computer program’s algorithm. Based on the comparison, the authors came to the
conclusion that the program’s means-ends analyses were similar to those of humans; therefore, the authors conclude that the program simulated human thinking processes.

The human body was not taken into account in this analysis. Similar to a software that runs autonomously from hardware, the mind was regarded as operating independent of the human body (Niedenthal, et al., 2005). The body’s only task was to deliver representations of the external world to the human mind (sensory system) and to execute the human mind’s commands (motor system) (Barsalou, 1999; Niedenthal, et al., 2005).

However, this concept of a ‘disembodied mind’ has recently been challenged by research that states “that cognitive representations and operations are fundamentally grounded in their physical context” (Niedenthal, et al., 2005, p. 186). This research stream is summarized under the label of ‘embodied cognition’ (Gallagher, 2005; Niedenthal, et al., 2005), although it might be misleading to speak about one approach, due to the different perspectives within the research program (Wilson, 2002). However, the different approaches share the assumption that the human body is not a mere provider of sensory information but plays an important role in higher-level cognitive processes, such as learning (Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Niedenthal, et al., 2005). Niedenthal and colleagues (2005, p. 185), for instance, argued that (social) knowledge “is ‘embodied’ or grounded in bodily states and in the brain’s modality-specific systems.”

Several studies provided empirical evidence for the influence of the human body on higher-level cognitive processes. First, the body has been found to influence thoughts, feelings and emotions. For instance, Strack et al. (1988) found that a cartoon is rated as being more funny if a person’s muscles involved in smiling are
activated. Tom and colleagues (2006) reported that persons who nodded the head (a sign for agreement or acceptance in several cultures) while listening to a persuasive message rated a product (headphone) more positively and would pay a higher sum for that product than persons who listened to the same message while shaking their heads (a sign for disagreement in several cultures). Second, the body has also been found to influence learning. For instance, Cook and colleagues (2008) found that children who had previously failed in solving a math equation could better memorize the learned procedure to solve the task when they were encouraged to produce gestures compared to children who were encouraged to express their problem solving strategy in words. Broaders et al. (2007) also investigated the performance of children in solving a math problem; they revealed that children who were told to gesture while explaining their solution of the math problem added previously seen problem-solving strategies to their repertoire, whereas children who were told not to gesture did not add any previously seen strategy to their repertoire. This finding also indicates improved learning of problem-solving strategies when these strategies are connected with bodily actions.

To summarize, research on ‘embodied cognition’ provides convincing evidence for the influence of the human body on cognitive processes such as learning and thinking. However, whereas the bodily perspective on human cognition has received much attention in cognitive science (see, e.g., Garbarini & Adenzato, 2004; Wilson, 2002), psychology (see, e.g., Niedenthal, et al., 2005; Yang, Gallo, & Beilock, 2009) and sociology (see, e.g., Ignatow, 2007; Ignatow, 2009; Vaisey & Frye, forthcoming), there are few studies that transfer these findings to management and organization studies (for an exception, see Harquail & King, 2010), particularly to institutional theory. However, based on this evidence from
research on ‘embodied cognition’, we argue that institutional theory cannot leave aside the human body when analyzing cognitive processes, as considering it may contribute to a better understanding of cognitive processes at the theory’s micro-level.

6.3. The human body and institutional theory

6.3.1. Cognitive institutions and their persistence

Although one of institutional theory’s main contributions to management and organization research was its focus on the cultural-cognitive pillar of institutions (cognitive institutions) (Scott, 2008), institutional researchers have thus far mainly focused on the regulative and normative pillar (Phillips & Malhotra, 2008). However, it has been argued that basic assumptions about institutions differ between the regulative and the normative pillar on the one side and the cultural-cognitive pillar on the other side (Hirsch, 1997). Whereas the first two pillars assure stability by sanctioning deviating behavior, such sanctions are not required in case of the cultural-cognitive pillar (Hirsch, 1997); Zucker (1977) even argued that sanctions may contribute to the de-institutionalization of cognitive institutions, as they appear less objective and impersonal. However, objectivity and impersonality are important characteristics of cognitive institutions; actors perceive them as the way how things have to be done (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Some institutionalists even go so far as to say that “other types of behavior are inconceivable” (Scott, 2008, p. 58). However, inconceivability may be too strong a claim, as actors may know that there are other ways of acting; these alternatives simply are incomprehensible to them or are perceived as being inappropriate (Lizardo, 2010). Therefore, we argue that cognitive institutions
constrain actors’ range of actions, as they appear as the ‘natural’ way of doing something.

Despite the centrality of cognitive institutions in institutional theory, their precise definition remains contentious (see, e.g., Greenwood, et al., 2008; Zilber, 2002). In some approaches, institutions are equated with behaviors or practices (e.g. Giddens, 1979; Greenwood, et al., 2008). In these cases, researchers argue that an institution is a form of behavior or practice that has spread widely within a certain social context. However, some scholars have argued that widely spread practices and behavior are rather the effect of cognitive institutions and are not institutions themselves (Fleetwood, 2008; Phillips & Malhotra, 2008), as the same behaviors or practices can be “associated with different meanings, hence reflecting and maintaining different institutions” (Zilber, 2002, p. 250). Taking this critique into account, we follow some approaches in the literature (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and define cognitive institutions as taken-for-granted beliefs about how things have to be done in a specific social contexts. The emphasis on beliefs indicates that institutions are not necessarily the most efficient or effective way of behaving; however, actors believe that they are and thus adapt their practices to the institutions (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Moreover, the definition acknowledges that institutions may vary between social contexts, potentially leading practices to differ between social fields.

An important question for institutional researchers is which processes influence cognitive institutions’ persistence. This question is particularly important for cognitive institutions, as their existence is not (necessarily) supported by rules, laws or societal norms, as in the case of institutions that depend on the regulative or normative pillar (Hirsch, 1997; Scott, 2008). Several scholars have analyzed underlying mechanisms of cognitive institutions’ persistence. Zucker’s (1977)
experiments revealed that institutional persistence depended on an institution’s
degree of institutionalization, i.e., the degree to which actors regard a certain form
of behavior as being self-evident or even natural (Berger & Luckmann, 1967;
Zucker, 1977). An action that is high in institutionalization is regarded as being
the only (feasible) action in a certain social context, such that the persistence of
such an action is regarded as being less critical, whereas the persistence of actions
that are low in institutionalization require social control mechanisms such as laws
(Zucker, 1977). Zucker’s (1977) experiments further revealed that the degree of
institutionalization was moderated by the social context; for instance, an
institution that is embedded in an office context had a higher degree of
institutionalization than an institution that is embedded in an organizational
context. Similar to Zucker, Dacin and colleagues (2010) analyzed the influence of
micro-level processes for institutional persistence; their study revealed that micro-
level rituals such as dining at Cambridge Colleges contribute to the persistence of
institutions such as the British class system because of rituals’ powerful bearing
on participants.

A different approach to institutional persistence can be found in the literature on
institutional work (see, e.g., Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence, et al., 2011,
2009). Whereas the studies of Zucker and Dacin et al. focus on unconscious and
unintended processes that contribute to institutional persistence, Lawrence and
Suddaby’s (2006) approach emphasized that actors apply purposive strategies to
maintain institutions. Moreover, it is argued that the maintenance of institutions is
embedded in actors’ day-to-day agency; in this way, institutional work
distinguished itself from the concept of institutional entrepreneur, which instead
focused on “heroic” forms of agency (Lawrence, et al., 2011). Institutional work
related to the persistence of institutions may take on the form of creating rules to
support institutions, the establishment of coercive barriers that make institutional change more difficult and the embedding of institutions into actors’ daily routines (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006).

The literature on institutional persistence has offered new perspectives on the persistence of institutions. In the following section of the paper, we aim to enrich this literature with a new perspective. We argue that the human body plays a significant role in institutional persistence. However, before pinpointing its influence, we discuss the connection between the human body and cognitive institutions, which is the basis for the following discussion.

6.3.2. The human body and cognitive institutions

Institutional researchers have paid little attention to the corporeality of institutions, i.e., how institutions are connected with the human body. Our starting point in this section is the connection between institutions and practices. A practice is a “routinized type of behaviour” (Reckwitz, 2002, p. 249) such as a particular way of eating or walking. As argued above, practices are not institutions, but they depend on fields’ institutions (see, e.g., Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Zilber, 2002). Because actors perceive institutions as “facts which must be taken into account” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 341), they adapt their practices to institutions. For instance, in his study about masculine domination in society, Bourdieu (2001) revealed that the behavior of both men and women is adapted to the institutionalized belief about the dominance of the male sex. It is a characteristic of institutions that they represent an automatic way of acting so that actors do not have to consciously think about them. Because practices are adapted to institutions, each participation in the practices – unintentionally – reproduces the institution (Barley & Tolbert, 1997;
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Giddens, 1979), leading the practices to contribute to institutional stability and persistence.

A fact that has not been considered by many institutional researchers is that practices that reproduce institutions are often bodily. For instance, Dacin and colleagues’ (2010) analysis about the connection between institutions and rituals used the example of dining. The authors revealed that by attending dining rituals, actors are socialized to the British class system, which contributes to the system’s maintenance. Whereas the authors provided insights into such dining rituals, they did not recognize the role of the human body. However, it is not simply actors’ minds that are present during dinners but also their bodies; actors are sitting in their chairs, carving the meat with the cutlery in their hands and chewing the food with their mouths. However, the bodily actions during rituals as well as postures are not performed incidentally but are often highly formalized and prescribed; they are an important part of the ritual. A study by Elias (1969) on the development of civilization revealed that table manners do not represent the natural way of eating but a socially constructed and prescribed way that was institutionalized over time. For instance, the use of the fork developed over time and became institutionalized despite the lack of any necessity, such as for hygienic reasons; instead, its institutionalization was based on societal beliefs about shame, distaste and civilization that were institutionalized in actors’ minds (Elias, 1969) and that are taken for granted in many cultures today. Similarly, Connerton (1989) revealed the connection between the human body and institutions; bodily practices such as wearing certain costumes or kissing the king’s hand were related to institutions such as status differences in medieval societies and the belief in the monarchy. By conducting the bodily practices,
actors experienced the underlying institutions, which contributed to their taken-for-grantedness.

In sum, these studies revealed that there is a connection between cognitive institutions and the human body, particularly at the micro-level. However, institutional researchers tend to ignore that the human body is involved in practices that contribute to institutions’ persistence. As we will illustrate in the next section, the human body is significantly involved in processes of institutional persistence. This challenges the taken-for-granted assumption that the body is a mere “executor” of orders from the human mind, which would indicate that the mind and not the body is involved in institutional processes.

6.3.3. The human body and the persistence of institutions

In this section, we analyze how the human body contributes to institutional persistence. This discussion is based on Bourdieu’s rationale that the body is a ‘memory pad’ for institutions (Bourdieu, 2000a, p. 141): “The most serious social injunctions are addressed not to the intellect but to the body, treated as ‘memory pad’. The essential part of the learning of masculinity and femininity tends to inscribe the difference between the sexes in bodies (especially through clothing), in the forms of ways of walking, talking, standing, looking, sitting, etc.” As a memory pad for institutions, the human body may prevent the forgetting of institutions by actors. This act of forgetting represents a serious threat for the persistence of institutions (Berger & Luckmann, 1967): if actors forget institutions, they will no longer adapt their behavior to the institutions, which is important for the institutions’ reproduction (Giddens, 1984).

However, although Bourdieu argued that the body serves as a memory pad for institutions, he does not provide any further explanation for how the body might
serve as such; for instance, he does not explain the cognitive processes on which the argument is based. Moreover, because the bodily perspective on institutional persistence has received little attention from institutional researchers, there are very few studies that empirically analyze the body’s influence. To overcome both deficits and to provide a convincing explanation for how the human body contributes to institutional persistence, we connect Bourdieu’s theory of practice with research on embodied cognition, which offers us cognitive explanations for Bourdieu’s claims to open up the cognitive ‘black box’. Additionally, we enrich our rationale with studies from fields such as sociology and ethnography, which have devoted more interest in the human body (Lande, 2007; Wacquant, 2004).

Our rationale in this section is depicted in figure 7. Based on Bourdieu’s theory of practice, we argue that the human body contributes to the persistence of institutions in two ways. First, it is an additional storage bin for institutions. Second, bodily practices remind actors of institutions.

Figure 7: Contributions of the human body to institutional persistence.

First, we argue that the human body contributes to institutional persistence by serving as a storage bin for institutions. This statement indicates that through the human body, institutions are stored in human memory. Research in cognitive science revealed that human memory is composed of two distinct memory systems: declarative and nondeclarative memory (see, e.g., Eichenbaum, 1997; Squire, 2004; Squire & Wixted, 2010; Ullman, 2004). Declarative memory stores
knowledge about facts (semantic memory) and events (episodic memory) (Squire, 2004). Actors are able to consciously remember and retrieve knowledge that is stored in declarative memory and to verbally express it (Squire, 2004). For instance, they may provide an account of what they have memorized from a book or recount an event. Nondeclarative memory stores implicit or tacit knowledge such as motor actions and skills (Squire, 2004). Actors are not required to actively recollect nondeclarative knowledge; it is present, and actors use it without any need for consciously retrieving the knowledge (Squire & Zola, 1996).

Several studies analyzing institutions tend to locate them, although rather implicitly, in declarative parts of human memory. For instance, Phillips and colleagues’ (2004) discursive approach toward institutionalization is based on the assumptions that institutions are institutionalized through texts. The authors argued that actions generate texts that are embedded in discourses. These discourses produce institutions by influencing actors’ social constructions of reality; they confront actors with a certain perspective on reality, which becomes taken-for-granted, thereby attaining the status of a cognitive institution (Green, Li, & Nohria, 2009; Phillips & Malhotra, 2008). From a cognitive perspective, institutionalization through discourses indicates that knowledge about institutions is stored in declarative parts of human memory; actors read the texts and store information about the perspective on reality in their declarative memory. When reading several similar texts, the perspective on reality described in the texts is no longer regarded as being a particular perspective but as being an ‘objective’ reality. Actors might remember the facts expressed in the texts and be able to (consciously) recollect them. Therefore, they are likely to adapt their actions to the institutions.
However, we argue that if institutions are solely stored in declarative parts of human memory, their persistence is rather critical. Research revealed that storage capacity of declarative parts of human memory, even for linguistic contents (see, e.g., Just & Carpenter, 1992), is limited (see, e.g., Cowan, 2000). However, within each society, there are a number of institutions that actors must remember, which raises the question of how actors can (correctly) remember such knowledge. Additionally, research revealed that actors tend to forget or falsely remember facts and events (Macleod, 2002). Such a forgetting or false memory, however, would have serious effects for institutions (Berger & Luckmann, 1967), including effects as severe as the deinstitutionalization of institutions.

We argue that the human body serves as a storage bin for institutions, thereby contributing to their persistence. It is important to clarify at this point that we do not deny that institutions are stored in declarative parts of human memory, as discursive approaches indicate (Phillips, et al., 2004); our argument is simply that bodily practices serve as an additional storage bin. Whereas linguistic contents are stored in declarative memory, knowledge about bodily practices is stored in nondeclarative memory, more precisely as so-called procedural memory (Salmon & Butters, 1995; Squire, 2004; Squire & Zola, 1996). Procedural memory, which is also called ‘implicit memory’ (Roediger III, 1990), is described as memory concerning how to do things (Squire, 1992); for instance, it stores knowledge about how to perform actions such as riding a bike, writing or running. Actors are often not aware that they possess such knowledge and are mostly not able to verbally express it (Schacter, Chiu, & Ochsner, 1993). Research has provided evidence that procedural memory is detached from declarative memory, thereby serving as an additional storage bin for knowledge (Salmon & Butters, 1995). For instance, it has been found that even amnesic patients, i.e., humans who suffer the
inability to form new explicit memories, were able to learn new motor skills, although they could not recollect that they had learned the skill (Cohen & Squire, 1980; Heindel, Butters, & Salmon, 1988).

Procedural memory has two characteristics that may affect the persistence of institutions. First, actors are not required to consciously recollect knowledge that is stored in procedural memory. Second, knowledge that is stored in procedural memory is very persistent and difficult to change and forget (see, e.g., Conway, Cohen, & Stanhope, 1992). Regarding the first characteristic, research has shown that actors do not consciously recollect knowledge that is stored in procedural memory but that they unconsciously apply it in action (Masters, 1992; Roediger III, 1990). For instance, experienced golfers perform the putting movement without any conscious awareness about the action’s execution (Beilock, Wierenga, & Carr, 2002); moreover, they even perform worse if they try to consciously control their movement (Masters, 1992). Similarly, research showed that actors unconsciously recollect embodied social knowledge (Vaisey & Frye, forthcoming). For instance, Wacquant (2004) described in his ethnographic study in a Chicago boxing gym that he had embodied knowledge about the boxing gym’s internal structure and boxers’ belief systems; therefore, he was able to retrieve this knowledge without the need for any conscious recollection (see also Bourdieu, 1988b).

We argue that the unconscious recollection of knowledge that is stored in procedural memory has a significant effect on institutions’ persistence. Because the bodily practices through which institutions are reproduced are stored in procedural memory, actors no longer have to consciously recollect knowledge about the institutions; they quasi-automatically perform the practices that reproduce the institutions (Vaisey & Frye, forthcoming). For instance, actors who
attend dining rituals at Cambridge College may not be aware that the ritual and the actions performed during the ritual are connected with the institution of the British class system. By performing actions such as using their cutlery in a way that is specific to the British upper-class, actors contribute to the reproduction, and thus the maintenance, of the British class system (Dacin, et al., 2010). Their unconscious recollection contributes to institutions’ persistence, as actors do not actively consider alternative ways of acting (Scott, 2008); they simply behave in a way that appears natural and objective to them. Therefore, it becomes less likely that they question the institution and actively try to disrupt it (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006).

The second characteristic of knowledge that is stored in procedural memory is its high persistence. For instance, Smith and colleagues (2005) found that the remembering of motor skills is not affected by age and that actors are able to recollect motor skills even two years after the first training. Similarly, Hikosaka et al. (2002) revealed that humans’ performance on a task they learned on the same day was significantly worse than their performance on a task they learned one day ago or 16 months ago, which provides evidence for humans’ ability for the long-term retention of motor knowledge. The emphasis on the durability of embodied knowledge can also be found in the work of some sociologists. For instance, Connerton (1989) argued that the incorporation of knowledge into the human body is an important way through which societies remember and that such knowledge is very persistent. Societal knowledge, such as postures and gestures, is learned and remembered by the human body and difficult for actors to forget. Likewise, Bourdieu (2001) showed that the fundamental differences between the sexes are related to bodily actions. Women unconsciously learn female movements, postures and gestures and store this knowledge in their bodies;
moreover, he argued that this knowledge is very durable and difficult to forget, as women unconsciously remember it. Because actors do not have to consciously recollect institutions that are connected to the human body, we argue that conscious efforts to change institutions become less likely and institutional persistence increases.

Our second argument for why the human body affects the persistence of institutions is related to Bourdieu’s (1990) rationale about the connection between body and mind. He argued that forcing the body into certain postures recalls feelings and thoughts that are associated with the posture or movement (Bourdieu, 1988b, 1990). Our argument is that because bodily practices are connected with institutions, carrying out certain bodily practices may have the effect of reminding actors of institutions, i.e., thoughts about institutions unconsciously come to mind among actors; Bourdieu (1990, p. 68) therefore described the body as a “living memory pad”. We argue that the mnemonic function of the body contributes to institutional persistence. Our argumentation is depicted in figure 8.

![Figure 8: Reinforcement of institutions through the human body.](image)

The first step in the framework is institutions’ influence on bodily practices. As already argued, actors perceive institutions as ‘objective reality’ or undeniable facts (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) so that they adapt their practices towards them. For instance, Bourdieu (2001) described that although Kabyle men walk upright with
their face up to look in other men’s eyes, Kabyle women tend to lower themselves and rather look at the floor instead of their eyes. Although these different techniques of the male and female body (Mauss, 1973) appear to be negligible and accidental, Bourdieu (2001) argued that they are influenced by a society’s taken-for-granted beliefs regarding differences between the sexes and that they are important for the reproduction of the differences.

The second step of the framework is the influence of bodily practices on actors’ thinking and feeling. By conducting bodily practices, meaning systems in human memory that are related to the institution with which the bodily practice is connected are activated (Bourdieu, 1988b, 2001). We argue that through the activation of the meaning systems, the institution (unconsciously) comes to actors’ minds (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000). This assumption is based on research in social psychology, which has provided rich evidence that bodily actions influence human thinking. For instance, Brinol and Petty’s (2003) study showed that actors listening to persuasive messages with strong arguments were more convinced of the message when nodding their heads (a sign for agreement in many societies) compared to when shaking their heads (a sign for disagreement in many societies). Moreover, research also indicated that associations related to certain postures and movements are socially constructed; Chandler and Schwarz (2009) revealed that extending one’s middle finger towards people (a sign for hostility in some societies) makes them appear hostile, whereas putting one’s thumb up (a sign for approval and optimism in some societies) makes others appear more positive and likeable. Similarly, Schubert and Koole (2009) found that making a fist enhances men’s power-related self-conception, whereas the same movement has no influence on women’s power-related self-conceptions. Finally, Cohen and Leung (2009) revealed that bodily postures
influence the presence of cultural norms such as honor, particularistic norms and purity in actors’ minds. For instance, the authors found that standing in a position with their head high and chin up creates a sense of honor for Latino men, whereas they create no such sense for Latino women or for white men and women. The authors explained this finding with the higher importance of honor in Latin societies, which is, however, restricted to male persons.

The third step of the framework is the connection between human thinking and feeling and institutions. By creating thoughts and feelings that are connected with institutions, bodily practices unconsciously remind actors of the very same institutions. For instance, the Latino men in Cohen and Leung’s (2009) study are not aware that a belief in honor is activated when they are standing upright with their head held high; nevertheless, honor-related thoughts and feelings are activated, leading these men to become more likely to act according to this institution, thereby reproducing it (Giddens, 1984). Similarly, Dacin and colleagues (2010) reported that participants of Cambridge dining rituals follow the ritual’s script, although some of them initially feel uncomfortable in their role. However, the dining context, i.e., the location in a historic college ornate dining hall, the ancient language spoken at some parts of the ritual and other medieval customs, may create feelings and thoughts of supremacy and domination that are important for the reproduction of the institution of the British class system. We argue that the unconscious reminding of actors on institutions through bodily practices contributes to institutional persistence, as it reduces the risk of institutional forgetting (Berger & Luckmann, 1967) and thus renders the reproduction of institutions more likely.
6.4. Implications and conclusions

6.4.1. Implications for management and organization studies

Before discussing the implications of our paper for institutional theory, we highlight implications to the field of management and organization studies. Most importantly, our paper provides a thus far neglected perspective in the field of management and organization studies: the focus on the human body. Here we question the mainly ‘bodiless’ research in large parts of management and organization studies (Hassard, Holliday, & Willmott, 2000; Styhre, 2004). Although each member of an organization possesses a body, it has thus far not been regarded as having any significance for research. Our paper reveals that the body is not just a “laboring machine” (Kilduff, 1993, p. 21), as management theorists such as Taylor argued. By transferring insights from fields such as cognitive science and psychology in management and organization research, we propose that the body is involved in higher-level cognitive processes, such as learning and memorizing. Although these cognitive processes have received much attention from management and organization scholars (see, e.g., Anderson & Sun, 2010; Crossan, Maurer, & White, 2011; March, 1991; Marshall, Smith, & Buxton, 2009), current concepts have thus far been mostly ‘bodiless’ (for exceptions, see, e.g., Slutskaya & De Cock, 2008; Yakhlef, 2010). Based on our findings, we argue that the field of management and organization studies is well advised to overcome the Cartesian dualism still present in the discipline. By extending the focus to the human body, researchers might gain new insights into cognitive processes in organizations. Using the examples of learning in organizational and managerial decision-making, we discuss some new insights that management and organizational researchers might gain when extending their focus to bodies.
First, we argue that a focus on the human body might provide new insights to discussions about learning in organizations (see, e.g., Crossan, Lane, & White, 1999; Walsh & Ungson, 1991; Wilson, Goodman, & Cronin, 2007). If we take the example of learning new skills such as how to use technical artifacts including (tablet) personal computers or smart phones, we realize that the human body is always involved in such actions. For instance, although we have written millions of words on the keyboard, only few people can say where the letters are located on the keyboard. This (tacit) knowledge is embodied, which means that our fingers know the location of the letters. We also develop a “feeling” for mistakes in writing even without looking at the screen due solely to the action of typing not “feeling” correct. Moreover, research in psychology revealed that children are better able to remember problem-solving skills when these skills are connected with gestures or postures (Cook, et al., 2008; Goldin-Meadow, 2004; Goldin-Meadow & Beilock, 2010). A similar connection may also exist between bodily actions and organizational routines. For instance, Cohen and Bacdayan (1994) revealed that knowledge about organizational routines is stored in procedural memory, which is also the storage bin for motor actions and bodily skills. This finding indicates that it is likely that routines’ existence is strengthened if they are connected to bodily actions. Given the centrality of routines for organizations (see, e.g., Nelson & Winter, 1982), a focus on their connection with bodily actions might provide important insights for management and organization researchers.

Second, we argue that extending the research focus to the human body might also provide new insights in fields such as managerial decision-making. For instance, studies in the field of consumer research revealed that seemingly unimportant bodily postures and movements influence consumers’ behaviors such as purchasing decisions (van den Bergh, Schmitt, & Warlop, 2011) and the
evaluation of products ( Förster, 2004; Tom, Pettersen, Lau, Burton, & Cook, 1991). Whereas there is much research on managerial decision-making that analyzes the process from several perspectives (see, e.g., Hendry, 2000), the body’s influence on managerial decisions has so far been neglected. The above-mentioned studies from the field of consumer research as well as studies from social psychology (for an overview, see Barsalou, Niedenthal, Barbey, & Ruppert, 2003) indicate, however, that managerial decisions are not necessarily based on rational calculations and may in addition be influenced by managers’ bodily postures and facial expressions as they are receiving information or making a decision. This finding would offer a new perspective on managerial decision-making and would contradict the current rationalist conception.

6.4.2. Implications for new institutional theory

In addition to providing implications for the field of management and organization studies, we believe that our study also significantly contributes to discussions in new institutional theory. Although researchers in the fields of anthropology and sociology already highlighted the body’s role in the internalization of social structures (see, e.g., Bourdieu, 1977; Connerton, 1989; Freund, 1988), these ideas have so far not been considered by institutional researchers and transferred to institutional theory. Our study indicates that the human body influences human cognition and that it provides new insights into and explanations for institutional processes such as the persistence of institutions. Therefore, we argue that our study has several implications for institutional theory. First, our study has important implications for institutional theory in general. We question the taken-for-granted belief among institutional scholars – we might also call it a cognitive institution – that the human body is of no interest
6. Introducing the human body in institutional theory

to institutional processes. Instead, our paper indicates that institutional theory could benefit from a turn towards the human body and bodily actions. Similar to Phillips et al. (2004), whose study highlighted the importance of discourse and linguistic processes for institutional theory, we believe that our paper provides evidence that by neglecting the human body, institutional research loses important insights into institutional processes at the level of individual actors. However, we do not recommend replacing the linguistic perspective by a bodily perspective; although our paper indicates that the human body should be taken into account, it does not aim to replace other perspectives on institutions, such as the linguistic perspective. On the contrary, we assume that the focus on the human body might complement the linguistic perspective. For instance, we argue in our study that both declarative and nondeclarative parts of human memory are involved in the persistence of institutions. Whereas bodily actions and habits are stored in nondeclarative parts, linguistic parts are likely to be stored in declarative memory (Squire & Zola, 1996). Because storage in both parts of human memory is likely to increases institutions’ persistence, we argue that institutions that are based on language and texts as well as bodily actions may feature a higher degree of institutionalization compared to institutions that are based either on texts and language or on bodily actions.

Second, we argue that our study has particular implications for micro-level research in institutional theory. Currently, we are observing increased interest in the connections between micro- and macro-level processes among institutional scholars (see, e.g., Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Dacin, et al., 2010; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). These studies have revealed that macro-level phenomena, such as institutional logics and institutions, are reproduced by individual actors’ actions. Based on our study, we recommend that institutional researchers intensify
their consideration of the human body in future studies. For instance, Dacin et al.’s (2010) impressive study on the connection between rituals and societal institutions might benefit from an additional focus on bodily practices during rituals and their connection with societal institutions. Similar to the study by Elias (1969), a historical analysis of how bodily actions and movements during such dining rituals have changed since the initiation of the ritual might reveal even closer connections between the societal institution (the British class system) and the ritual (dining at Cambridge University).

Third, our study has implications for research on the cognitive micro-foundation of institutional theory. Whereas early institutionalists argued that new institutional theory comprises “a turn toward cognitive and cultural explanations” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 8), there have been few attempts to develop such a cognitive micro-foundation (see, e.g., DiMaggio, 1997; Vaughan, 2002). In particular, institutional scholars have devoted comparably little attention to findings from fields such as cognitive science, psychology or neuroscience (for an exception, see George, et al., 2006; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009) that have gained increased attention in management and organization studies (see, e.g., Becker, et al., 2011; Grégoire, Corbett, & McMullen, 2011; Kaplan, 2011). Our study implicates that institutional theory may benefit from a transfer of findings from such fields to the theory. For instance, although the influence of the human body on actors’ mental states has been discussed in the field of embodied cognition since the early 1990s, it has so far received no attention among institutional researchers, although the findings have significant implications for the theory. Moreover, connecting it with cognitive science and neuroscience may open institutional theory’s cognitive ‘black box’ (Zucker, 1991). Although 35 years have passed since Zucker’s (1977) study on the institutionalization of cognitive institutions, institutional theory
continues to lack a cognitive micro-foundation that explains basic processes such as how institutions become institutionalized in actors’ minds, although it is frequently argued that research at the theory’s macro-level would benefit from such insights (see, e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; George, et al., 2006). Although embodied cognition is not yet a theory but rather is a research program, we argue that the insights that institutional researchers might gain from connecting with such research are significant. Despite some promising approaches to transfer insights from fields such as social and cognitive psychology into institutional theory (see, e.g., George, et al., 2006; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009), we believe that there is still much to explore, as fields such as cognitive science have made tremendous developments in the last 30 years.

However, we do not forget that connecting with these fields of research is not without its problems. Whereas most research in the fields of cognitive psychology and cognitive science are relatively positivistic, institutional researchers mostly follow an interpretative, social constructivist approach. Although it may be difficult to combine both approaches in some cases, we argue that psychologists in particular have become more aware of social constructivism, consider cultural differences in cognition and focus on explaining how humans develop their subjective perception of reality (DiMaggio, 1997). Therefore, we argue that institutional theory, if it takes its cognitive heritage seriously (Phillips & Malhotra, 2008), could benefit significantly from connecting with cognitive science to develop a more complex and realistic perspective on human cognition.

6.4.3. Conclusions

In this paper, we have begun a ‘bodily turn’ in institutional theory, based on insights from Bourdieu’s theory of practice as well as research on embodied
cognition. We argue that a bodily perspective on micro-level institutional processes such as institutional persistence provides new insights for researchers. Obviously, this paper merely provides some first insights; much more research, particularly empirical research, must be conducted to show how the human body influences institutional processes. For instance, our focus in this paper was on institutions’ persistence; however, institutional researchers showed that institutions may also change over time (see, e.g., Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). Analyzing the human body’s role in processes of institutional change could further contribute to a ‘bodily turn’ in institutional theory and to a more comprehensive picture of micro-level processes related to institutional change. Nevertheless, we believe that this paper could mark a starting point for the discussion and provides a conceptual framework on which future studies might build.

Finally, we would like to emphasize that by discussing a ‘bodily turn’ in institutional theory, we do not intend to suggest a ‘turning away’ from other approaches such as the linguistic approach (see, e.g., Green & Li, 2011; Phillips, et al., 2004). We believe, as we describe in some parts of our paper, that the bodily perspective complements and does not replace more established perspectives such as the linguistic perspective. Therefore, we urge researchers to extend their perspective to micro-level institutional processes, taking into account both linguistic and bodily processes to develop a comprehensive theory of institutions.
7. Implications and conclusions

7.1. Implications for management and organization studies

Our aim in this thesis was to analyze the contributions of Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice to research in management and organization studies. Particularly, we focused on Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, which has so far received only little attention by management and organization scholars, as our review of the literature showed. Our analyses show that the concept of habitus has the potential to further research in the field of management and organization studies in several directions. However, in this section, we broaden our focus and discuss how Bourdieu’s concept of habitus might contribute to other discussions in the literature. Particularly, we focus on three topics: Institutional work, unethical behavior and organizational culture. Our aim is to explain in which ways the concept of habitus provides new insights into these discussions to further research.

First, we focus on the contributions of the habitus to the discussion about institutional work. Lawrence et al. (2011, p. 52) define institutional work as “the practices of individual and collective actors aimed at creating, maintaining, and disrupting institutions” (see also Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). One of the main contributions of the concept of institutional work to institutional theory was the re-conceptualization of the concept of actors. Previously, actors in institutional theory were regarded either as ‘mighty’ institutional entrepreneurs that are able to create new institutions even against the interest of others (Beckert, 1999; Hardy & Maguire, 2008) or as ‘passive victims’ of institutions, which determine actors’ actions (Hwang & Colyvas, 2011). Institutional work researchers on the one hand acknowledge that institutions exert an influence on actors, but on the other hand
emphasize that institutions’ existence depends on their reproduction by actors and that actors are not forced to reproduce them, but that they also have the possibility to create and disrupt institutions (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence, et al., 2011). Thereby, research on institutional work provides a more realistic concept of (human) actors to institutional theory.

Although the concept of institutional work mainly builds on the work of DiMaggio (1988) and Oliver (1991), researchers also draw on the work of practice theorists such as Giddens (1984) and Bourdieu (1977) (see Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). However, a closer look in the institutional work discussion shows that researchers tend to apply the thoughts from practice theories very selectively. For instance, Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) argued that actors are knowledgeable and have the potential to make changes through their actions. Moreover, they argued (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, p. 216) that institutions “are the product (intentional or otherwise) of purposive action.” This claim, however, is not fully consistent with the general ideas of practices theories such as the structuration theory or the theory of practice. For instance, although Giddens (1984) acknowledged that humans are knowledgeable actors, he nevertheless argued that much of actors’ daily actions is not purposefully and conscious, but directed by actors’ practical consciousness. Similarly, Bourdieu (1977) also assumed that actors’ are often not aware of the reasons for their actions, so that they unconsciously and unintendedly reproduce societal structures. These general ideas of practice theories are in accordance with research in the field of psychology, which found that most human actions are not directly motivated but automatized (see, e.g., Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Evans, 2008). Therefore, we criticize that the current concept of institutional work builds on an unrealistic concept of human cognition. This seriously limits the
explanatory power of the concept of institutional work, since actors’ actions cannot be adequately explained. To overcome this unrealistic conception and to improve the explanatory power, we argue that institutional work would benefit from a more intensive dealing with Bourdieu’s concept of habitus. The habitus might offer insights into the question under which circumstances actors tend to disrupt, maintain or create institutions. For instance, Battilana (2006), building on Bourdieu’s concepts of field and capital, argued that actors who are higher in the organizational hierarchy are more likely to conduct organizational change, i.e., the disruption of institutions, than actors who are lower in the hierarchy. Although Battilana’s approach is fruitful to enhance the explanatory and predictive power of the concept of institutional work, we argue that the hypothesis would be different if we take in account Bourdieu’s concept of habitus. Battilana correctly argued that actors’ with a high amount of capital are more powerful than actors with low amount of capital, so that they are more likely to be able to change institutions. However, Bourdieu (1988a, 1998) argued that actors, who possess high amounts of capital, are likely to engage in institutional maintenance, since it is their interest to preserve the current state and because they perceive the current state to be ‘natural’. Actors with lower amounts of capital, however, are likely and to engage in institutional disruption, since they are interested in improving their position in the field, which means that they have to change the field’s structure to devaluate the capital possessed by dominant actors. However, actors will only engage in institutional disruption if actors perceive that the social order is not natural and ‘objective’, but just a social construction (Bourdieu, 1998). This description indicates the importance of the habitus in such processes of institutional work. Actors’ perception of the social reality, which is influenced by the cognitive
schemata internalized in their habitus, influences whether actors engage in the disruption or maintenance of institutions.

Second, the concept of habitus might contribute to discussions about morality and ethical behavior in organizations (see, e.g., Kaptein, 2011; Moore, Detert, Trevino, Baker, & Mayer, 2012; Schwartz, 2001; Schweitzer, Ordóñez, & Douma, 2004; Vaughan, 1999). Although many organizations voluntarily and involuntarily introduced codes of conduct to guide their employees’ and managers’ behavior and to reduce the risk of opportunism and other kinds of unethical behavior (Erwin, 2011; Hsieh, 2006), there are still reports of unethical behavior such as fraud (Sen, 2007), corruption (Homann, 1997) and environmental misbehavior (Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006). Since this misconduct is costly for organizations and society, it is of particular importance to reduce its occurrence. However, it is so far unclear what causes misconduct. Research found that factors such as competitive pressure (Kulik, O'Fallon, & Salimath, 2008), incentive systems (Schweitzer, et al., 2004) and leadership behavior (Mayer, Aquino, Greenbaum, & Kuenzi, 2012) are antecedents of unethical behavior in organizations. However, recently researchers argued that actors’ moral beliefs, which are likely to influence their behavior, are unconsciously held cognitive structures that enable actors to decide without the need for any conscious considerations whether practices are morally justified or not; therefore, moral judgment is not longer regarded as some kind of a (conscious) reasoning process, but as taking on the form of an (unconscious) intuition (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001). For instance, Vaisey (2009) found that actors cannot articulate principles that guide their moral judgment, although their moral behavior over time proofs to be consistent. The author argued that this finding provides evidence that unconscious cognitive schemata influence actors’ moral judgment and that
such schemata do barely change over time. These findings bear resemblance to Bourdieu’s concept of habitus. Indeed, some sociologist already drew on the concept of habitus to explain actors’ moral judgments (Ignatow, 2009; Vaisey, 2009). We also argue that the concept of habitus might provide new insights into discussions about unethical behavior in organizations. By introducing the habitus in such discussion, we might pinpoint to the importance of unconscious processes. We argue that actors’ decisions about how to behave in a situation are influenced by the cognitive schemata that are incorporated in their habitus. These cognitive schemata were built over the course of their (childhood) socialization and are relatively stable (Bourdieu, 1977). Actors are not aware that they possess the schemata and that their actions are often guided by them (Evans, 2008). Therefore, unethical behavior is unlikely to be a spontaneous decision by actors; they have rather a certain disposition towards such unethical behavior, which is unlikely to change over time.

Third, we argue that the concept of habitus might provide a more realistic concept of culture in management and organization studies. Culture, both on the level of organizations (see, e.g., Hatch, 1993; Hatch & Zilber, 2012; Schein, 1985; Trice & Beyer, 1984) and nation states (see, e.g., Hofstede, 1980; House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004; Steensma, Marino, Weaver, & Dickson, 2000), has become an important concepts in management and organization research. Moreover, culture is also one of the cornerstones of institutional theory (Scott, 2008). However, despite the increasing interest in culture since the 1980s, a close look in the literature shows that the concept of culture still needs further development. Management and organization researchers tended to regard culture as being uniform, constraining actors actions and providing actors with ultimate ends and values towards which actions are directed (Aten, Howard-Grenville, &
Ventresca, 2012; Swidler, 1986; Weber & Dacin, 2011). This approach towards culture has recently shifted, as researchers applied Swidler’s (1986) ‘tool-kit’ concept of culture (Weber & Dacin, 2011). According to Swidler (1986), culture influences actors’ actions by offering them a ‘tool kit’ of habits, skills and styles from which actors can unconsciously choose. Culture is not fully internalized by actors, since that would be too cognitively costly, but it takes on the form of heuristics. Although Swidler’s ‘tool kit’ approach has contributed to combining organizational culture research with research in the cognitive science to provide a more realistic concept of culture, we argue that Bourdieu’s concept of habitus has some particular strengths that have the potential to further research on culture in management and organization studies (Lizardo & Strand, 2010). In contrast to the ‘tool kit’ approach, Bourdieu (1990) has a clear concept about human cognition, which provides a more fully account of how culture is represented in human mind (Lizardo & Strand, 2010). Although Swidler’s (1986, p. 275) ‘tool kit’ approach implicitly acknowledged that culture is a cognitive concept, she did not offer any explicit cognitive approach. In contrast, Bourdieu’s concept of habitus provides an elaborated concept of human cognition that is consistent with findings in the fields of cultural psychology (Hong, et al., 2000) and anthropology (Tomasello, et al., 1993). Therefore, while Swidler’s (1986) ‘tool kit’ concept offers a valuable approach to re-conceptualize culture in management and organization studies, Bourdieu’s concept of habitus additionally provides researchers with more detailed explanations about how culture is represented in human minds (Lizardo & Strand, 2010). This cognitive concept about culture is important to further research on culture in management and organization studies, since it provides a more realistic account of culture that enables researchers not only to describe but also to explain human cultural actions, with is difficult in the current context.
Moreover, Bourdieu’s concept provides a new approach towards (cultural) socialization. For instance, previous studies on actors’ socialization to organizational culture mainly focused on explicit socialization mechanisms such as formal training (Chatman, 1991). Although Bourdieu acknowledged that formal socialization mechanisms might play a significant role in actors’ socialization, he argued that informal and implicit socialization mechanisms such as imitative learning play a much greater role (Bourdieu, 1977). This claim is supported by research in cultural anthropology (Tomasello, 2001; Tomasello, et al., 1993), but has received little attention in management and organization research so far (for an exception, see Sieweke, forthcoming-a).

Summarizing, there are several discussions in the literature to which the concept of habitus might add a new perspective. The three discussions selected in this paragraph are just examples to pinpoint the overall potential of the concept of habitus. We believe that the particular strength of Bourdieu’s concept of habitus is that it might, on the one hand, connect the micro with the macro-level of social analysis and, on the other hand, that it might enrich the micro-perspective with a more realistic concept of human cognition, which is missing in several discussions in the field of management and organization studies. However, we do not argue that the concept of habitus is the solution for all problems, but it might be a small piece to further research in the field of management and organization studies.

7.2. Implications for management practice

In the current discussion about the conflict between scientific rigor and practical relevance in the field of management and organization studies (see, e.g., Daft & Lewin, 2008; Kieser & Nicolai, 2005; Palmer, Dick, & Freiburger, 2009), it is frequently argued that besides their contribution to research, studies should also
matter to (managerial) practice and should offer practitioners valuable insights into relevant topics (see, e.g., Hambrick, 2007; Lorsch, 2009). Although we admit that practical relevance is an important aim for academics, we nevertheless argue that (1) this thesis has no direct implications for management practice and (2) that this lack of practical implications is not a serious limitation of the thesis. Regarding the first point, we believe that our study has no direct implications for managers or other practitioners, since the thesis was rather concerned with theory development than with (empirically) analyzing questions that matter to practitioners. For instance, neither the review of the literature regarding Bourdieu’s application in the field of management and organization studies nor the studies about the connection between Bourdieu’s theory of practice and institutional theory investigate topics that are normally of interest for practitioners or that help managers to make decisions such as how to increase organization’s effectiveness and/or efficiency. While some implications might be derived from the topic of this thesis (Sieweke, forthcoming-b), we admit that they are – probably – of little interest for practitioners. Coming to the second point, we argue, however, that this neglect of practical relevance is no serious limitation of our study. Nicolai and Seidl (2010) argued that a direct transfer of knowledge from management science to management practice is often impossible, since practitioners often do not take into account the theoretical context in which the knowledge is embedded. This is particularly the case for so-called conceptual knowledge, i.e., knowledge that is related to complex causal relationships. Such knowledge is often difficult to apply in practical contexts, since it is related to a scientific theory and to the theory’s basic assumptions. If this context is not considered by practitioners, the knowledge is of very little relevance for them. Based on this rationale, we argue that the relevance of scientific knowledge for
managerial practice is in many cases questionable. Referring to Luhmann’s social system theory, Kieser and Leiner (2009) argued that social systems such as management science and practice can only irritate or provoke each other; however, a direct transfer of communication elements, in this case knowledge, from one system into the other is not possible. Therefore, we argue that presenting no direct implications for management practice is no serious limitation, but can be explained by the fact that management science and practice are two different social systems (Kieser & Leiner, 2009; Nicolai & Seidl, 2010). Moreover, we argue that researchers’ practical implications often take on the form of a mere ceremony or legitimizing façade. If we take Kieser and Leiner’s (2009) argument serious, we might also question the “direct” transfer of knowledge from the field of management and organization studies to managerial practice. Additionally, Bourdieu frequently criticized sociologists for their “intellectual bias” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 39), which means that they do not regard the social world from the perspective of those persons that are involved in the social interactions, but from an intellectualist perspective, which might have the effect that researchers do not understand the “logic of practice”, i.e., the logic actors apply in practice. Splitter and Seidl (2011) transferred this argument of Bourdieu to the context of management and organization studies; they argued that this “scholastic ethnocentrism” (Splitter & Seidl, 2011, p. 106) might be a serious problem when researchers try to transfer their findings to managerial practice. Although there are ways to overcome this problem (e.g., using the method of participant observation, see Splitter & Seidl, 2011), It still limits the transferability of findings from research to managerial practice.

In sum, we refrain from giving practical implications based on the findings of our thesis, since it was neither the aim of our study to make any significant
contribution to managerial practice nor do we think that scholars are able to give (valuable) recommendations to practitioners.

7.3. Limitations and future research

Despite its contributions to the literature, the thesis has several limitations. First, in large parts, the rationale in the thesis does not build on primary empirical data, but is conceptual. This is particularly the case for the chapters 5 and 6. For instance, although the rationale that mimesis plays a significant role in processes of institutionalization builds on empirical studies in the fields of psychology, anthropology and neuroscience, we have no data to provide direct empirical evidence that institutions are transmitted through mimetic processes. Similar problems concern our argument regarding the influence of the human body in institutional processes such as the persistence of institutions. Again, we build our rationale on empirical studies that were conducted in other fields of research, without providing direct empirical evidence. Since both conceptual arguments are so far not supported by empirical data, we argue that they have currently the status of propositions. This limitation can be overcome by future research that tests the propositions. We particularly recommend testing the conceptual arguments in (laboratory) experiments. Experiments have at least two specific advantages compared to, for instance, surveys: First, since in experiments only one factor (independent variable) is systematically varied, holding all other factors equal, a change in the dependent variable can be attributed to the variation in the independent variable (causality). Second, since subjects are randomly assigned to either a control or an experimental group, the problem of endogeneity is reduced (see, e.g., Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003).
Although experiments had some popularity in early stages of the development of institutional theory (see Zucker, 1977), this research method has received significantly less attention recently. However, we argue that experiments are particularly appropriate for analyzing the theoretical arguments in this thesis for two reasons: First, since we assume that most processes take place on an unconscious level, it is difficult to interview or survey actors. For instance, actors often behave in a certain way without being consciously aware of the reasons for their actions (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999), which indicates that they also cannot properly state these reasons in interviews or surveys. Second, interviews or surveys might influence actors, thereby leading them in a certain direction, so that the findings might be biased.

An experiment that analyzes the influence of mimesis on institutionalization might be construed similarly to that applied by Zucker (1977) in her study of institutionalization processes. In differences to her study, where institutions were transmitted verbally, we suggest to analyze whether subjects mimic observed actions, even in cases where the observed actions do not represent the most efficient and/or effective way of achieving a goal, which might be interpreted as a sign for an institution (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Similar to Zucker (1977), we suggest systematically varying the context in which the action is observed: first, we might use a non-organizational, non-formal context. The second context might be an organizational one, which is non-formal. Third, we might use a formal organizational context. By systematically varying the context, we might analyze (1) whether institutions might be transmitted through mimesis and (2) whether the context influences subjects’ mimicking. In a similar experiment, we might also test the proclaimed influence of the human body on institutional persistence. For instance, in a first experiment, subjects might listen to a verbal instruction about
how to conduct a specific practice, which should fulfill the above mentioned criteria of institutions. After some days, we might test how well the subjects can recollect verbal instructions and follow the institution. In a second experiment, subjects do not listen to verbal instructions but are bodily shown how to conduct the very same practice. Again, recollection is tested some days later. Finally, in a third experiment, we might combine verbal instructions with bodily actions and again test the recollection. It would be interesting to see, whether subjects that additionally perform bodily actions more accurately perform the practice than subjects that have only listened to verbal instructions. Moreover, the third experiment would control whether persistence is higher in case of a combination of verbal instructions and bodily practices.

However, (laboratory) experiments are often criticized for their low external validity, which means that the findings are limited in their generalizability to non-laboratory contexts (Scandura & Williams, 2000). This problem might be overcome by triangulating findings from experimental studies with those obtained from other research methods such as surveys or interviews. However, in our case, we argue that ethnographic studies are particularly well-suited to test our propositions about the role of mimesis in processes of institutionalization and regarding the influence of the human body in institutional processes. Such ethnographic studies could follow examples such as that of Wacquant (2004), who found in his ethnographic study in a Chicago boxing gym that over time actors’ habitus adapts to new social fields. Another good example is Michel (2011), whose ethnographic study in two investment banks revealed that the banks’ controls target the bankers bodies. Because mimesis and the influence of the human body both take place mostly on an unconscious level, we argue researchers have to make direct experience themselves in order to get insights into the
7. Implications and conclusions

processes. Regarding the context in which such ethnographic studies should be conducted, we recommend two particular settings: In the first setting, the body shall obviously play an important role. For instance, in military organizations, the body has always been one of the most important objects. In order to discipline soldiers, military organizations always tended to punish their bodies (Foucault, 1979), which provides evidence for the central role of the human body in the organization. A different context, in which the bodies influence is also obvious, is sports. In most sports, the body is responsible for goal achievement and athletes try to enhance the body’s performance. In both settings, researchers might observe and experience how their body is formed and how the social field inscribes in their bodies (Bourdieu, 1988b). For instance, in military organizations, researchers might experience how their postures, gestures and movements change after some days and how a control of the body is simultaneously also a control of the mind (Foucault, 1979). In the second context, in which researchers might analyze mimesis and the influence of the human body on institutional processes, the body should be less ‘visible’. For instance, although investment bankers have bodies – and although these bodies matter for their organizations – very few researchers have devoted interest into this research objects in that particular context. A reason might be that it is still believed that knowledge workers do not need their bodies or that their bodies do not matter. However, even in knowledge intensive services firms, workers’ bodies are of particular importance (Michel, 2011). By analyzing the body’s role in such contexts, researchers might get more insights into the relationship between body and mind in organizations and might get more insights into the role of mimesis in processes of institutionalization as well as in the role of the human body in institutional processes. Moreover, these findings are important to answer the question whether the findings from “body
centric” organizations (e.g., army, sports organizations etc.) can be generalized to “non-body centric” organizations such as knowledge-intensive service firms.

A second limitation of this thesis concerns its focus on Bourdieu’s concept of habitus. As argued in chapter 2, Bourdieu built his theory around the three contexts field, capital and habitus to overcome dualisms such as micro-macro and structure-agency. In this thesis, however, we devoted much interest in the habitus, while the role of fields and capital have been almost completely been neglected. Although we justified the choice of this narrow research focus in the introduction, we nevertheless have to admit that it limits the findings of our study. The reason is that the concepts of field, capital and habitus are intertwined, as Bourdieu frequently argued (see, e.g., Bourdieu, 1990; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). For instance, actors’ habitus are influenced by social fields in which actors are involved as well as by the positions they occupy within the fields, which depend on actors’ amount of capital. Separating Bourdieu’s theoretical triad might have the effect of ignoring the connectedness as well as the complexity of human life as predicted by Bourdieu’s theory (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008). However, we argue that limitations caused by our focus on the concept habitus are not serious for two reasons: First, although we devoted more interest in the concept of habitus, our studies did not completely ignore the concepts of capital and field. For instance, we acknowledged that the cognitive schemata that actor’s internalize during their socialization depend on the field in which they are located, thereby taking into account the field dependence of the habitus. Moreover, although our analyses concentrated on the organizational context, Bourdieu (2005) argued that organizations can also be classified as fields, so that we implicitly always take into account the connectedness between field and habitus. Second, we argue that our focus on a single concept limits our findings only to a minor extend, since our
goal was not to analyze a particular empirical case or data set based on Bourdieu’s theory of practice or to test his theory in the context of organizations, but to analyze the theory’s contribution to research in management and organization studies. In our thesis, we showed how single concepts of Bourdieu’s theory of practice, particularly the concept of habitus, provide new insights in and perspectives on well-researched topics, thereby contributing to the development of the field of management and organization studies. Since these contributions rather concern the development of management and organization theories than providing new empirical findings, we argue that the neglecting of the concepts of capital and field has no serious influence on the presented conceptual findings.

7.4. Conclusions

Although the thesis highlighted some contributions of Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice, particularly his concept of habitus, to research in the field of management and organization studies, it is important to clarify that Bourdieu, of course, does not solve all problems. Like any other (social) theory, Bourdieu’s theory of practice has weaknesses and problems that limit the theory’s applicability. These limits have to be taken into account when applying Bourdieu’s theory, particularly in empirical contexts.

Moreover, it is also important to clarify that bringing Bourdieu’s theory into a new field is not a contribution for itself. Researchers who apply Bourdieu’s theory have to reflect whether the theory is appropriate to explain a certain phenomena or not. It would be a serious mistake to create a Bourdieusian ‘theory fashion’, i.e., applying the theory because it is currently much liked by reviewers, editors or the scientific community in general. Such fashions, although common in many sciences including the field of management and organizational studies (Bort &
Kieser, 2011), bear the risk of uncritically applying an inappropriate theory to explain an empirical phenomena. In the worst case, researchers apply a theory they are not familiar with, just to impress reviewers and editors alike. This might result in misinterpretations or in a high number of ceremonial citations to a theory, without testing the theory’s predictions in empirical research. Therefore, we urge researchers to apply Bourdieus’s theory of practice only when the theory might add new insights or explanations into empirical observations.
8. References


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8. References


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8. References


